Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill

secret

[Palm Beach, Florida, January 10, 1942]¹

Prime Minister to General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee and Defence Committee.

I have availed myself of a few days quiet and seclusion to review the salients of war as they appear after my discussions here.

1. The United States has been attacked and become at war with the three Axis Powers, and desires to engage her trained troops as soon and as effectively as possible on fighting fronts. Owing to the shipping stringency this will not be possible on any very large scale during 1942. Meanwhile the United States’ Army is being raised from a strength of a little over thirty Divisions and five Armored Divisions to a total strength of about sixty Divisions and ten Armoured Divisions. About 3¾ million men are at present held or about to be called up for the Army and Air Force (over a million). Reserves of manpower are practically unlimited, but it would be a mis-direction of war effort to call larger numbers to the armed forces in the present phase.

2. It does not seem likely that more than between a quarter and a third of the above American forces can be transported to actual fighting fronts during the year 1942. In 1943, however, the great increases in shipping tonnage resulting from former and recent shipping programmes should enable much larger bodies to be moved across the oceans, and the Summer of 1943 may be marked by large offensive operations which should be carefully studied meanwhile.

3. The United States Air Force, already powerful and rapidly increasing, can be brought into heavy action during 1942. Already it is proposed that strong bomber forces, based on the British Isles, should attack Germany and the invasion ports. American Fighter Squadrons can participate in the defence of Great Britain and the domination of such parts of the French shore as are in Fighter reach. Additional United States’ Fighter and Bomber forces are much needed in Egypt and Libya, and it may be that the attack of the Roumanian oilfields from Persia by the heaviest American bombers is a project which should be entertained. Meanwhile, also, continuous streams of American bombers are proceeding both westward and eastward to the Pacific theatre of war, which will, of course, be the main scene of United States’ air action in 1942.

4. The Declaration by the President to Congress² of the enormous increases in United States’ output of munitions and shipping to proceed during 1942, and reach full flow in 1943, makes it more than ever necessary for Hitler to bring the war to a decision in 1942 before the power of the United States can be fully brought to bear. Hitler’s need to invade the British Isles has always been great. The difficulties of the operation are also very great. Our preparations to resist have continually improved during the past year, and will be still further augmented by the time the Spring invasion season is reached. Improvements in British preparations comprise:

(a) a far better trained and equipped Army;

(b) stronger and more elaborate beach defences, including substantially increased coast batteries;

(c) the marshalling by the Spring of between three and four thousand medium and heavy tanks in Great Britain, forming the equivalent of seven or eight Armoured Divisions;

(d) by the need imposed upon the invader, arising from the above, of bringing a very large invading Army across the sea, with consequent aggravated difficulty of finding the shipping and of assembling it in the ports and river mouths, and of the greater target presented to British naval and air action.

(e) by the increase in the actual and relative power of the British Fighter Command which can now, instead of fighting at odds, bring superior numbers to bear upon the enemy Air Force over British soil, and can moreover dominate the French coastal regions nearest to the British Isles, viz., from Dunkirk to Dieppe, as well as Cherbourg, during the daytime, thus permitting daylight bombing under Fighter escort, of the nearest and most dangerous regions of hostile embarkation.

5. Notwithstanding all the foregoing, we must continue to regard the invasion of the British Isles in 1942 as the only supreme means of escape and victory open to Hitler. He has had the time to prepare, perhaps in very great numbers, tank transporting vehicles capable of landing on any beach. He has no doubt developed airborne attack by parachutes, and still more by gliders, to an extent which cannot be easily measured. The President, expressing views shared by the leading American strategists, has declared Great Britain an essential fortress of the United Nations. It is indeed the only place where the war can be lost in the critical campaign of 1942 about to open. It would be most imprudent to allow the successful defence of the British Isles to be hazarded. We have, of course, to continue to send about 40,000 men a month, with proportionate munitions and air forces, to the Armies of the Middle East. We have to send, as soon as shipping can be found, several additional Divisions to the Far East, or to replace Divisions withdrawn from the Middle East for the Far East. We also hold certain Divisions ready for particular overseas enterprises. The naval position in the Eastern Mediterranean also requires a very marked increase in British air power along the North African and Levantine shores. We must, therefore, face a continued outward flow of strength from the British Isles, and apart from equipment and armour there is no way in which our home defence army can be sensibly augmented by us. Indeed, the despatch of further Divisions abroad cannot be replaced by us.

