J. C. S. Files
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
1. Antisubmarine Warfare
Sir Dudley Pound said that the four points at which the U-boats could be attacked were the factories and building yards, the operating bases, the routes to their hunting grounds, and the hunting grounds themselves. He had sent for detailed information concerning the construction bottlenecks. As regards the operating bases, the British Government had agreed to intensify air attacks on French ports which were used as bases. The only question now at issue was that of giving some warning to the French inhabitants.
Attacks on the U–boats on passage to the hunting grounds had been successful for a time and considerable damage and delay had been inflicted on them as long as the U–boats did not know when the aircraft were detecting them with their A.S.V. equipment. This equipment was used in conjunction with the Leigh light3 at night. Now, however, U–boats were fitted with listening devices which detected the A.S.V. outside the range of the light. Ten-centimeter A.S.V.’s were now being introduced, but no doubt in time the Germans would find a counter to them. Nevertheless, if we were successful even in compelling them to remain submerged in darkness, it would have the effect of making them surface in daylight to recharge batteries.
For dealing with the submarines on the hunting grounds, the two requirements were first: as much air cover as possible, and second: adequate escorts. A rough rule of thumb for the number of escorts was to have three ships with every convoy plus one for every ten ships in the convoy. A convoy of forty ships would thus have seven escorts. In practice, however, we were never able to supply this number of escorts, and as a general rule we never had more than six with any convoy. When escorting vessels had to be withdrawn for operations, there was no pool from which to replace them. We had now new commitments in the Sierra Leone convoys which had had to be restarted, and the convoys bringing oil from the Dutch West Indies to the United Kingdom and to North Africa. As a minimum sixty-five more escort vessels were required in the Atlantic alone. Before any decisions were taken on our strategy for 1943, it seemed essential to weigh carefully the requirements in escort vessels for any operations to be undertaken. Once an operation was launched and escorts were [Page 565] withdrawn from convoys, they could not be returned usually for four or five months, during which an acute shortage was felt. The only relief during such a period would be the intake from new construction.
Sir Charles Portal said that the air had proved the most effective weapon against the U–boat. The estimated German output of U–boats was twenty a month. He gave the following figures for attacks on U–boats during the last two months:
November | December | ||||
U–Boats sunk | } | by aircraft | { | 8 | 2 |
U–Boats damaged | 24 | 9 | |||
U–Boats sunk | } | by other means | { | 8 | 6 |
U–Boats damaged | 7 | 6 |
Air patrols over the U–boat routes to the hunting grounds were very costly in aircraft since it was calculated that there was only one sighting for 250 hours flying time. Nevertheless, even if a large number of U–boats were not actually destroyed by this means, aircraft patrols had a good effect in compelling U–boats to remain submerged and thereby reducing their time on the hunting grounds. A further method of attack on U–boats was the laying of mines from the air at the exits of the U–boat bases and construction yards.
General Arnold inquired whether it was not possible to use flying boats for anti-submarine work, both over the hunting grounds and on the routes to them. This would avoid the use of valuable long-range bombers.
Sir Charles Portal said that the long-range bomber was essential for work over the convoys, since flying boats, owing to their slow speed, took too long to reach them after a call for assistance. Moreover, the load of the flying boat in bombs and depth charges was less than that of the Liberator. In addition they were not processed for the 10 centimeter A.S.V. A considerable number of Catalinas were being used in spite of these disadvantages. It was estimated that the minimum requirements for the whole of the Atlantic and British Home Waters was between 120 and 135 long-range bombers. New devices were being developed to combat the German listening apparatus which detected the presence of A.S.V. aircraft.
Admiral King asked whether economy in long-range bombers could not be effected by using Catalinas for patrol work and reserving long-range bombers for emergency calls when convoys were actually attacked. The Catalina had a very long endurance and could be kept in the air for twenty-four hours if the crew was large enough to provide two watches. One advantage of the flying boat was that any sheltered water could be used for a base instead of airfields.
