Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 22, 1943, 2:30 p.m.

secret

1. Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943
(C.C.S. 168)²

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff which Admiral King explained with the aid of a map of the Pacific theater.

General Arnold, in reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, said that the theoretical radius of action of the B–29 and B–32 was 1,600 miles. This would be sufficient for the bombardment of Tokyo from the Nanchang area. The best bases for the bombardment of Japan were in the Maritime Province where there were known to be twenty-five airfields. No details, however, were available regarding their condition.

The Committee:

Took note of the proposals of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for the conduct of the war in the Pacific theater in 1943, as set out in C.C.S. 168.

2. Press Communiqué

(Previous reference C.C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 4)³

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note that the President and Prime Minister were themselves preparing the communiqué⁴ for issue to the press at the conclusion of the Conference, and that it would not, therefore, be necessary for them to submit a draft.

3. Continental Operations in 1943
(C.C.S. 167)⁵

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a report by the British Joint Planning Staff on Continental operations in 1943, C.C.S. 167.

Sir Alan Brooke said that paragraph 2 (c) was somewhat misleading in its present form since there could, in fact, be no half-way house between the limited operations described in (a) and (b) of the paragraph and return to the Continent in full. He proposed that subparagraph (c) should, therefore, be amended to read, “Return to the Continent to take advantage of German disintegration.”

The policy which the British Chiefs of Staff recommended was contained in paragraph 19 of the paper.

The provision of additional airborne forces from the U. S. would be essential since Husky would use up all British resources in this respect.

Lord Louis Mountbatten agreed and emphasized the need for airborne forces to turn the beach defenses. Without these and armored forces to follow up, the assault on the northern coast of France was, in his opinion, quite impracticable. He drew attention to the note at the end of paragraph 5 relating to armored landing craft.

The Committee:

Agreed to defer final acceptance of the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff pending further study.

4. Organization of Command, Control, Planning and Training for Cross-Channel Operations
(C.C.S. 169)⁶

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a note by the Combined Staffs, C.C.S. 169.

Sir Alan Brooke thought that it would be premature to designate a Supreme Commander for large-scale operations on the Continent at present in view of the limited operations which could be carried out with available resources in 1943. A special staff was, however, necessary for cross-channel operations and should, he thought, be set up without delay.

General Marshall agreed that a Supreme Commander would make a top-heavy organization at present, but thought that it was desirable to put a special staff under a selected Chief of Staff of sufficient standing; such an officer would perhaps suffice for the command of limited operations during the summer. This special staff could work out their plans on the basis of certain forces being available, even though they were not in actual control of the troops themselves.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the staff which was at present working on cross-channel operations belonged to various Commanders in the United Kingdom. It would be necessary to take them away from their present Commanders and set them up independently.

The Committee:

(a) Accepted the proposals contained in C.C.S. 169, except for the immediate appointment of a Supreme Commander.

(b) Agreed that a Supreme Commander will ultimately be necessary for the reentry to the Continent, but that he should not be appointed at the present time.

(c) Agreed that a British Chief of Staff, together with an independent U. S.-British staff should be appointed at once for the control, planning and training of cross-channel operations in 1943.

(d) Invited the British Chiefs of Staff to prepare for their approval a draft directive to govern the planning and conduct of cross-channel operations in 1943 in accordance with the decisions to be reached on C.C.S. 167.

(e) Agreed that the above directive should make provision for a return to the Continent with the forces that will be available for this purpose in the United Kingdom month by month.

5. Landing Craft

Lord Louis Mountbatten gave an account of the British experiences in building up an Assault Fleet. He described how the L.C.I. (L) had been produced and explained the dislocation which had been caused by Torch. For that operation it had been necessary to stop the entry and training of British crews so that U.S. combat teams could have the use of the training center at Inveraray. As a result, a situation had arisen in which the British were temporarily unable to man all the landing craft at their disposal. The position was now in hand, and there would be no difficulty in manning all the landing craft expected by next August.

He drew attention to the shortage of spare parts which had recently forced him to consider the cannibalization of 25% of the landing craft at his disposal. This position, according to Admiral Cooke, also was now improving; but he emphasized the very great importance of providing ample spares parallel with the production of craft.

He described the organization of the British Assault Fleets. Broadly speaking, there were local forces organized for operations in home waters, western and eastern Mediterranean, and India. Besides these local forces, there was an overseas Assault Force with a lift of 30,000 personnel, 3,300 vehicles and 200 tanks. The purpose of this Force was to reinforce the local Assault Fleet in whichever theater might be the center of active operations. This Force would be ready to sail for the Mediterranean by March 15th, to take part in Husky.

He described three important lessons of amphibious operations which had so far emerged:

(a) For any amphibious campaign involving assaults on strongly defended coasts held by a determined enemy, it is essential that the landing ships and craft shall be organized well in advance into proper assault fleets. These must have a coherence and degree of permanence comparable to that of any first-line fighting formation. Discipline, training, and tactical flexibility are just as necessary for assault fleets as for naval, military and air combat formations. This was the overriding lesson of Dieppe.

(b) No combined operation can be carried out with reasonable hope of success without adequate beach reconnaissance beforehand. He had now organized specially trained beach reconnaissance parties which had already done most valuable work.