6. The sending of four United States’ Divisions (one armoured) into Northern Ireland is therefore a most necessary war measure, which nothing should be allowed to prevent. The replacing of the British troops in Iceland liberates an additional British Division. It is suggested, however, that the United States’ authorities should be asked to consider:

(a) the training in Iceland of as many troops as possible to work in mountains and under snow conditions, as only the possession of such trained mountain and ski troops in considerable numbers can enable liberating operations in Scandinavia to be prepared for the future; and

(b) that the American troops once settled down in the North of Ireland should pass in rotation, first by Brigades and then by Divisions, for tours of duty on the beaches of England and Scotland. This would be of interest to the American troops as well as adding to their experience and the defence of the island.

(c) It is further suggested that, in the absence of other more urgent calls, American Divisions beyond those already under orders may be sent into the United Kingdom where they can if need be perfect their training.

7. The Operation “ Super-Gymnast” might become ripe, or might be forced upon us in the near future by unpredictable political or military events. It would be a misfortune if it were to interrupt the movement called “ Magnet”. Provided the situation in North Africa, France or Spain, undergoes no sudden deterioration, a month or six weeks’ delay might be accepted. Moreover, the military fact which would set French North Africa in a ferment and bring matters to a head would be the arrival of General Auchinleck’s vanguards at the frontiers of Tunis. We cannot tell yet if and when this will be possible; certainly the stubborn resistance of the enemy in Cyrenaica; the possibilities of General Von Rommel withdrawing, or being able to escape with a portion of his troops; the reinforcements which have probably reached Tripoli, and others which must be expected during the delay, and above all, the difficulties of supply for our advancing troops—all will retard, or may even prevent the full completion of Acrobat. We are therefore in a position to study Super-Gymnast more thoroughly, and to proceed with Magnet with the utmost speed.

8. For reasons which are known, the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean is greatly in excess of the British, and it is only the poor morale of the Italian fleet that enables us to dispute the command of the sea, having regard especially to the very numerous well posted air-bases which the enemy has in Tripoli, in Sicily, in Italy, in Greece and in Crete. The concentration of German aircraft in large numbers at these air bases and the number of U-boats they maintain in the Mediterranean, may conceivably portend an overseas expedition to the African shore, or alternatively or as a preliminary, an attack upon Malta, that cruel thorn in their sides. It is, therefore, most important that the maximum air-power—bomber fighter and torpedo-carrying types—we can gather and transport must be installed along that portion of the North African coast which is under our control. Substantial British Air reinforcements are already on the way. The employment of American squadrons, based primarily on Egypt and extending westwards, would be invaluable. It would be for our advantage to develop air war in the Mediterranean on the largest scale on both sides, with constant bombing of enemy airfields and sea-traffic. The German front-line Air Force is already less strong numerically than the British. A considerable portion of it must now be left opposite Russia. But the bulk of the British Air Force has to be tied up at home facing at the present time a much smaller concentration of German bombers and fighters, and yet not able to be moved because of the good interior communications possessed by the enemy and his power of rapid transference. In addition, there is the Italian Air Force to consider. What comparative value should be placed upon them is a matter of opinion.

