J. C. S. Files
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
1. Conduct of the War in
1943
(C.C.S. 155)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a draft memorandum prepared as a result of their meeting the previous day.2 Certain amendments were suggested and agreed.
The Committee:
Approved the memorandum as amended.3
[Page 638]2. Suggested Procedure for
Dealing With the Agenda of the Conference
(C.C.S. 155/1)4
The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a note, prepared by the Combined Staffs suggesting the procedure to be followed for dealing with the major questions on the agreed Agenda of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 140).5 Certain alterations were suggested to the tentative program of meetings set out in the annex to these minutes.
The Committee:
Approved the suggested procedure subject to the Annex being revised as agreed at their meeting.6
3. Strategic Responsibility and Command Set Up for Dakar French West Africa
Admiral King said that no question of land forces was involved in West Africa. Admiral Glassford had proposed that the West African Coast from Cape Bojador to the Western boundary of Sierra Leone should be placed under French naval command.7 The French naval forces should be responsible for such operations off shore as might be necessary in that area. He understood that M. Boisson and Admiral Collinet were both agreeable to this suggestion.
The proposed arrangement would include the air cover for offshore operations. The difficulty would be the lack of equipment of the French air forces. He suggested that to overcome this difficulty we should set out to familiarize the French with modern aircraft. To do this it would be necessary to give them up to date equipment and adequate training and to include them, so far as possible, in actual operations. He said that the West African coast from Cape Bojador southwards was a British sphere, and his proposal was that the French in their area should work under Admiral Pegram. We should have to decide whether to deal with the French as full allies or whether it would be necessary to exercise some degree of control over them.
Sir Dudley Pound said that he had formed the impression that Admiral Collinet was all out to help and that the arrangement which Admiral Glassford proposed was based on the assumption that the French would fully cooperate.
Sir Charles Portal said that he was in general agreement with the suggestions put forward by Admiral King.
It was essential that all coastal air operations in West Africa should be coordinated by the British Air Commander who would be working [Page 639] in cooperation with the British Naval Commander. He was fully alive to the importance of giving the French airmen at Dakar some equipment to enable them immediately to take a share in air operations in the proposed French sub-area. For this purpose he proposed, subject to the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to allot them 2 Sunderland Flying Boats and 4 Hudson patrol bombers which, to begin with, would be operated by British crews with the more experienced French crews alongside them until they were fit to take over themselves.
He was less anxious about the reliability of the French than about their technical ability and training. So far, they had neither the equipment, training or experience of coastal air operations in modern war. He proposed, therefore, that the less experienced French air crews, together with the appropriate maintenance personnel, should be withdrawn to British training establishments, with the object of forming them, if they turned out to be any good and as soon as the equipment could be made available into two squadrons, one of Catalinas and one of Wellington patrol bombers. He agreed that the equipment of these coastal squadrons in West Africa should be a British responsibility-, but pointed out that owing to present shortage of suitable aircraft and the necessity for adequate training of crews, the formation of the proposed two squadrons was not likely to be practicable in the immediate future.
General Arnold said that the United States concept was gradually to draw in French air force personnel as they became trained and equipped for operational work over a period of about a year. He agreed that in French West Africa this would be a British responsibility.
General Marshall said that he was in favor of proceeding with a definite program for reequipping the French forces. This would, of course, imply French acceptance of our organization and training methods, and would inevitably delay the progress of equipping our own forces. He thought, however, that we should do the thing wholeheartedly; and he was prepared, subject to General Eisenhower’s views, to modify the United States program in order to equip French forces up to a strength of 250,000. All the equipment provided for the French would be at the expense of United States troops forming in America. He proposed to make use of French shipping to bring it over.
General Somervell said that General Giraud had agreed to turn over 160,000 tons of French shipping to the Allied pool. Out of this tonnage General Giraud proposed that 85,000 tons should be allocated to meet French civil requirements, leaving 75,000 tons for shipping equipment for the French forces. General Somervell calculated that this would enable them to be equipped at the rate of about [Page 640] one division a month. No allowance was made in this program for the carriage of coal and oil which was at present being shipped by the British.
The Committee:
Agreed:
- (a)
- That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador (Rio de Oro) southward shall be an area under command of a British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval forces.
- (b)
- That subject to (a), a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command.
- (c)
- That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as equipment and training permit.
4. Publication of Results of the Conference
Sir Alan Brooke drew the attention of the Committee to the decision which the President and the Prime Minister had made at their meeting the previous day that:
- (a)
- The results of this conference should be communicated to Stalin in the form of a document setting out our intentions for 1943.8
- (b)
- A communiqué should be prepared for issue to the Press when the conference is finished.9
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that a small subcommittee should be appointed to draft a suitable document for approval by the Committee at the end of the conference.
The Committee:
Agreed:
To appoint a subcommittee for this purpose consisting of:
- United States Representatives:
- Brigadier General Hull
- Colonel Smart
- Commander Libby
- British Representatives:
- Lt. General Ismay
- Major General Kennedy
- Air Vice Marshal Slessor
- C.C.S. 155, January 18, 1943, post, p. 760.↩
- C.C.S. 155/1, January 19, 1943, post, p. 774.↩
- The document under reference is presumably C.C.S. 156, January 18, 1943, “Suggested Procedure for Dealing with Agenda of the Conference,” post, p. 762.↩
- C.C.S. 140, January 8, 1943, Note by the Secretaries, post, p. 752.↩
- For the annex to minutes of the meeting, see post, p. 641.↩
- Glassford headed a mission to Dakar, French West Africa, at the end of 1942 to arrange for the Allied use of air and naval bases there; see Howe, p. 271.↩
- For draft of the telegram prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see post, p. 782.↩
- For the draft communiqué, presumably prepared by Roosevelt and Churchill and their aides on the evening of January 23, 1943, see post, p. 842.↩