Sir Charles Portal said that Catalinas were being used to the maximum. A survey had been made of the West African coast and it was found that two depot ships for Catalinas would suffice on the [Page 566] northern part, but this did not cover the requirements of the Indian Ocean or the South Atlantic.
Sir Dudley Pound said that anti-submarine aircraft were essential in the area north of Freetown. The requirements in long range bombers which had been stated were an absolute minimum, even allowing for the maximum use of flying boats.
Sir Charles Portal asked whether the aircraft in the Pacific, details of which had been given at a meeting on the previous day, were available for anti-submarine work as well as local defense of the Islands themselves.
Admiral King said that fortunately the Japanese had not yet made any great use of submarines in the Pacific, and it was, therefore, possible to work with only small escorts. If the Japanese submarines became more active, aircraft would have to be used against them. The total resources available, however, were insufficient for security everywhere. When Alaska was threatened, forces had to be sent up from all quarters. The acute shortage of escort vessels was of course fully recognized.
Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that where long range shore based aircraft could not be employed to cover the whole passage, as for example in the direct convoys from the Dutch West Indies to the United Kingdom, auxiliary aircraft carriers had to be used with the convoys themselves. On the northern route it was hoped to establish bases for long range aircraft in Newfoundland to join up with aircraft working from the United Kingdom.
General Arnold said that Greenland would be of little use for this purpose owing to the long hours of darkness and the very bad weather.
Admiral Cooke asked whether full use was being made of direction finding apparatus to pick up the short range inter-communication radio of U-boats working in packs. The Japanese had developed this technique to a high degree.
Sir Dudley Pound said that all destroyers and most corvettes, were fitted with the necessary apparatus for this purpose. This use was being developed to the maximum.
Sir Charles Portal suggested that it would be desirable to have an assessment made of the total resources required in escort vessels and aircraft to combat the submarine menace, in order that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should have a picture of what would be left over for offensive operations during the coming year.
The Committee.
Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to examine and report the minimum requirements of escorts (including aircraft carriers) [Page 567] and aircraft which should be devoted to the security of the sea communications of the United Nations during 1943.4
(General Eisenhower entered the Meeting at this point.)
2. Situation in North Africa
General Eisenhower gave a résumé of the situation in North Africa at the present time. Operations in December had been held up by bad weather and mud which restricted the use of vehicles entirely to the roads. Since this check every effort had been made to build up for an attack in the North by increasing our air power, improving the communications to the front and re-equipping the 6th Armored Division with Sherman Tanks. By the end of December, however, it was clear that the weather conditions would compel postponement of any attack for a considerable time. Attention had then been directed to the possibility of an attack further to the south where ground conditions were better. For this purpose forces composed of the 1st U.S. Armored Division and two U.S. Regimental Combat teams with Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank Units were being concentrated. At first operations on the right flank had been looked upon primarily as a diversion, but it now seemed probable that it would be possible to advance on Sfax and hold it with infantry while withdrawing the 1st Armored Division as a mobile reserve further to the rear, where it could be maintained more easily. This mobile reserve would be available to deal with a threat either from the North or from Rommel’s forces retiring from the direction of Tripoli. The plan was to launch the attack on Sfax on January 24th. Although the road to Gabes was better, the time factor made it necessary to go direct for Sfax. There seemed, however, every reason to hope that Sfax could be successfully taken.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out the need for careful coordination of the attack on Sfax with General Anderson’s operations in the North and those of the 8th Army in the South. If weather conditions made it impossible for General Anderson to move forward, except on the roads, before March 15th there seemed to be a danger that the Germans would thin out in the North and defeat the Sfax forces in detail. It would take some time before the 8th Army could bring pressure to bear from the southward in support of this force, since even at the best General Montgomery did not expect to reach Tripoli before the [Page 568] middle of February; and before he could advance from there the port would have to be cleared in order to supply his forces with petrol for a further advance.
