Defense Files
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
WW–1 (U.S. Revised)1
I. Grand Strategy
1. At the A–B Staff conversations in February, 1941,2 it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.
2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.
3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A–B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.
II. Essential Features of Our Strategy
4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.
- a.
- The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.
- b.
- The maintenance of essential communications.
- c.
- Closing and tightening the ring round Germany.
- d.
- Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities, and propaganda.
- e.
- The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.
- f.
- Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests and deny to Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.
III. Steps To Be Taken in 1942 To Put Into Effect the Above General Policy
The Security of Areas of War Production.
5. In so far as these are likely to be attacked, the main areas of war industry are situated in:—
- a.
- The United Kingdom.
- b.
- Continental United States, particularly the West Coast.
- c.
- Russia.
6. The United Kingdom. To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat invasion.
7. The United States. The main centres of production on or near the West Coast of United States must be protected from Japanese seaborne attack. This will be facilitated by holding Hawaii and Alaska. We consider that a Japanese invasion of the United States on a large scale is highly improbable, whether Hawaii or Alaska is held or not.
8. The probable scale of attack and the general nature of the forces required for the defense of the United States are matters for the United States Chiefs of Staff to assess.
9. Russia. It will be essential to afford the Russians material assistance to enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue their war effort.
Maintenance of Communications.
10. The main sea routes which must be secured are:—
- a.
- From U.S.A. to the United Kingdom.
- b.
- From U.S.A. and the United Kingdom to North Russia.
- c.
- The various routes from the United Kingdom and U.S.A. to Freetown, South America and the Cape.
- d.
- The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to India and Burma, to the East Indies and to Australasia.
- e.
- The route through the Panama Canal, and U.S. coastal traffic.
- f.
- The Pacific routes from United States and the Panama Canal to Alaska, Hawaii, Australia and the Far East. In addition to the above routes, we shall do everything possible to open up and secure the Mediterranean route.
11. The main air routes which must be secured are:—
- a.
- From the U.S. to South America, Freetown, Takoradi, and Cairo.
- b.
- From Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, Australasia.
- c.
- From the U.S. to Australia via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia.
- d.
- The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya via the Netherlands East Indies.
- e.
- From the U.S. to the U.K. via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland and Iceland.
- f.
- From the U.S. to the U.K. via the Azores.
- g.
- From the U.S. to Vladivostok via Alaska.
12. The security of these routes involves:—
- a.
- Well-balanced A–B naval and air dispositions.
- b.
- Holding and capturing essential sea bases. The main
sea bases which are, or may be, required, apart from the
terminal points to the various routes, are:—
- Bermuda
- Iceland
- Gibraltar or the Canaries
- The Azores
- Cape Verdes
- Freetown
- Dakar
- Madagascar
- Ceylon
- Hawaii
- Samoa
- c.
- Holding and capturing essential air bases. The main
air bases which are or may be required, apart from the
terminal points to the various routes, are:—
- Newfoundland
- Greenland
- Iceland
- Azores
- Bermuda
- Trinidad
- Belem
- Natal
- Freetown
- Ascension Island
- Takoradi
- Lagos
- Kano
- Ft. Lamy
- Khartoum
- Massaua
- Cairo
- Habbaniya
- Basra
- Teheran
- Kuibyshev
- Dakar
- Karachi
- Calcutta
- Hawaii
- Christmas Island
- Palmyra
- Canton
- Samoa
- Fiji
- New Caledonia
- Townsville
- Darwin
- Glencurry
- Koepang (Timor)
- Soerabaja
Closing and Tightening the Ring Around Germany.
13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows:
Archangel—Black Sea—Anatolia—The Northern Seaboard of the Mediterranean—The Western Seaboard of Europe.
The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast.
14. If this ring can be closed, the blockade of Germany and Italy will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or to the Atlantic seaboard of Africa, will be prevented. Furthermore, the seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to convoys, thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long haul around the Cape.
The Undermining and Wearing Down of the German Resistance
15. In 1942, the main methods of wearing down Germany’s resistance will be:—
- a.
- Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces.
- b.
- Assistance to Russia’s offensive by all available means.
- c.
- The blockade.
- d.
- The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements.
Development of Land Offensives on the Continent
16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany, except on the Russian front, will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited land offensives.
17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, via the Scandinavian Peninsula, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by simultaneous landings in several of the occupied countries of Northwestern Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory programme should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out.
The Safeguarding of Vital Interests in the Eastern Theatre
18. The security of Australia, New Zealand, and India must be maintained and Chinese resistance supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be [Page 214] developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:—
- a.
- Hawaii and Alaska.
- b.
- Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines.
- c.
- Rangoon and the route to China.
- d.
- The Maritime Provinces of Russia.
The minimum forces required to hold the above will have to be a matter of mutual discussion.
- The memorandum is printed as it was revised by the United States Chiefs of Staff. The source text was Annex 1 to JCCSs–1; see ante, p. 89. Further revisions of the memorandum were agreed to on December 31; see ante, p. 145.↩
- A footnote on the source text identifies “A–B” as “American-British”. For a reference to sources of information on these conversations, see ante, p. 16, footnote 2.↩