Editorial Note

The information set forth above regarding the circumstances of the meeting has been derived from the Log (ante, p. 526) which indicates that the main subject of discussion was shipping. This is supported by Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 91–92), who appears to have dined with the group but not to have participated in the discussions that followed. Kennedy, Business of War, p. 284, suggests that the President and the Prime Minister may have discussed the deadlock in the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting regarding the strategy to be pursued in the Pacific in 1943. Churchill’s message to the War Cabinet on January 18, 1943 (Hinge of Fate, pp. 676–677), reviewing the course of the conference up to that time, indicates that it was at this meeting that the Prime Minister broached the matter of designating Alexander as Eisenhower’s Deputy.

At the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on the morning of January 18, 1943, Admiral King recounted as follows a portion of his conversation with the Prime Minister on the previous evening: [Page 613]

“Admiral King, recounting his conversation with the Prime Minister the previous evening, said that Mr. Churchill had committed himself to undertaking Anakim in 1943 and that he was agreeable to operation Ravenous , concerning which there still remains the question of Chinese cooperation. They had thoroughly discussed the submarine situation and Mr. Churchill appeared agreeable to giving highest priority to bombing the submarine bases, building yards, and assembly points, although he said the United States must help. The Prime Minister objected to our ‘putting the cart before the horse’ with respect to Pacific operations, and said we had refused to give the British accurate information as to our landing craft program and as to our dispositions in the Pacific. He appeared greatly concerned over our stand with respect to Pacific operations. With respect to the Burma operation, Admiral King had tried to explain to the Prime Minister his concept regarding the geographical position and manpower of China. The President was anxious to get additional airplanes to General Chennault, which could not be supplied unless the upper Burma Road is opened. Admiral King understands the purpose of Ravenous to be to open this upper Burma Road in order to improve communications to China. He feels that Chiang Kai-shek should be urged to move at once.” (J.C.S. Files)