General Eisenhower agreed that it was improbable that any movement off the roads would be possible in the North before March 15th, though General Anderson had seven days’ reserves built up which would be kept intact for an attack whenever conditions permitted. He hoped that General Montgomery would push on through Tripoli as fast as possible. By the end of January the 46th Division would be concentrated forward under General Anderson and the 18th Regimental Combat Team would be withdrawn into reserve. As long as the 1st U. S. Armored Division was kept for counterattack, he felt that he could deal with any threat to the Sfax force. He hoped, however, to be able to discuss the whole problem with General Alexander and to make any necessary adjustments in the plan on the latter’s arrival.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that after two months of “an active defensive,” the 78th Division would not be in very good condition for the attack in the North and suggested that it would be better to let a fresh division form the spearhead.
General Eisenhower said that he was faced with the dilemma of either allowing the troops in the North to deteriorate by remaining inactive in the mud or suffering some losses to them through keeping them more active. In his opinion the latter was the lesser of two evils. Also that active patrolling would reveal any thinning out of the Axis force in the North.
The latest intelligence reports place the Axis strength in North Africa at about 65,000. Every effort had been made to retard their buildup but the appalling conditions of the airfields and the bad weather had largely closed down air operations against them recently. At the present time it was calculated that the Axis were getting in about 750 men a day with the necessary supplies for them, in addition to a certain amount of supplies for Rommel.
The French forces in the middle of the front were playing a most important part since they were holding the line between the British in the North and the American forces in the South. Unless they held firm, a serious situation would develop. Moreover, he was completely dependent on them for the working of his long line of communication and the ports. These considerations necessitated careful handling of the French. The French units themselves were badly equipped and some of them were poorly trained. The French troops from Tunisia were somewhat unreliable since their families were now in the German area. In one battalion there had been 132 desertions. The French Generals Barré and Juin were cooperating excellently with General Anderson and General Fredendall. Unfortunately, General Juin was not being given very much scope by General Giraud. The latter might [Page 569] be a good Division Commander but he had no political sense and no idea of administration. He was dictatorial by nature and seemed to suffer from megalomania. In addition he was very sensitive and always ready to take offense. He did not seem to be a big enough man to carry the burden of civil government in any way. It had been far easier to deal with Admiral Darlan.
Civil affairs, which included economic as well as political matters, had of course, given a great deal of anxiety. There were many agencies involved but the necessary organization to deal with all these problems was being improved.
Rail communications forward were very limited in capacity at present. East of Algiers the daily tonnage which could be carried amounted to about 2,200 tons but with additional rolling stock and locomotives which were being sent from the United States, it was hoped to increase this to 4,400. From Casablanca to Oran the daily tonnage was only about 900. Port clearance was improving. At Oran it averaged 5,000 tons a day. At Algiers the daily clearance was not so great and initially it had been much reduced by the presence of French ships lying at many of the berths. Losses of shipping had been sustained by air attack at Bougie and Bône. Air defense of the ports was being steadily improved. All available French antiaircraft weapons had been brought into action and night fighters had been sent from the United Kingdom. Radar had been installed to cover the stretch from Bône to Algiers and some had also been provided at Oran and Casablanca. Passive air defense measures in the ports were being improved and assistance had been given by an expert sent from the United Kingdom who had done very good work at Algiers. One difficulty was that there was no rigid control over the French civil population.
Sir Charles Portal said that the Radar cover between Bond [Bône?] and Algiers was not yet effective below 10,000 feet. He had made arrangements for additional equipment to be provided to make good this deficiency. He inquired what air defense could be provided for Sfax.
General Eisenhower said that there was good natural cover for the troops in Sfax. One airfield there was practically complete and there was another at Gabes. The improvement of airfields had been one of the greatest problems. Approximately 2,000 tons of steel matting were required for a single runway and this quantity used up the complete capacity of railroads in the forward areas for a whole day. Every possible expedient had been tried to use local material but broken stone merely sank into the mud. Once the weather improved all these difficulties would vanish since there were large areas in the forward zone which could be used as airfields with little or no preparation at all.
