Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by the Presidents Naval Aide (McCrea)

secret

Washington, June 25, 1942.

Memorandum

The twelfth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 12:30 p.m., Thursday, June 25, 1942.¹

• Present
  • The President
  • The Prime Minister of Great Britain (The Eight Honorable Winston S. Churchill)
  • The Prime Minister of Canada (The Eight Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King)
  • The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Dr. Eelco van Kleffens)
  • The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)
  • The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)
  • The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon)
  • The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)
  • The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)
  • The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)
  • Mr. Harry Hopkins

The President stated that, on behalf of the regular members of the Pacific War Council, he wished to extend cordial greetings to the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill), the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. King), and the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Dr. van Kleffens), remarking as he did so that the Council would be pleased to receive the observations and comments of these distinguished visitors.

In general, the President remarked that there was “no particular news.” It now appears that the Japanese carrier strength has been reduced from twelve to seven. Three or four of the original twelve were no doubt converted merchant types, and not having been built as carriers they no doubt lacked certain desirable features, but nevertheless up until now they have been able to carry on pretty successfully in their appointed roles. The attrition that has gone on against the Japanese carrier strength has been very gratifying. In addition, with the loss of each of the aircraft carriers concerned there must have been a correspondingly heavy loss of embarked aircraft.

With reference to the Aleutian situation, the President stated that he was “somewhat disturbed.” Continual fog, rain and wind make aircraft operations against the enemy in this area very difficult. So far as can now be determined, the enemy forces in this area are “small, even somewhat infinitesimal as regards ships and men.” Looking at the Pacific problem as a whole and without attempting to evaluate the relative importance of the south and central Pacific, it would appear nevertheless that the north Pacific is definitely in third place insofar as priority of attention on our part is concerned. With the remark that Canada appeared to be “somewhat excited,” the President asked the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. King) for his comments. To this, the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. King) replied, “We are not much excited; we feel that we are in good company.”

The President then requested that the Prime Minister of Great Britain present his views on the general situation. The Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill) replied substantially as follows: “I have, of course, been concerned about Libya. We think that with reinforcements which are now enroute to that theater, the situation will be gotten in hand. I wish to here state with what inexpressible relief we learned of the results of the fighting in the Pacific, both in the Coral Sea and Midway areas. The change in the list of Japanese ships as a result of those two engagements is, to say the least, refreshing. I can now disclose that in the latter part of March and in early April we were much alarmed for the safety of Bengal and Ceylon. Very different is that position now. Into India we have put three divisions, with more on the way. There are more British troops in India now than have ever been there before. The Eastern Fleet will be built up to full strength by August. This will not alone improve our position in the Far East, but we will be in a position to do something of positive help to China, and I wish to say here and now that we will extend ourselves to the utmost to aid our Oriental ally. It is our very definite hope that we will be able to take the offensive in the Bay of Bengal area not later than November, 1942. What has happened in Libya will not set back this date. The Japanese are making their first important and decided move to wipe out Chinese resistance. Everything points to early action on the part of the Japanese against Siberia. With a war on his western front, Mr. Stalin no doubt views the possible attack on Siberia by the Japanese without enthusiasm. The United Nations can rest assured that Britain will spare no means or methods to bring the aggressor nations to their early and ultimate downfall.”

At this point the President remarked that the Japanese are in such a position that heavy withdrawals of troops from the southwest cannot be made since there is much resistance by guerrillas going on in the East Indies and the Philippine Islands. To this, both the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Dr. van Kleffens) and the President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) added vigorous agreement. The President further remarked that the Japanese were encountering much resistance in Timor on the part of the Portuguese and that the Australian troops and New Guinea natives in the Australian Mandates were helping “harass the invader.” The President further stated that authority had been given General MacArthur to purchase at a good price all rubber which could be smuggled into Australia; this will unquestionably help to keep alive the resistance against the Japanese.

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) remarked that he had recently received information that Colonel Roxas, the one whom the President had designated as his successor in case he were killed or fell into the hands of the enemy, was still fighting bravely against the Japanese in central Mindanao.

