Hopkins Papers
The British Minister of Supply ( Beaverbrook ) to President Roosevelt
Memorandum for the President of the United States
I am asked to say my opinion of the production requirements of the United States for war weapons in 1942.
I confine my recommendations to tanks and anti-tank guns, to aircraft and anti-aircraft guns.
These are the principal weapons in any programme, whether of defence, attack, or assistance to other countries.
The programmes allied to these projects should of course be stepped up accordingly. But the main purpose must always be the production of these four weapons.
[Page 335]Now the stock of the United States in medium and light tanks appears to have been 631 on October 1st last.
On the other hand, the stock of the United Kingdom on the same date was 5,163 tanks, on account of the generosity of the United States in helping Great Britain. About 500 obsolete light types are included in these figures,
But it is evident that the United States has a duty during the year 1942 not only to replace shortages of existing supplies, but also to secure an output consistent with needs.
I heard Mr. Knudsen’s suggestion that the output should be no less than 45,000 medium and light tanks, including of course a few heavy tanks. This discussion took place in the Cabinet Boom last Friday.
The proportion of tanks should be as suggested: two-thirds medium and one-third light.
You will see that this programme involves a very considerable increase of 75 mm. guns, which will be a difficulty. But it is possible to require from Great Britain and the Dominion of Canada an increased production of 6-pdr. guns which could be substituted for 75 mm. guns.
Both Britain and Canada would require some assistance in materials and possibly in the permission to place sub-contracts in the United States.
The anti-tank gun is one of the most important productions for defence purposes and also for attack.
On October 1st last Britain possessed three times as many anti-tank guns as the United States. The British necessities for 1942 amount to 15,000 anti-tank guns.
To be on the same basis as Great Britain, it would be necessary to produce here 17,000 guns in the year 1942. But the basis is not at all comparable. United States’ necessities far exceed Britain’s. And the output capacity of the United States is in every respect greater than that of the United Kingdom. In fact, the British programme is not a complete unit at all. It is a programme which relies entirely on assistance from the United States.
The present United States programme of anti-tank guns is 7,000 guns, with possibly 4,700 added when the target is increased.
It appears to me imperative that a further increase of 6,000 guns should be provided for at once.
The aircraft programme does not surpass the British programme of operational types in any direction, with the exception of light bombers. These are very useful, but other classifications are of more value.
[Page 336]I have already urged that the fighter programme should be doubled. Many difficulties will arise and much argument will take place before such a large target is realised. But it seems to me that the immense possibilities of American industry justify such an expectation.
The need for 24,000 fighters is shown by experience of heavy losses through combat, through flights in war conditions and through operational training exercises.
An examination of British operational experience will convince you of the present necessity for this increased programme.
If the fighter programme is increased by as much as 12,000 in output in the year 1942, then of course other types must also show an increase in output, though not on the same scale as the fighter programme.
In anti-aircraft guns, the United States Government has a very unsatisfactory supply in hand.
The Government is therefore involved in a programme of anti-aircraft weapons not only sufficiently extensive to provide for necessities during the year 1942, but also to build up a reasonable stock for the defence of centres of population possibly exposed to enemy attack.
Stalin told me that Moscow is defended by 800 anti-aircraft guns, and my experience in the Russian capital leads me to believe that he did not under-estimate his resources.
If this indication of anti-aircraft necessities is used for the purpose of providing a programme here, then it appears likely that the antiaircraft project should be based on programmes more than double the present projects, including all increases now contemplated.
The concluding arguments, I regret to say, are based on calculations which can be torn to bits by all those who are experienced in production.
None the less these arguments in support of increased production here should be considered.
I have received from one of the Canadian authorities a statement of output for 1942, which I am assured will be realised.
This Canadian output should be increased fifteen times by the United States, taking into account the national incomes of the two countries. In fact, the resources of the manufacturing community in the United States far exceeds fifteen times the Canadian resources. At the same time Canada gets engines and other parts from the United States.
But on the basis of this multiple of fifteen, the United States output in tanks would be 45,000, in anti-tank guns, 36,000, and in anti-aircraft guns 45,000.