[Page 570](General Eisenhower withdrew at this point.)
3. Strategy in the European Theater
Sir Alan Brooke outlined two broad policies which should be followed in the European Theater during 1943. The first was to close down in the Mediterranean as soon as the North African coast had been cleared and the sea route through the Mediterranean had been opened, and to devote every effort to building up in the United Kingdom for an invasion of the North of France at the earliest possible moment. The British Chiefs of Staff had examined the possibilities and calculated that 21 to 23 divisions could be made available for this purpose by September 15th. It had at first been thought that port and railway capacity would be the limiting factor on the build-up of American troops’ expansion but it looked as if these difficulties could be overcome if the expansion of receiving depots for supplies were pushed ahead. As a basis of calculation, a monthly movement of 120 merchant vessels from the U.K. to the U.S.A. had been taken, the corresponding troop lift being 120,000. This would allow 9 to 12 U.S. divisions to be transported to the U.K. by September 1st. The number of troops which could be put into France was severely limited, however, by the availability of landing craft and of administrative facilities in France.
Three possible areas for invasion had been considered:
- (a)
- The Calais-Boulogne area which, although heavily defended, was within fighter cover of the United Kingdom;
- (b)
- Cherbourg Peninsula, which could be seized by a comparatively small force;
- (c)
- Brest Peninsula, which was a more worth while objective, would require a much larger force, say, at least 15 divisions to hold the 150 kilometers of front.
One of the objections to operations against the North of France was the excellent railway connections across Europe which would enable the Germans rapidly to reinforce the invaded area. Moreover, it would not be possible to begin the operation until the early autumn and no support would therefore be given to Russia throughout the summer. This last factor seemed to be the principal objection. A land invasion on a small scale would have little more than a local effect except for the air fighting which would inevitably ensue from it.
The other broad possibility was to maintain activity in the Mediterranean while building up the maximum air offensive against Germany from the U.K. and putting in as many troops as could be spared with a view to undertaking a comparatively small operation such as seizing Cherbourg Peninsula.
The Mediterranean offered many choices: Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, and the Dodecanese. Our amphibious power enabled us to threaten all these points simultaneously and thereby cause the Germans to [Page 571] disperse their forces. Unless they were to risk the loss of these islands, they would be compelled to reinforce them as well as the coasts of Italy, Greece, and France. If Italy could be knocked out, Germany would be involved in large new commitments in an attempt to bolster her up and replacing Italian troops in the Balkans. Other German satellites might also fall out. The British Chiefs of Staff considered that our best policy would be to threaten Germany everywhere in the Mediterranean, to try to knock out Italy, and to bring in Turkey on our side. It was not, of course, certain that we could bring Turkey in but by a combination of inducements and pressure we might be successful. With Turkey as a base, we could attack the Rumanian oil fields and open up the Black Sea Route to Russia.
If this policy was adopted, we shall have to make a careful choice of our objective. The main choice seemed to lie between the capture of Sardinia and Corsica and the capture of Sicily. Sicily would be the bigger prize but would be a bigger undertaking and the operation could not be staged until late in the summer. The threat, however, would compel dispersion on Germany long before the operation itself was launched. As for Sardinia and Corsica, these increased the possibilities of air attack against Italy by providing bases for fighter escorted bombers. The operation might be combined with operations from the Middle East against the Dodecanese.
One of the great advantages of adopting the Mediterranean policy was that a larger force of heavy bombers could be built up in the United Kingdom for the attack on Germany than if we concentrated for an invasion of France. For the latter purpose, a much larger proportion of the lighter type of bomber and ground support planes would be needed and the number of heavy bombers would suffer accordingly.
