Defense Files
United States Minutes
JCCSs–10
1. Shipping for United States Reinforcements for the Far East
General Marshall gave the Conference an outline of certain proposals which had been submitted by the United States Staffs for expediting the move of American reinforcements to the Pacific and ABDA Area. (See Annex l)1 He explained that these proposals had been developed since the meeting of United States and British shipping experts on the previous evening. If the proposals were accepted, it would be possible to sail a convoy of 21,800 men from New York for the Far East on January 20. Of this, some 10,000 were earmarked for the defense of New Caledonia, the remainder being ground staffs for air squadrons. The effect would be to reduce the Iceland convoy sailing on January 5 from 8,000 to 2,500 and the Northern Ireland convoy from 16,000 to 4,000. Certain additional American ships not at present scheduled for troop movements would [Page 183] also be employed, such as ships on the South American trade, and train ferries.
Brigadier Napier said that the proposal for the Queen Mary to take American troops to the United Kingdom and pick up a load there for the Middle East was a new idea which he had not yet had time to study. At the shipping conference the proposal had been that she should take troops from New York to South Africa for onward carriage in the United States ships West Point and Wakefield across the Indian Ocean. The proposal that the Mount Vernon, Wakefield and West Point should be left in the Indian Ocean for a second round trip from the Middle East to the Far East was also new. London had already arranged an Indian Ocean convoy program which excluded these ships, in order that they should revert to American use, and must be consulted as to their most useful employment.
Sir Charles Portal inquired whether the shipment of some 400 aircraft to the Far East would cut into American aircraft replacements to the Middle East. It seemed very probable that there would be intensive air operations in the near future in the Mediterranean, and the rate of attrition there was likely to be much more heavy than in the Pacific, where air operations were sporadic and on a comparatively light scale. In these circumstances, he would not be able to agree to any diversion from the Middle East. It was the P–40 and Martin 187 Baltimores in which he was particularly interested.
General Arnold, after inquiry, confirmed that the proposed program would not interfere with the dispatch of replacement aircraft of the P–40 and Martin 187 types to the Middle East.
General Marshall pointed out that the reinforcements proposed would involve a cut of up to 30 per cent in monthly deliveries to Russia. This would be in addition to a certain deficiency which was already likely to arise on the program of supplies to Russia up to April 1, 1942. The ships involved in the United States reinforcement program would be diverted from carrying supplies to Russia for a period of up to four months.
Sir John Dill said that undoubtedly there would be considerable pressure on political grounds not to cut down Russian supplies in any way.
Admiral King pointed out that it was doubtful whether the Russians could clear the full amount of supplies which were delivered to them. In so far as this was the case, therefore, a cut in deliveries would be of no consequence.
Sir John Dill said that the effect of the proposed program, so far as Ireland was concerned, appeared to be a postponement of the arrival of some 20,000 troops by one month. In the case of Iceland, the rate of relief of British troops and the United States Marines would be cut down to about 2,500 per month. He thought these reductions [Page 184] could be accepted in view of the urgent needs of the Far East. A token force of some 4,000, at least, would be going to Northern Ireland and that was of great political significance.
Brigadier Napier inquired whether, if 21,800 men were sailed from New York on January 20 in the ships which were loading for Iceland and Ireland, they would not arrive in the Pacific Area before their equipment, which would have moved in slower freight ships. He had had this consideration in mind when suggesting that the Queen Mary should take United States personnel to South Africa for onward carriage after she had finished docking in New York. Under this arrangement the troops would have arrived about the same time as their equipment.
General Marshall said that it seemed important to rush in personnel in one convoy, if possible, in order to simplify the escort problem. Moreover, it was likely to be easier to get the troops through without enemy interference if it were done earlier rather than later. It might be necessary to accept the fact that the personnel would arrive without all of their equipment. At the present time the only American forces in Australia were the ground staff for one bomber group with a certain number of pilots, and an artillery brigade which had no ammunition. Ammunition and a certain amount of equipment for this brigade were due to arrive there almost immediately.
In his view, the whole question was one of priorities. For example, was the dispatch of some 10,000 troops for New Caledonia of greater strategic importance than the relief of British troops in Northern Ireland, or supplies to Russia? An immediate decision was necessary on the Ireland and Iceland shipping, since ships already loading in New York would have to be unloaded and re-stowed if they were to get away on January 20.
Admiral Stark summed up the effect of General Marshall’s proposals as follows:
- a.
- They would set back the relief of Northern Ireland by one month.
- b.
- The Middle and Near East would not be affected.
- c.
- The supply and Lend-Lease materials to Russia would be reduced by 30% for a period of three to four months.
- d.
- The situation in the Far East would be immeasurably strengthened.
After some discussion it was generally agreed that the postponement of the dispatch of some 20,000 troops to Northern Ireland by one month and the reduction in the rate of relief of the troops in Iceland could be accepted, but that there should be no interference with the supply of American aircraft to the Middle East. The crux of the position, therefore, was whether a cut of up to 30 per cent in monthly deliveries to Russia could be accepted for a period probably of four months.
[Page 185]The Conference:
- a.
- Agreed that the provisional program as outlined by General Marshall would have to be referred to the President and the Prime Minister for a ruling on the question of interruption of Russian supplies;
- b.
- That, before the proposals for the use of the Queen Mary and the three United States ships in the Indian Ocean could be accepted, it would be necessary to consult the British Shipping Authorities in London in order to insure that convoy programs already worked out were not upset, and that shipping was used in the most economical manner.
2. Defense of Island Bases Between Hawaii and Australia
General Marshall signified his acceptance of the report of the Joint Planning Committee on the defense of island bases between Hawaii and Australia (U.S. ABC–4/8, British WW (J.P.C.) 8) subject to the amendments which had been agreed to in discussion at the previous meeting. (See Annex 2)2