At this point the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill) stated that he would “like to remark in conclusion” that he thought it wise for the Council to adopt an offensive policy embodying (1) Operations against the enemy to the northward from Australia; (2) Counterstrokes against the enemy from India; (3) Maintenance of guerrillas wherever they were located.

The President remarked that he felt it most essential that the guerrillas be assisted in every possible way. “Every Japanese killed by the guerrillas hastens the end of the war.” Plans for the offensive to the north from Australia are now in a most confidential and advanced state of completion. Cooperation from British seaborne forces in Trincomalee, the Prime Minister informs me, can confidently be counted upon.

The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon) suggested that early consideration be given to opening up a channel through Torres Strait. To this remark the President replied that the matter was being “attended to.”

The Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill) told the Council that he had a very gratifying conversation with Rear Admiral Sherman, lately in command of the U.S.S. Lexington, and that Rear Admiral Sherman had particularly impressed him with the capabilities of dive bombers and torpedo planes.

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) remarked that he had just received a despatch from his government in which it was stated that aircraft were being used for transportation purposes in the Indian area in an injudicious manner, in that this type of transportation was being employed where other and slower transportation would do. The President directed that Captain McCrea take up this matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²

The President then informed the Council that information had been received that the Germans, Italians, and Japanese were planning a commercial air route between their countries via Rangoon and the Middle East. Consideration was also being given to flying a northern route across Siberia and Russia, but that that route was looked upon with little favor because of the usually adverse weather conditions. The President remarked that everything possible should be done “to make their venture a failure.”

At this point the President read a memorandum attached hereto marked (A).³

The Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill) at this point read a letter which he had received from General Smuts recommending that every effort be made to recover Rangoon and the Burma route. The import of General Smuts’ letter was that it was most important to support China and that the quickest and best way to do so would be to reestablish the Burma route as a supply line to the heart of China. In conclusion, the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill) remarked that General Smuts’ proposal had his entire approval and hearty endorsement. “I have great confidence in General Smuts’ judgment.”

The President remarked that the immediate goal of the allied nations was to construct “more and more planes and arms per month.” In that manner we shall bring the full force of our resources to bear at the earliest possible moment, on the aggressor nations.

The President then announced to the Council that invitations had been extended by him to General Smuts and Messrs. Fraser (Prime Minister of New Zealand) and Curtin (Prime Minister of Australia) to visit the United States at their earliest convenience. General Smuts and Mr. Fraser have already accepted, but the dates for their visits have not been fixed.

The next meeting of the Pacific War Council is scheduled for Wednesday, July 1, 1942, at 11:30 a.m.

The Pacific War Council then (1:15 p.m.) adjourned to lunch in the State Dining Room, there being joined by the Secretary of State (Mr. Hull) and the Under Secretary of State (Mr. Welles).⁴

John McCrea

1. A photograph of the participants at this meeting of the Pacific War Council follows p. 483.
2. During this meeting of the Pacific War Council, perhaps at this particular point in the discussion, Roosevelt apparently circulated Arnold’s memorandum of June 22 to McCrea regarding the conversion of military-type planes to transport use in India and China; for text of the document, see post, p. 472.
3. The memorandum under reference is Arnold’s memorandum of June 21 to McCrea, regarding the India-China air cargo situation, post, p. 467.
4. No official record of the substance of the discussion during the luncheon referred to here has been found. According to the account in Pickersgill, pp. 415–416, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Mackenzie King were seated together during the luncheon, and their discussion touched on such subjects as the Japanese danger to the Pacific coast of the United States, the military situation in the Aleutian Islands, a possible trip by the President to Canada, and Canadian domestic matters. Pickersgill also indicates that Prime Minister Mackenzie King spoke with Hopkins about the buildup of American troops in the United Kingdom and the possibility of a landing in Europe in 1943 or even in 1942. Welles spoke to Prime Minister Mackenzie King about the desirability of Canada’s maintaining diplomatic relations with Vichy France.