11. [Sic] The object we should set before ourselves is the wearing down by continuous engagement of the German Air power. This is being done on the Russian front. On the British front it can only be done to a limited extent, unless the enemy resumes his bombing or daylight offensive. But in the Mediterranean the enemy shows an inclination to develop a front, and we should meet him there with the superior strength which the arrival of American Air Forces can alone give. It is of the utmost importance to make the German Air Force fight continuously on every possible occasion, and at every point of attack. We can afford the drain far better than they can. Indeed, like General Grant in his last campaign, we can almost afford to lose two for one, having regard to the immense supplies now coming forward in the future. Every German aircraft or pilot put out of action in 1942 is worth two of them in 1943. It is only by the strain of constant air-battle that we shall be able to force his consumption of air-power to levels which are beyond the capacity of his air-plants and air-schools. In this way the initiative may be regained by us, as the enemy will be fully occupied, as we have been hitherto, in meeting day to day needs and keeping his head above water.

12. Coming further east we must acclaim the very great deliverance to us afforded by the successful Russian resistance along the Don and in the Crimea, carrying with it the continued Russian command of the Black Sea. Three months ago we were forced to expect a German advance through the Caucasus to the Caspian and the Baku oilfields. That danger is almost certainly staved off for perhaps four or five months till the winter is over; and, of course, continued successful Russian resistance in the south gives complete protection to us. This fact alone has enabled us to divert the 18th Division, the 17th Indian Infantry Division and to plan the withdrawal of two out of the three Australian Divisions in Palestine, together with considerable air reinforcements and much material, from the Levant-Caspian front to the new emergencies in Malaya and the Far East. It must be emphasised that we could not possibly have provided for the Libyan operations, the maintenance of the Levant-Caspian front and the Malayan needs simultaneously. Even without the war with Japan we could only have maintained a very doubtful defence of Palestine, Iraq and Persia.

13. The danger may, however, recur in the late Spring. The oil stringency which is already serious in Germany and the German conquered countries, makes the seizure of the Baku and Persian Oilfields objects of vital consequence to Germany, second only to the need of successfully invading the British Isles. No-one can forecast the future course of the Russo-German struggle. Evidently the Germans will suffer increasingly heavy losses during the winter. They may even sustain disasters so great that the Russian counter-strokes will reach the former frontier with consequences to the Nazi regime, both military and internal, which cannot be measured. On the other hand, the enormous power of the German Army may be able to reassert itself as soon as weather conditions improve. In this case they might well be content to adopt a defensive attitude along the northern and central sectors of the Russo-German front, and thrust an offensive spearhead south-east through the Caucasus to the oilfields which lie beyond.

14. They may also persuade or compel Turkey to grant them passage through Anatolia to attack successively Syria, Palestine and Egypt. It would, however, seem unlikely, first that Turkey would agree in view of the Russian strength in the north and of the British activities in Egypt and Libya, and also of the world situation, now that the United States is a full belligerent. Secondly, in the event of a Turkish refusal it seems unlikely that Germany would, after her Russian losses, wish to bring into the field against her the 50 Turkish Divisions by which the inhospitable and difficult mountainous regions of Anatolia would certainly be stubbornly defended. Moreover, if the south-eastward spear-thrust through the Caucasus were successful, the Anatolian line of advance would not be indispensable to the acquisition of the oilfields. The resistance of Turkey as a friendly neutral should be stimulated in every way, and especially by sending whatever supplies are possible in aircraft, anti-aircraft, tanks and antitank equipment. Great Britain has already made promises to aid the Turks with considerable air and land forces if they are attacked and resist. Our ability to fulfil these promises has been prejudiced by the diversions necessary for making head against Japan. On the whole, however, it would seem reasonable to assume that the main danger to be faced in the spring of 1942 in this theatre will be a breakdown in Russian defence of the Caucasus and Baku, and the German advance thence to the oilfields of Persia, and to Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf.

