Hopkins Papers
Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s Special
Assistant (Hopkins)1
secret
[Washington, January 10, 1942.]
I should be grateful if you would look at this. The statements marked
by me in red would, if true, be catastrophic.2
There surely should be a joint Consultative Board so that your people
can hear what we have to say before taking decisions on
allocation.
Perhaps you will let me know what you advise.
[Attachment 1]
Sir Arthur Salter to Prime
Minister Churchill
Copy
Prime Minister:
1. In a note of January 4th (summarizing at your request what I
had said to you in conversation the previous day) I urged the
great importance of an appropriate organization here, both
American and Anglo-American, to decide upon the allocation of Merchant Shipping.
The difficulties of allocations are now very great because, with
the new demands, there is much less tonnage than is required for
urgent work.
Till recently the Maritime Commission has controlled the
disposition of U.S. shipping and we have been able to secure
assistance for British needs by negotiation with them. This
method has worked well till recently but does so no longer. The
Navy and Army are taking U. S. ships directly, (without
requiring the assent of the Maritime Commission) from existing
services. The new American “Strategic Shipping Board” is not at
present equipped with the necessary
[Page 354]
information and staff to enable it to
decide upon the relative importance of the services from which
the ships are withdrawn and those to which they are diverted.
This is true even when the existing services are American; it is
still more true when they are British.
2. Events of the last few days have illustrated the urgent need
of an improved system.
The main shipping assistance (apart from tankers) which we have
received this year from the U.S.A. has been in the conveyance of
our munitions from the U.S.A. to the Bed Sea. 15 ships a month,
or a total of some 100 ships in constant employment, have been
allocated to this service. This assistance has been
indispensable for our Middle East supplies, and has also helped
the U.K. import position by enabling British ships that would
otherwise have had to be sent to the Bed Sea to be kept in the
N. Atlantic.
For this month, however, as a result of the pressure of the new
demands, the Maritime Commission were only able to allot 10
ships, and of these 4 have been suddenly, without notice of
consultation, taken away for Army needs.
Some British ships are being diverted to the Bed Sea from the N.
Atlantic imports service. But our U.K. importing service is
itself now in a very serious condition. The Ministry of War
Transport estimate that the January-February loadings for U.K. in all areas
(excluding oil) will only amount to 3.85 mil. tons and that means a rate of import of only
23 mil. tons even without
allowance for losses. This figure compares with the 33 mil. tons you instructed me to
press for only a few weeks ago.
3. May I suggest that, before you go, you should try to obtain
decisions
- (a)
- To equip the Strategic Shipping Board, or whatever may
take its place, with a suitable organization to enable
it to allocate shipping in relation to the relative
importance of the different services.
- (b)
- To associate my Merchant Shipping Mission with this
authority so that decisions affecting British services
or shipping may be taken after joint
consultation.
- (c)
- As an interim measure that the allocation of U.S.
tonnage to the Bed Sea, on the scale adopted in the last
six months, should continue and enjoy a priority equal
to the highest.
I should, of course, be glad to supplement this note by an oral
explanation if you are able to give me the opportunity.
I enclose, for convenience of reference, a copy of my note of
January 4th.
[Page 355]
[Attachment 2]
Sir Arthur Salter to Prime
Minister Churchill
Copy
Prime Minister:
I submit the note you asked for yesterday.
Merchant Shipping—Arrangements
for Allocation
1. The strain on shipping, at least in 1942 and perhaps in 1943,
will be much greater than any yet experienced.
The total transporting capacity available to the U.K. and the
U.S.A. cannot be greater for the year 1942 as a whole than it
has been in 1941. We have extra demands in respect of (a) the
Russian needs; (b) the Pacific situation; (c) the transport of
U.S. troops. The decision to increase the U.S. programme taken
two days ago in all that is practicable as regards building.
The real problem now is one of allocation.
2. The U. S. Government has just created a new “Strategic
Shipping Board”, consisting of the Chairman of the Maritime
Commission, General Marshall, Admiral Stark and Mr. Hopkins with
alternates.
This Board will need a “ship planning” organization to prepare
the issues for decision; and will then decide on broad lines the
use of American shipping, while similar
decisions are taken in London as to the use of British
controlled tonnage, including the time-chartered Allies and
neutrals.
It is extremely important since British services and imports
depend to an important extent upon U.S. assistance, that the
American Board should take its decisions after full
consideration of the British position.
The best arrangement would be that, in addition to meeting as a
purely American Board, with executive authority, to decide on
the use of American ships, this Shipping Board should also meet
as a Joint Consultative Board, myself as
Head of the British Shipping Mission being added at such
meetings; and that members of my Mission should collaborate with
the American officials in preparing the plans and statements of
fact, for consideration of the Board.
Such an arrangement would be consistent with what is proposed for
the allocation of supplies. Mr. Hopkins would, I think from a
recent conversation, be in favor of it. Lord Beaverbrook
strongly supports it.
An early decision to this effect would be of great value.
I should, of course, be glad to elaborate this brief note orally
if opportunity offers.
Arthur Salter
January 4,
1942.
