Roosevelt Papers
The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the President
personal and
most secret
Washington, December 31,
1941.
Dear Mr. President, I enclose herein a
copy of a telegram which I have just received from our
Ambassador in Cairo. This telegram is headed “Following from Mr.
Bullitt and Captain Lyttelton”.1
[Page 249]
I am having a copy sent to the Prime Minister.
Believe me, Dear Mr. President,
Yours very sincerely,
[Enclosure]
The President’s Personal
Representative (Bullitt) and the British Minister of State in the
Middle East (Lyttelton) to
President Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Churchill
2
most secret
Cairo, December 31,
1941.
Following from Mr. Bullitt and Captain Lyttelton.
Please convey simultaneously to President Roosevelt and the
Prime Minister personally.
This telegram represents the agreed views of Mr. Bullitt and
myself on the subject of possible invasion of Tunisia if and
when all Tripolitania should be occupied by His Majesty’s
Forces. We have had the advantage of a general discussion
with Catroux, particularly upon the French officers in
Tunisia, but we could not carry on the discussion very far
for obvious reasons.
- 2.
- We assume the following premise applies to-day:
- (a)
- That some resistance by the French in Tunisia
is certain and that French blood would be
shed.
- (b)
- That the strain on shipping and Naval escorts
would preclude the immediate supply of substantial
forces in Tunisia from Alexandria and that,
therefore, the bulk of any supplies for these
forces must come through the Western
Mediterranean.
- (c)
- That it would be impossible to supply forces
through the Western Mediterranean if the French in
Algeria and Morocco should be engaged in
hostilities against us. We must count on the
probability that German Air reinforcements would
cross to Algeria and Morocco and operate against
our shipping from those bases. We must also count
on the probability that the Vichy French fleet
would operate against us.
- 3.
- The Commanders in Chief have not yet completed their
study of the problem and the above premises may
consequently be qualified, but we do not think they can
be materially changed.
- 4.
- Catroux put the minimum force necessary to invade
Tunisia from the South at six Divisions. We think this
should be accepted with reserve but taking into account
the possibility of large reinforcements being brought
from Algeria and Morocco we consider the force must be
substantial.
- 5.
- We consider that in view of 2(c) above operation would not be sound unless
simultaneous with the invasion of Tunisia United States
Forces should seize Casablanca or possibly Agadir. Such
an operation would seem to involve preliminary seizure
or control of Canaries, the Azores and Madeira; we think
invasion of Tunisia must not be considered in isolation
from the problem or of reactions of all French North
African Colonies. We believe there would be French
resistance to landing of American forces unless careful
preparations should have been made within French North
African Colonies. We think it may be possible to have
American forces welcomed in French North African
Colonies provided certain French leaders can be
approached and informed that an American landing in
force at either Casablanca or possibly Agadir is to be
expected.
- 6.
- Above opinions are based on the present situation
remaining unaltered. We believe the Germans may take
action which would bring the majority of the French in
North Africa over to our side if we should be in a
position to give them effective and immediate
aid.
- 7.
- We therefore recommend that if resources permit (a) British forces in Middle East
which are already estimated to be considerably short of
minimum required for defence of two fronts, should be
reinforced; (b) U.S.A. should
immediately start preparations for Casablancan
expedition; (c) propaganda and
subversive activities in all French North African
Colonies should be immediately concerted between the
United States and Great Britain.
- 8.
- With regard to 7 (a)
considerable supply problems will be involved in
employing forces in Tripolitania and if premise 2 (b) is correct we must look to
supplies and reinforcements for Tunisia after its
occupation being shipped through Western
Mediterranean.
- 9.
- With regard to 7 (c) the nature
of the propaganda is one of nice judgement and Bullitt
and I propose to sketch tentative plan for submission to
you.
- 10.
- We would emphasize that this is a preliminary telegram
which is sent by us to reach you while the Prime
Minister is still in Washington and that it is sent
without full consultation between Commanders in Chief.
It appears however to us that if resources are available
in the near future the planning must start at once in
order that we may either be ready to undertake invasion
by force at a later date or reach the highest possible
state of preparations to take advantage of any
favourable opportunity produced by German action against
France.
