Hopkins Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)1

most secret

Grey 305. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

Reference your telegram to Lord Halifax, No. 237 of Jan. 10th.2

1.
President raised the Miquelon issue with me tonight3 as an urgent matter. He pressed that we consider it in connection with Super-Gymnast. United States’ relations with Vichy have strengthened since German-American war. He does not wish to break sharply with Vichy. The State Department for their part are boring along on their old lines quite oblivious of the fact that the further they go against de Gaulle the worse they will fare in American opinion. Nevertheless, I am of opinion that the following proposal should be embodied in a communiqué representing the policy of the United States, Canadian and British Governments. I understand that Mackenzie King says he will agree to whatever the President and I settle.4 It would have to be understood that Vichy will have to conform:
(i)
The islands are French and will remain French;
(ii)
To avoid any potential threat to the shipping and interests of the Governments concerned, the use of the wireless stations on the islands will be subject to the supervision and control by observers appointed by the American and Canadian Governments and attached to their respective consulates;
(iii)
The islands shall be neutralized and de-militarized and shall be considered out of the war;
(iv)
The present Administrator shall be withdrawn for the period of the war; the appointment of an Administrator shall be withheld for the same period, and the administration of the islands shall be left in the hands of the Consultative Council.
(v)
All armed forces will be withdrawn.
(vi)
The Canadian and American Governments agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the islands and the respective consuls of those countries will confer with the local authorities as to the nature of the assistance to be given. Arrangements are being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which the islands are dependent and to provide the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique.
2.
I think this is a reasonable compromise, and that in the circumstances it is only prudent to accept and enforce it. This means that [Page 400] you should tell de Gaulle that this is our settled policy, and that he must bow to it. He has put himself entirely in the wrong by his breach of faith. If he is to retain any measure of our recognition he must send orders to Muselier which the latter will obey. You should dwell on the many advantages gained by Free France and that many of the points agreed will be a bitter pill to Vichy, but however you dish it up he has got to take it. I cannot believe he will refuse to give Muselier orders or that Muselier will disobey. If he were to they are in a mood here to use force—i.e., the battleship Arkansas which the President mentioned5 or starvation without stint. It is intolerable that the great movement of events should be obstructed, and I shall certainly not intervene to save de Gaulle or other Free French from the consequences.
3.
I hope to hear from you tomorrow that it is all fixed. Personally, I think the terms are very reasonable considering the embarrassing position in which United States has been placed by its agreement with Admiral Robert, and the breach of faith by de Gaulle. By all means consult the Cabinet if you will, but we shall soon be flitting and I must settle this before I go.
  1. The source text is marked “copy no. 1”.
  2. Not found in American files.
  3. Refers to the evening of January 11, on which Churchill returned from his trip to Florida. The telegram was sent early on the morning of January 12.
  4. For the Canadian reaction, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, pp. 663667.
  5. For Secretary Hull’s reported reaction to this mention of the Arkansas, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, p. 666.