15. We thus see ourselves drawn away towards the West by Crusader, Acrobat and perhaps Gymnast and Super-Gymnast, while at the same time we are drawn farther to the East by the increasing scale of the Japanese war. How are we to meet the danger outlined in the two preceding paragraphs? It will not be possible for Great Britain to replace the 18th British, 17th Indian, and two Australian Divisions moved or already assigned to the Far East, especially if Gymnast or Super-Gymnast should develop. The monthly drafts for North Africa, for the Levant-Caspian front and for the Malayan theatre, which have already averaged for many months 35,000 a month, will probably rise to 50,000 if existing units are to be maintained and if the necessary British contingents of the five new Divisions being raised in India are to be supplied. This will strain to the utmost both the escorts and the shipping necessary to move these monthly convoys in and out of the danger zones in the British Isles, and it is a three or four months’ round voyage via the Cape of Good Hope to Suez, Basra or Malaya. It is doubtful whether more than one, or at the outside two, new Divisional formations can be transferred from Great Britain to the various eastern theatres in six or eight months. It would not be wise to call upon India for further reinforcements for the Levant-Caspian theatre, as all her resources will be needed to nourish the war against Japan in the Malayan theatre, to defend Burma (and it may be India) and keep open the Burma Road to China. After the move to the Far East of the Divisions mentioned above has been completed we shall, therefore, have in the Levant–Caspian region only the 5th Indian Division in Cyprus, the 50th British Division at Baghdad, one Australian and one Armoured Division (as yet only partly formed) in Palestine, the 8th, 9th and 10th Indian Divisions in Persia and Iraq—total 7 Divisions. We shall have in Egypt and North Africa three British Armoured, the 70th British, the New Zealand Division, 2 South African Divisions, 4th US Indian Division and various British Brigade Groups and Polish and French contingents the equivalent of, say, three Divisions—total 11 Divisions. It seems likely that this force will be fully occupied in maintaining the North African shore, especially if the fighting front should extend westwards into Tunis.

16. It is a question to be profoundly considered whether the United States would not be wise to contemplate the development of an American Army, based on the Persian Gulf ports, to operate to the northward with the British and Empire forces set out above. The monster liners sailing from United States’ east coast ports could perhaps find their fullest employment in carrying American troops through the great ocean spaces via the Cape to the Persian Gulf. If an American Army of six or eight Divisions could be developed north of the Persian Gulf, it would, added to the seven we have and proportionate air forces, with any reinforcements we can send, be a powerful factor in the war against Germany. Whether this Army of, say, 15 Divisions, or any part of it, should stand purely on the defensive or should move forward to the Caucasus and even to the Russian southern front north of the Black Sea, would be dependent upon events on the Russo-German front, on where that front would be standing in the third quarter of 1942 and on the development of the communications by road and rail from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. It must be observed that any large force moved and maintained from the Persian Gulf in the Caspian basin will, of course, choke the southern warm water supply lines by which it is proposed to carry munitions into Russia. If nothing can be done and the Russian southern front is beaten in (which may not happen), a frightful gap will be open which at present there is nothing in sight to fill, and the loss of the oilfields of the Caspian and Persia, and of all the regions between the present Russian front and the frontiers of India cannot be excluded from our thoughts. It is suggested that the Joint Staffs should study and report on the possibilities which are open, the precise object being the development of at least fifteen Divisions in the Levant-Caspian theatre.

Far East

The War Against Japan

17. It is generally agreed that the defeat of Germany entailing a collapse will leave Japan exposed to overwhelming force, whereas the defeat of Japan would not by any means bring the world war to an end. Moreover, the vast distances in the Pacific and the advantageous forward key-points already seized or likely to be seized by the Japanese will make the serious invasion of the homelands of Japan a very lengthy business. Not less lengthy will be the piecemeal recovery, by armies based mainly on Australia and India, of the islands, airfields and naval bases in the south-west Pacific area now confided to General Wavell. It seems, indeed, more probable that a decision can be reached sooner against Germany than against Japan. In any case, we cannot expect to develop adequate naval, air and military superiority in the aforesaid area for a considerable time having regard to other calls made upon us and the limitation of shipping.

18. While, therefore, it is right to assign primacy to the war against Germany, it would be wrong to speak of our “standing on the defensive” against Japan; on the contrary, the only way in which we can live through the intervening period in the Far East before Germany is defeated is by regaining the initiative albeit on a minor scale. Certain measures stand out clearly and are indeed imposed upon by events:

(a) The Philippines must be held as long as possible if only to detain Japanese forces there.