(c) Adequate fire support for the assault against a strongly defended coast was most essential. A scale of 100 guns (48 self-propelled in L.C.T. and 52 in the new gun craft to be known as L.C.G.) for each assault brigade had been recommended. He handed around drawings of a type of amphibious close support vessel which had been designed for this purpose. These special assault craft were primarily intended for Roundup , and none could be ready in time for Husky .

He then handed around a table^* showing the estimated availability of British and American built landing ships and craft. Referring to this table, he pointed out that the main British deficiencies by next August would be in L.S.T. and L.C.I. (L). He urged most strongly that allocations to the British of both these types should be increased to make up these deficiencies. He confirmed that provisions had already been made for manning the full number of all types of craft which had been asked for by next August together with 50 percent spare crews.

General Somervell confirmed that, so far as could be foreseen, sufficient landing craft could be made available for both the U. S. and British portions of Husky as now planned.

Admiral King drew attention to the great diversity of types of British built ships and craft. He asked whether a greater degree of standardization would not be possible. In reply Lord Louis Mountbatten explained that different types had been developed independently by the two navies; improvements had been made as a result of experience. Some of those shown in the table were now out of date.

Admiral Cooke expressed the view that the production of landing craft would be at least as great as the ability of the U. S. and British Navies to man them. He explained the heavy demand for the Pacific where rate of wastage was high and maintenance facilities extremely limited. He confirmed the shortage of spare engines. Spares had been used to fit up new hulls which had come out of production in large numbers.

He explained that the original split of L.S.T. for Roundup, as between U. S. and British, had been in the proportion of 125 to be manned by the U. S. and 75 by the British. Allocations now proposed by the U. S. Navy Department gave a higher proportion to the British, half of the 168 proposed for the European Theater going to the British and half to the U. S.; 117 of these craft would be allocated to the Pacific. He then raised the question of L.C.A., of which the U. S. had none at all. He understood that 96 of these craft were required for the British portion of Husky, and he thought that a similar number would be required for the U. S. portion as well.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the provision of these craft would need careful examination. It might be found best to send the drawings to America so that they could be built in U. S. yards.

The Committee:

(a) Agreed that the question should be reviewed by July 1, 1943, whether the number of L.S.T. (2) to be allocated to the British from the total U. S. production of 390 can be raised from the figure of 120 now proposed by the U. S. Navy Department to 150 which was the full British requirement.

(b) Took note that the U. S. Navy Department would investigate whether the follow-up order for 44 L.C.I. (L) can be restored and half of this production allocated to the British.

(c) Took note that the greatest needs of the British Combined Operations Naval Command were for:

(1) L.C.M. (3), of which 646 had been asked for by the British by August 1, 1943, but the detailed allocation of which was not yet available.

(2) Scripps-Ford conversion engines for L.C.A., of which a large additional number would be needed if L.C.A. were built in the United Kingdom for the U. S.

(3) Spare parts, as a matter of great urgency, for landing craft in the United Kingdom, to be supplied in the first instance on the requisitions already submitted to the U. S. Navy Department by Comamphoreu.

6. System of Command for Combined U. S. and British Operations
(C.C.S. 75/3)⁷

(Previous reference: C.C.S. 45th Meeting, Item 1)

General Marshall said that the intention of the paper under consideration was to lay down general principles for the organization of command where U. S. and British forces were engaged in combined operations under a Supreme Commander. The systems of command employed by the two nations for their own forces differed fundamentally. He recalled that when Field Marshal Wavell had been suddenly called upon to form a combined headquarters at short notice in the Southwest Pacific he had had considerable difficulties in arranging satisfactorily the general organization of his command. Similar cases might occur in the future, and it would be of great assistance to have guiding principles agreed beforehand.

Discussion followed on the precise channels for the communication of orders which would be used in the organization shown in the diagram attached to the paper.

Admiral King said that in considering the chain of command shown in the diagram, it must be remembered that all Subordinate Commanders act as the agents of the Supreme Commander. The authority of Task Force Commanders was complete in respect of their own task forces. It would not be necessary, however, for the Naval Commander always to transmit orders affecting naval forces through the Supreme Commander, and the Task Force Commander to the naval component of the task force. He would be an officer of experience and discretion and would avoid issuing orders which would encroach upon the authority of Task Force Commanders. The channels were not rigid. Taking the example of Husky, he explained that the Air Commander with General Eisenhower would have two main functions apart from advising the Supreme Commander. He would arrange for the air bombardment required to soften the defenses of the island, and command the air forces allotted to this task. He would also answer calls for assistance from the task forces. There would be no objection to such calls being passed direct from the Air Commanders in the task forces to the Air Commander at the main headquarters.

The Committee:

Accepted the basic system of unified command in combined U. S. British operations as set out in C.C.S. 75/3.

2. For text of C.C.S. 168, January 22, 1943, memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff entitled “Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943”, see Morton, Appendix H, p. 627.
3. Ante, p. 640.
4. For text of the Communiqué by the President and the Prime Minister, issued to the press on January 26, 1943, see post, p. 847.
5. Post, p. 785.
6. C.C.S. 169, January 22, 1943, post, p. 789.
7. Annex. [Footnote in the source text. Annex not printed.]
7. C.C.S. 75/3, October 24, 1942, post, p. 733.