Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for Information

secret

[Washington,] June 19, 1942.

1.

The discussion generally revolved around the basic reasons that led initially to the adoption of Bolero as the principal effort of the United Nations and the possibilities of conducting an offensive operation either in Western Europe or Northwest Africa during 1942 as a means of assisting Russia.

2.

There was general agreement on the following points:-

(a)

The fundamental reasons that led initially to the adoption of Bolero as the principal offensive effort of the United Nations are still sound. Accomplishment of the Bolero plan should constitute the basis of our future strategy.

(b)

Strategic and tactical developments, since the initial decision was made, have tended to increase rather than to decrease the probability of carrying out the operation successfully.

(c)

Concentration of U.S.—U.K. effort in production, training, organization, administration, and operational planning, increasing and continuing without interruption, is essential to success in the Bolero operation.

(d)

Our target date for a full scale attack in Northwest France has been set for the Spring of 1943, since logistic factors preclude the mounting of any powerful attack in this theater prior to that time.

(e)

Consideration should be given to the undertaking of any other offensive operation in 1942 only in the event that:

Either

(1)

Such operation does not materially delay the date at which Bolero can be mounted,
or

(2)

It should contribute directly to the success of Bolero ,
or

(3)

It is forced upon us by reason of emergency conditions not now existing.

3.

Any attempt to execute Gymnast this year will have the following effects:

(a): It would seriously curtail reinforcements to the Middle East with possibly disastrous consequences in that theater, since the situation there is such that the indirect effects of the Gymnast operation cannot give the support necessary to the British Middle East forces.
(b): It would thin out naval concentrations in all other theaters. The most serious effect of this would be felt in aircraft carriers and escort vessels.
(c): The operation depends upon the existence of certain psychological conditions in North Africa which are impossible to predict. If these conditions should be definitely unfavorable at the time of attack, the effect would be most serious both militarily and politically.
(d): It would have marked effect in slowing up Bolero , particularly in the accumulation in Britain of the necessary aircraft, anti-aircraft and service units. If the ships from British Middle East convoys cannot be used, the effect on Bolero would be profound, since the troop-lift and cargo shipping would have to come from that presently planned for Bolero .
(e): The U.S.–U.K. production capacity is now maintaining many battle fronts. Opening up of another, in which the extent of eventual [Page 428] material requirements cannot possibly be foreseen, will tend to disperse further our available resources and weaken our effort.

4.

The possibility of conducting a 1942 attack against some point in Western Europe was also discussed. Particular points were Brest, Channel Islands, Cherbourg and Northern Norway. It was agreed that each would be accompanied by certain hazards that would be justified only by reasons that were compelling in nature. However, it was generally agreed that any of these plans would be preferable to undertaking Gymnast, especially from the standpoint of dispersing base organization, lines of sea communication, and air strength.

Conclusions:

1. It was the considered opinion of the conferees:

(a): That Gymnast should not be undertaken under the existing situation.
(b): That United States and Great Britain should adhere firmly to the basic decision to push Bolero with all possible speed and energy.
(c): That the locality, strength and availability of means for any 1942 attack on Western Europe should be studied further. That when the most favorable of these has been decided upon, plans should be developed in anticipation of conditions compelling its initiation.
(d): That since any 1942 operation would inevitably have some deterring effect upon Continental operations in 1943, it should be undertaken only in case of necessity or if an exceptionally favorable opportunity presented itself.