Hopkins Papers
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Soong) to the Presidents Special Assistant (Hopkins)
secret
[Washington,] June 20, 1942.
Dear Mr. Hopkins: I am sending you a
memorandum which will you please present at your discretion to the
President and the Prime Minister, as I think it is important for me to
participate with them in discussions affecting China.1
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Chinese Minister for Foreign
Affairs (Soong)
secret
[Washington,] June 20,
1942.
Memorandum
- 1.
- At the conference between the President and the Prime Minister
now going on when strategic decisions will be made, China asks
to be consulted, at least on the sectors affecting her own war
operations.
- 2.
- On July 7th, China will have completed five years of her war
with Japan. Her people have been exhausted by this long
struggle; such arms and materials as were bought from Germany
and the U.S.S.R. are being exhausted; due to the fall of Burma,
materials for her arsenals are wanting; and the Japanese are
delivering heavy attacks not only to secure airfields but to
drive the Chinese forces west of the Peiping–Hankow–Canton Line.
With air support the Japanese have been having great initial
successes, and if they realize their plans, it may well be the
“last straw” to Chinese resistance, because the economic and
military position of Free China, dependent to a great degree on
the coastal and central provinces and already so much weakened
by uncontrolled inflation, will be made untenable.
- 3.
- China could not hope for the immediate opening of a new front
to relieve her, and she is not even asking for such supplies as
will enable her to launch major counter-attacks. She asks only
for such supplies and support as will enable her to hold on,
while major decisions are being made elsewhere.
- 4.
- To enable her to do so, would mean:
- A.
- Decision and plans to recapture Burma in the near
future.
- B.
- Air Support for the Chinese Armies.
- C.
- Air Transport into the Interior.
[Page 464]
- A.
- It is obvious that large-scale supplies to China could
only be resumed with the reopening of the land route to
China. Active preparations should therefore be begun in
China and India during the monsoon season for the
recapture of Burma by land and sea operations at the end
of the year. I am given to understand that naval control
of the Bay of Bengal will shortly be restored, so
emphasis should be given to military preparations,
especially in India.
- B.
- The President has already ordered the Brereton Tenth
Pursuit Group to China, and the Prime Minister has
agreed to send a light bombing squadron to China. The
Generalissimo has asked that, in order to enable the
Chinese armies to hold the Japanese at bay, there be
maintained constantly an effective airforce of about 500
planes. Between 200 and 300 planes would be in China
with the Brereton Group, the AVG and the British light bomber squadron,
and the force should be immediately built up and kept at
the total urged.
- C.
- In the interim before the reconquest of Burma, so as
to supply the Chinese armies with a minimum of war
supplies by air transport, an emergency monthly program
of 3,500 tons of munitions was drawn up by Chinese
representatives with the Joint Munitions Assignments
Board. This is a pitifully small figure, and represents
the absolute minimum which would be of any use. However,
the air transport program between India and China needs
to be taken seriously to build up to the figure of 5000
tons monthly capacity sufficient both for munitions and
supplies for the airforce. Of the 100 twin-engine
transports ordered by the President in February to be
sent, little more than half were sent. Even of these,
some were diverted to the shuttle service in Africa, and
some were used for flying within India, so that only a
few were actually put into service between India and
China. Due to lack of planes, reserves of pilots, ground
crews, spare parts, and the monsoon season, the U.S.
Ferry Command now plan to carry from India to China 128
tons in June, 264 tons in July and 400 tons in August,
September and October! The remedy, it seems, lies in:
- (1)
- The full complement of 100 twin-engine planes,
as assigned by the President, with all necessary
ground organization, crews, and spare
parts.
- (2)
- Additional four-engine planes of the C–54 type
to overcome even unfavorable weather conditions
enroute to China.
- There is great need for airplanes everywhere, but
compared to the requirements of the other theatres of
war, the demands of China are so modest that they could
be realized if the will is there.
- 5.
- I consider it my duty to the President and the Prime Minister
to state without any desire to exaggerate that the situation in
China is most grave, and to ask that an opportunity should be
taken during the Prime Minister’s visit to make decisions
relating to China of so concrete a nature as not only to enable
the Chinese High Command [Page 465] to make due preparations, but also to afford actual relief,
as well as maintaining the morale of the Chinese people and
armies.