Admiral King pointed out that the more troops that we concentrated in the Mediterranean, the more likely Germany was to move into Spain in order to cut our line of communications through the straits of Gibraltar. An invasion of Northern France such as the seizure of the Brest Peninsula would not nearly so likely precipitate such an event. He doubted whether the Spaniards could be relied upon to offer anything more than guerilla resistance to a German invasion.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff did not consider it was at all probable that Spain would permit free passage to the German forces. It was calculated that some 20 divisions would be necessary to occupy the country if the Spaniards resisted at all. This would be a very large commitment for Germany. In any event, we would be able to secure the south side of the Straits of Gibraltar by occupying Spanish Morocco and this would prevent the complete closure of the sea route. He did not think it would be possible for Germany to seize the Spanish airfields in the South by parachute [Page 572] troops. The problem of supplying them by air would be extremely difficult.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that if the Spaniards allowed the Germans free passage we should declare war on Spain which was depending on us for many of the necessities of life. Even if the Germans did go in, we should be better able to afford aircraft for the protection of shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar than could the Germans for its attack. It would be much more advantageous for the Germans if we built up against France and left the Mediterranean alone. They would then be able to withdraw large numbers of air forces from the Mediterranean and reinforce the Russian Front, relying on the strong defenses of Northern France to resist an invasion. On the other hand if we kept the Mediterranean active, they would be compelled to keep large air forces there the whole time. This was of the greatest importance since Germany’s main shortages were air forces and oil.
Considerable discussion followed on the details and timings of operations against Sicily and Sardinia in which the following were the principal points made:
- (a)
- If the capture of Sicily was mounted from the United Kingdom and the United States, it could be carried out early in August, but would require some 190 escort vessels. If it was mounted from North Africa some 65 escorts would be saved, but its launching would be delayed about one month. This delay was due to the time required for amphibious training in North Africa where facilities were extremely limited.
- (b)
- The capture of Sardinia could be undertaken in about May, i.e., three months earlier than Sicily. Air cover for the Sardinia operation, however, would be more difficult owing to its greater distance from North Africa.
- (c)
- The total coastline of Sicily was about 500 miles and it was anticipated that some 7 to 8 enemy divisions would be defending the island. This compared very favorably with the coastline of Northern France which was the same length, more strongly fortified and would be defended, by 15 divisions.
- (d)
- Part of the air cover for operations against Sicily could be provided from Malta from which about 300 fighters could be operated. Additional fighter protection could be given if Pantellaria was seized in a preliminary operation. The troops required for the operation amounted to some 9 divisions, 10 to 12 brigade groups being employed as assaulting troops.
- (e)
- It was doubtful whether the whole operation against Sicily could be undertaken by troops already in the Mediterranean owing to the difficulties of training them in time in North Africa. Assembly and repair of landing craft was another bottleneck.
Sir Dudley Pound estimated that once the North African Coast had been cleared, even without having Sicily in our possession, it would be possible to run a convoy of thirty ships once every ten days through [Page 573] the Mediterranean, in substitution for the present shipping to the Middle East, Persian Gulf and India, which moved via the Cape. This would effect a saving of some 225 ships. The average losses per month on the Cape route are at present about 15 ships. The estimated losses if the Mediterranean route were used should only be about 9 a month even allowing a higher percentage of loss. He understood, however, that the United States estimate was 18.
- Search light installed on anti-submarine aircraft to facilitate night search and spotting; devised in 1940 by Royal Air Force Squadron Leader H. de V. Leigh.↩
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The conclusion of the Report by the Combined Staff Planners, C.C.S. 160, January 19, 1943, not printed, was as follows:
“On the basis of the tables included in the enclosures it will be seen that minimum acceptable requirements as to escort craft will be met approximately in August and September. We will not be in a position, however, to give fully adequate protection to ocean-going convoys to the extent of sinking attacking submarines at a rate even comparable to their production output before the end of the year.” (J. C. S. Files)