Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

June 25, 1942, 9:30 a.m.

secret

General Marshall, on behalf of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, welcomed Admiral Cunningham to membership in the Combined Chiefs of Staff and paid tribute to the striking services performed by him when in command of the naval forces in the Mediterranean.

United States Reinforcements for Middle East
(C. C. S. 84)³

While not prepared to render an official report, General Marshall said that every effort was being made to place additional U. S. bombers in Cairo from India. General Brereton had been ordered to Cairo for temporary duty in command of the U. S. air forces in that area. He added that Admiral King had approved the use of U.S.S. Ranger for ferrying P–40’s into Takoradi whence they could be flown to Cairo.⁴

Field Marshal Dill expressed the great appreciation of the British Chiefs of Staff for the manner in which the U. S. was endeavoring to provide reinforcements of all types to the Middle East.

Air Marshal Evill said that an informatory despatch had been sent to Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East, forewarning him of the arrival of U. S. air reinforcements in order that suitable British ground forces could be made available until arrival of the U. S. maintenance groups.

There were then presented for consideration one British and four U. S. plans, detailing methods by which reinforcements might be moved to the Middle East.^* There followed a general discussion regarding the desirability of each plan separately and the possibility of devising still another plan, using the most desirable features of those already presented.

General Marshall made the following offers of facilities which were not included in the plans as presented:

‘X’

(a) The use of two seatrain vessels which could move some 300 medium U. S. tanks, plus some 100 105 mm guns on self propelled mountings together with a small number of key personnel, to the Middle East. (b) The use of U. S. tanks now in Ireland for training the personnel of a British armored division which might then be despatched from England to the Middle East to man the U.S. tanks sent in accordance with (a) above. (c) The forwarding of additional trained personnel to the Middle East via S.S. Pasteur. These, together with the personnel on the seatrains and those already in the Middle East, would provide in that area a total of some 300 experienced U. S. personnel available for instruction in use and maintenance of U. S. equipment.

General Marshall said that if the U. S. 2nd Armored Division was to go to the Middle East he preferred not to accept plans 1 and 2, favoring plan 3 as the one which would least interfere with Bolero plans and movements already in progress.

Air Marshal Evill stressed the desirability of providing additional transport aircraft for trans-African service. He said that in the Middle East a great many parts were lacking, the provision of which would enable many planes to be put in operational condition. For example, there were some fifty-seven pursuit planes grounded for the lack of radio.

Colonel Schneider said that there were now thirty-five transport planes on the Takoradi–Cairo run and that General Brereton had been instructed to provide an additional ten. Every effort was being made to increase the number of transport planes, both for trans-Atlantic and trans-African duty.

The Committee:

(a) Took note that General Brooke and the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff would examine the five plans (annexed to these minutes), together with the additional offer made by General Marshall at ‘X’ above, and report later in the day to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.⁵

(b) Took note that the Committee would meet later in the week to consider the remainder of the agenda.

3. At a meeting of the Combined Military Transport Committee on June 23, 1942, five alternative shipping schedules were prepared for the movement of the United States 2nd Armored Division to the Middle East. These plans were included as annexes to these Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes and were circulated as C.C.S. 84, entitled “U. S. Reinforcements for Middle East” (not printed).
4. On the subject of the prospective movement of American aircraft to the Middle East, see the memorandum by Marshall for Churchill, June 23, 1942, post, p. 477.
5. Plans 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, annexed to these minutes. [Footnote in the source text. The plans referred to are not printed, but see footnote 3, above.]
5. The additional offer made by Marshall and set forth in these minutes was subsequently accepted by the British military chiefs (see editorial note, post, p. 448) and approved by Roosevelt and Churchill in the course of June 25. Stimson’s Diary for June 25, 1942, provides the following additional information on the preparation and acceptance of the Marshall compromise offer:

   “During our absence yesterday Marshall had had the Staff working on the logistic details of the problems that were confronting us and the British in respect to reinforcements to Libya. I spent the first of the morning sitting in with them and with Marshall getting the results of the study which made more clear than ever the impossibility of sending an American armored division to Libya in time to be of any value without completely disrupting Bolero . After we had gone through these studies, they were taken up with the British Staff officers who agreed to the compromise I had spoken of a little further back. Later we heard that Brooke and Dill had persuaded Churchill that that was the wisest course to take. It was a fine and loyal step for those two officers to take and I appreciated it very much.

   Late in the afternoon we heard that the President, with Churchill having taken this position, also accepted it and did not push his ideas any further.”