J. C. S. Files
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
Offensive Operations in 1942 and 1943
The Committee considered a memorandum for information, containing the minutes of an informal meeting between General Marshall and members of his staff representing the U.S. War Department, and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, General Sir Alan Brooke and Major General Sir Hastings Ismay, which was held in General Marshall’s office at 2 p.m. on 19th June, 1942.2
General Brooke said that he had been much encouraged to find that there was complete unanimity of opinion between the U.S. and British Staffs on general strategic policy and the merits of the Bolero plan as a whole. He would like to have the memorandum expanded somewhat to cover the situation which would arise if Russia failed to withstand German attack this summer. As at present drafted, it was based on the premise that Russia would hold out. In his view the Bolero plan held good on either hypothesis. If the Germans, as a result of defeating Russia, were able to bring back large forces into France the renewed threat to the safety of the United Kingdom would immediately become a vital consideration. In this eventuality the Bolero Plan fitted into the pattern because it contemplated putting American troops into England in sufficient strength to insure [Page 430] the safety of the United Kingdom and especially to replace the British forces which are now being dispatched to the Middle East. But we should have to seek an alternative to a major offensive on the continent in 1943 in case the German strength in France were so great as to make this impracticable. The issue in Russia would be decided by September 1942 and by that time, although American reinforcements would be sufficient to give reasonable security to the United Kingdom, the number of American troops thus committed would not be so great as to make it impossible to modify existing plans in favor of an expedition to North Africa. Since the Bolero Plan permitted this flexibility, General Brooke was strongly in favor of concentrating all possible efforts on carrying it through as agreed.
Sir John Dill concurred in this view.
Admiral King said he was entirely opposed to any idea of carrying out Gymnast in 1942. An entry into N.W. Africa would open a ninth front with all the increase in overheads and escort and transportation problems involved therein. Moreover, the present situation in North Africa did not augur well for the success of Gymnast this year. By putting all our efforts into Bolero we were concentrating to the maximum on one front. In the Pacific risks have had to be taken for Bolero, which had given him considerable anxiety. Gymnast would make the position far more serious there, since it would be necessary to withdraw naval forces from that theatre.
General Marshall said that large scale operations on the Continent in 1943 would clearly not be possible unless all efforts were concentrated now on their preparation. If we changed our plan now, and opened up another front, we should probably achieve nothing. If we went ahead, we should at least ensure the safety of the United Kingdom, whatever happened in Russia, and any change of plan could be made in about September when we knew what the situation on the Eastern front was going to be. To defeat the Germans we must have overwhelming power, and North West Europe was the only front on which this overwhelming superiority was logistically possible. It was, therefore, sound strategy to concentrate on this front and divert minimum forces only to the other fronts. From the military point of view, therefore, there seemed no other logical course than to drive through with the Bolero Plan. He had been examining the possibility of sending a U.S. armored division, desert trained, to the Middle East, and saw no reason why this should not be done. The division was available.
[Page 431]Admiral Little said he felt sure the First Sea Lord3 would agree with Admiral King’s opposition to Gymnast. The naval situation in the Atlantic was already difficult enough without taking on a large new commitment. Even as it was we were not able to maintain our existing sea communications properly.
General Brooke referred to the suggestions that had been made for a so-called “sacrifice” operation on the Continent to relieve pressure on Russia. This question had been exhaustively examined by the British Chiefs of Staff, but they had not been able to discover any worth-while objective. The Germans had about 25 divisions in France now, but with the landing craft available this autumn not more than six divisions at the most could be transported across the Channel from England. It was doubtful if the Germans would bring back large air forces to deal with such a landing. Even if the landing force gained a bridgehead, we should not have sufficient additional forces available to follow up since the number of divisions that could be provided with the necessary services for mobile operations was at present limited.
General Eisenhower pointed out that in these circumstances there was a possibility at least of securing a bridgehead and holding it as Malta or Tobruk had been held. If the air forces in Great Britain were concentrated for the operation the Germans would certainly have to bring back air forces to deal with the situation. He realized that the circumstances in which such an operation might be feasible were unlikely to arise, but felt that we must be ready to seize immediately any favorable opportunity.
Air Marshal Evill observed that the majority of the bombers now in the United Kingdom were night bombers unsuitable for the particular type of operation under discussion. They would have to be escorted by fighters unless almost complete air superiority had been first obtained.
General Arnold said that means would have to be devised of employing all available air forces to the best possible advantage for the special type of operation on the Continent which was now contemplated. There would have to be improvisation and adaptation of existing methods.
The Committee:
Directed the Secretaries to prepare for their approval a revised draft of the paper, expanded and amended in the light of the discussion, in the form of a memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.4