War Shipping Administration Files

Douglas Minutes

Notes on Conference at the White House, June 23, 1942, 11:30 a.m.

Admiral King opened by saying that one ship saved was worth two ships sunk, and that therefore the escort vessel program was of very great importance.

The Prime Minister agreed with Admiral King.

Admiral Land said that this program would use our ways and steel which would prevent the building of 100 to 150 merchant cargo vessels.

Admiral Vickery thought the question was largely one of steel.

LWD2 then said, and everybody agreed, that submarine sinkings were very bad, and that the period of greatest shipping stringency was in the next 6 or 8 months; that none of the escort vessels now contracted for in the proposed plan would be delivered at best until early next year, and that therefore, to construct these escort vessels at the expense of the merchant cargo construction program would have the effect of diminishing the volume of cargo vessels available. To meet the shrinkage during the period of greatest stringency the greatest urgency is needed to increase the volume of merchant shipping. Moreover, the reduction of the number of merchant vessels dispatched from the American ports would not reduce the number of sinkings necessarily, but certainly would reduce the volume of essential munitions delivered to places where men were fighting. But the logic of the position indicated, that instead of reducing the number of merchant ships to be constructed during 1942, we should increase the number to be constructed, for this was the period of the greatest urgency and stringency.

Finally, that the deficiency of escort vessels should be made up at the expense of some other consumer of steel plate, other than merchant cargo vessels. That LWD didn’t know the alternative, but emphasized the fact that reduction in merchant vessels would not be in 1943 as so many have assumed, but in 1942 and the first months of 1943—it was only in that period that our supply of ships will be very meager.

Apparently the Prime Minister was swung around, and said to Admiral King that whereas one ship saved was better than two ships sunk, it was also far better that one ship delivered munitions to the fighting front than no ships at all.

The President finally asked that a conference be held on Thursday and that we report back to him on how the escort vessels can be built and how the steel plate facilities would effect the merchant vessel [Page 442] construction program. He said he was sure that the bottom of the barrel could be scraped for steel plate.3

Employment and usage of steel ships was discussed.

Harry Hopkins wondered whether we had enough control over wooden ships.

It appears that we did not cut deep enough into the east coast of South American trade.

It was brought up that the WSA and the CSAB were too much interested in their own departmental affairs to be objective in their view of getting things done, and in using ships to carry cargo that was not essential.

Sir Arthur said that during the last month Admiral Land had cut down ruthlessly the amount of unessential cargo, and that when their plans were carried out in full, there would be no commercial cargo carried—only essential cargo.

  1. Lewis W. Douglas
  2. For an account of subsequent American-British discussions on the escort-vessel question, see Frederic C. Lane, Ships for Victory: A History of Shipbuilding Under the U. S. Maritime Commission in World War II (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), pp. 179 ff.