Defense Files

United States Minutes
secret
JCCSs–11

1. Post-Arcadia Collaboration

The Conference had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff on Post-Arcadia Collaboration (WW–8).1

Sir Dudley Pound said that the arrangements for collaboration on the operational side proposed in the paper would be suitable not only for ABDA, but for all other operational matters as well. The question of intelligence was closely bound up with planning, and this aspect was also dealt with in the paper. As regards the allocation of war matériel, the British Chiefs of Staff felt that if we were to get the best use out of our resources, allocation must be made on strategical grounds in accordance with general directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. America and Great Britain would each take on certain groups of Associated Nations and, after receiving bulk allocations from United States and British production, would sub-allocate them among their own groups.2

[Page 198]

The Conference then considered the paper paragraph by paragraph.

It was agreed that Paragraph 2 would be better worded as follows:

“2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word ‘Joint’ should be applied to Inter-Service collaboration of One Nation and the word ‘Combined’ to collaboration between two or more United Nations”.

Admiral Stark, referring to Paragraph 3, said that the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that if anyone could carry out the duties laid down therein, they would rather have Sir John Dill than anyone else. They felt strongly, however, that there should be no Military Representative of the British Government above the Chiefs of Staff level. They would not desire for a moment to have any similar arrangement in London whereby a Military Representative of the United States had direct access to higher political authority. He thought it only right to express the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff quite frankly on this matter, though he realized that the President and the Prime Minister might have come to some other agreement on the matter.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff would have to refer the matter to the Prime Minister, as any decision on this point would have to be taken on a higher level.3

Admiral Stark said that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted, without comment, Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the paper, but in Paragraph 6 would like to have the following amendments made:

  • Line 4—delete “either”.
  • Lines 5 and 6—delete “or considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting”.

The principle that coordinated intelligence should be available for the Planning Staffs was fully accepted, but the details would have to be worked out by the Planning Staffs in collaboration.

As regards Paragraphs 8 to 11 (Priorities and Allocation), the United States Chiefs of Staff entirely agreed with the principle enunciated in the first sentence of Paragraph 8. The United States organization for allocation was not, however, yet in final shape, and before accepting the remainder of these paragraphs, they would like to examine the matter further.

Sir Dudley Pound suggested that the principle involved in this matter was so important that it would be desirable for the Combined [Page 199] Chiefs of Staff to submit their recommendations to the President and the Prime Minister.

A draft minute was handed round for discussion and agreed to, subject to certain amendments. A copy of the agreed minute is attached to Annex l.4

General Marshall in this discussion emphasized that there could be no question of having any duplication of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization in Washington and in London. There could only be one Combined Chiefs of Staff who would give broad directions on the allocation of matériel. He saw no objection whatever to having parallel Allocation Committees in Washington and London, dealing with the allocation of American and British war matériel respectively.

The discussion then turned on the control of shipping dealt with in Paragraph 12.

General Marshall felt that the Chiefs of Staff should have control over shipping resources so that they could apply them to the best strategic purposes. It was hoped that something similar to the British system for the control of shipping would be set up in the United States; but the problem was more difficult since they were not a maritime nation like Great Britain, and the importance of shipping was not well realized in the United States. Many other interests clashed with strategic requirements when it came to dealing with shipping.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff had no control over the Ministry of War Transport in the matter of shipping, but they had access to all the facts and could make their case to the Prime Minister on military grounds if there was a clash of interests between strategical requirements and imports.

Admiral Stark said that the United States Chiefs of Staff could not accept anything more than the first sentence of Paragraph 12, since their own organization for the control of shipping was not yet settled. It followed, therefore, that Paragraph 13 also could not be accepted at present.

Sir Dudley Pound undertook to let the United States Chiefs of Staff have a short memorandum on the British system for the control of shipping and raw materials.5

The Conference—

a
Took note of the proposals for Post-Arcadia Collaboration made by the British Chiefs of Staff in WW–8, and of the extent to which these had been accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the discussion recorded above.
b
Agreed that the minute on the principle for the allocation of finished war matériel, as amended in discussion, should be submitted by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister respectively. (See Annex 1.6 Portions in Annex 1 indicated as deleted are those indicated in the discussion above as subjects for further consideration by the United States Chiefs of Staff.)

2. Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater—First Half of 1942

The Conference had before them a report by the Joint Planning Committee on movements and projects in the Atlantic theater for the first half of 1942 (U.S. Serial ABC–4/6, British Serial WW (J.P.C.)6).7

Sir Dudley Pound welcomed the idea of United States forces being sent to the Freetown-Bathurst area in certain circumstances, as proposed in Paragraph 14.

Admiral King pointed out that the adverse effects on other operations of carrying out various projects had only been set out in the case of North Africa. It should be made clear that any of these projects would have repercussions on others. Some reference should also be made in the final paragraph to the Northeast Brazil project.

The Conference—

Approved the report by the Joint Planning Committee, subject to the following amendments:

a.
At the end of paragraph 6, add:
Note. If any of the other operations mentioned in this paper are undertaken, they will adversely affect other operations in some or all of the above ways to a greater or less extent”.
b
Paragraph 17, insert new subparagraph (4) as follows: “(4) That the United States plans for the security of Northeast Brazil should be kept active”.

Renumber existing subparagraph (4) as subparagraph (5).

(See Annex 2.)7

3. Operation Super-Gymnast

The Conference agreed to postpone consideration of the Joint Planning Committee’s reports on Super-Gymnast (U. S. ABC–4/2 and 4/2A and British WW (J.P.C.) 2 and 2A) until the next meeting.

  1. The reference is to the original version of WW–8, post, p. 217.
  2. See the memorandum by Macready, post, p. 349. For discussion of the staff talks on the question, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 249–250.
  3. In telegram 277, January 20, 1942, to Hopkins, Churchill agreed that it would be “far simpler and plainer that he [Dill] should come into the Combined Staff as our chief representative” without standing in any “undefined relation between me and the President.” (740.011 E.W. 1939/18676)
  4. The “draft minute” is the attachment to the revised version of WW–8, post, p. 232.
  5. Not printed.
  6. Annex 1 consisted of the revised version of WW–8 plus the attached “draft minute”, post, p. 230.
  7. As amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, this report was serialized as ABC–4/6, WW–14, January 13, 1942, post, p. 258.
  8. As amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, this report was serialized as ABC–4/6, WW–14, January 13, 1942, post, p. 258.