(b) The supply lines to China via Burma must be kept open and fought for with the utmost energy.

(c) The Singapore fortress and its immediate approaches must be defended to the utmost limit.

(d) The Dutch Possessions in Java and Sumatra must be disputed on a constantly increasing scale.

(e) The air routes from Australia to the S.W. Pacific area and the sea routes from the United States to Australia must be maintained.

19. None of the above defensive operations will be successfully accomplished apart from the development of a counter-stroke offensive on a minor, but nonetheless, considerable scale. In a theatre of a thousand islands, many capable of being converted into makeshift air and naval bases, insoluble problems are set to purely passive defence. The Japanese having obtained temporary command of the sea, and air predominance over considerable areas, it is within their power to take almost any point they wish apart from the fortress of Singapore. They can go round with a circus-force and clean up any local garrisons we or the Dutch have been able so far to hold. They will seek to secure their hold by a well-conceived network of air bases and they no doubt hope to secure, in a certain number of months, the possession of the fortress of Singapore. Once in possession of this as well as Manila, with their air bases established at focal points, they will have built up a system of air and naval defence capable of prolonged resistance. They may succeed in doing this, in which case the end of 1943 or 1944 may well see them still ensconsed in the possessions they have so easily won. On the other hand, the wider they are spread the greater the weight of the war upon them and the larger the target they expose. Their air-power cannot be replenished or maintained at strength comparable to that of the United States and Great Britain. The naval superiority of the United States, to which Great Britain will contribute to the best of her ability, ought to be regained by the Summer of 1942.

20. It is not proposed here to discuss the steps by which the American-British naval superiority will be attained. Thereafter, or at least as soon as possible, raids should be organized upon islands or seaports which the Japanese have seized. The President has, I understand, ordered the formation of a force akin, on the West Coast of America, to the Commandos. Such a force, on account of its individual qualities, will be exceptionally valuable by gaining key-points and lodgments in amphibious operations. It would require to be supported by a number of small Brigade Groups whose mobility and equipment would be exactly fitted to the particular task foreseen, each task being a study in itself. It is not necessary, unless required on strategic grounds, to stay in the captured or re-captured islands. It will be sufficient to destroy or make prisoners of the garrison, demolish any useful installations, and depart. The exact composition of the forces for each undertaking and enterprise is a matter for separate study. According to our experiences it would seem essential that there should be adequate cover by sea-borne aircraft and detachments of tanks and tank landing craft. The enemy cannot possibly be prepared and must be highly vulnerable at many points. After even a few successful enterprises of this character, all of which are extremely valuable experiences to the troops and Commanders for instructional purposes, he will be terrorized out of holding places weakly, and will be forced to concentrate on a certain number of strong points. It may then be possible for us to secure very easily suitable islands, provided we do not try to hold too many, in which air and re-fuelling bases of a temporary or permanent character can be improvised. The establishment of a reign of terror among the enemy’s detached garrisons would seem to be an extremely valuable preliminary to the larger operations for re-conquest and the building up of strong bases as stepping stones from Australia northward. (Unfinished)

1. The source text, which bears no place or date, incorporates various editorial changes in Churchill’s hand, with paragraphs numbered as shown here. In The Grand Alliance, pp. 699–700, Churchill referred to it as follows: “During my rest in Florida I prepared a fourth memorandum in two parts addressed to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and for the Defense Committee of the War Cabinet. This was written also for American eyes. It differed from the three previous papers in that it was composed after the opening discussions in Washington between me and the President and his advisers and between the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently on my return to London I circulated all these papers to the War Cabinet for information. A very large measure of agreement had already been reached between our two countries, and the War Cabinet accorded in effect a very wide degree of approval to the direction which had been given to our affairs.” An abbreviated text of this memorandum is printed ibid., p. 700.
2. For text of the Annual Message of the President to the Congress, delivered before a joint session of the two Houses of Congress on January 6, 1942, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. vi, January 10, 1942, p. 39.