Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Defense Files

United States Minutes

secret
JCCSs–9

January 11, 1942.

1. Establishment of Command in the ABDA Area

Admiral Pound read to the Conference Part I of a telegram which had been received from General Wavell,¹ in which he gave an account of a Conference held on the afternoon of 10th January, with Admiral Hart, General Brett, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, and other commanders, and stated that he was establishing his Headquarters ten miles north of Bandoeng. Part II of the telegram had not yet been received.

The Conference took note of the telegram.

2. Situation in the ABDA Area

Admiral Stark said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had been giving thought to the situation in the ABDA Area, which appeared to be critical. They felt that there was a good case for subordinating everything in the immediate future to the necessity for getting reinforcements quickly into that Area. Might it not be right, for example, to cut down the flow of United States troops to Northern Ireland and Iceland, if by so doing further assistance could be sent across the Pacific?

General Marshall said that it was not a question of diverting troops, since these were available for both purposes. The problem was to find the necessary tonnage. The immediate necessity was to convey [convoy?] to Australia anti-aircraft troops, ground staff and equipment for the aircraft arriving out there, and for personnel to organize and operate the bases which must be established in Australia.

The United States Chiefs of Staff had considered whether additional shipping could be provided by cutting down the programme of reinforcements to Hawaii, but there was little to be obtained in that way, as urgent reinforcements had already been diverted to Christmas and Canton Islands, and to Samoa. The present programme of shipments of men and matériel across the Pacific would take three months, the situation being what it was. Should not the priorities over the next few weeks be weighed, with a view of deciding whether the reinforcement of ABDA could be accelerated by diverting ships from other projects, such as the moves to Iceland and Northern Ireland, and operation Super-Gymnast ?

Marshal Dill suggested that the best way of tackling the problem would be for the shipping experts to get together, consider total tonnage available, and see what sort of a programme could be drawn up.

Admiral Stark asked whether Singapore was in immediate danger, and how long it might be expected to hold out.

Marshal Dill said that it would be a race between the arrival of reinforcements, and the progress of the Japanese. If the projected reinforcements arrived, there seemed no reason why Singapore should not hold out indefinitely. A risk had had to be taken in moving the Australian Division from the Mersing Area over to the Northwestern front, but one Indian Brigade Group had already arrived, and a British Brigade Group and 51 Hurricanes were due to arrive on 13th January.

Admiral Stark thought that if there were a chance that the race could be won, it would be worth while doing anything possible to hasten the arrival of reinforcements, and to build up the position as quickly as possible. If Singapore and the Philippines were captured by the Japanese, they would be free to bring their whole weight to bear on the Netherlands East Indies.

General Marshall said that already the Japanese could move troops from the Philippines and use them for other purposes, and, in his opinion, certain indications pointed to their already being in process of doing so.

Air Chief Marshal Portal said that it would certainly be a great waste of matériel if aircraft reinforcements were poured into the ABDA Area without the necessary ground staff to operate and maintain them. He felt that before a decision was taken to sacrifice the North Atlantic move in order to provide ships for the Pacific moves, it would be well worth while holding a general review of the shipping situation. This might reveal other resources which would enable us to carry on with both projects. It should be borne in mind that the move of United States troops to Northern Ireland and Iceland was part of a chain of movements extending through the Middle East to the Far East; and he would be reluctant to see it abandoned.

General Marshall said that he did not think it would be necessary to do more than cut down the strength of the convoy which was shortly due to sail for Magnet , to approximately 10,000 men. The ships required for the Pacific move would have to be of a certain type in order to manage the long sea passage.

Admiral King inquired whether, if the North Atlantic convoy were cut so as to release personnel ships to carry 10,000 men, the urgent Pacific moves could then be accomplished.

General Marshall said that it would accommodate three antiaircraft regiments badly needed in the ABDA Area; that it was not only a question of personnel ships; freight ships would also be required. That the basic problem was to accelerate movements requiring three months to consummate, into one month; those contemplated within the next few weeks to be undertaken within the next two weeks; that time—even days—is the pressing factor.

After further discussion it was agreed that the problem should be put forthwith to the British and American shipping experts, and the following terms of reference were approved:—

“To make proposals for providing shipping from United States and British resources to carry to the ABDA Area the urgent reinforcements of men and matériel which the United States Army wishes to send in the immediate future; and to show at what cost to other commitments this shipping can be found.”

The above terms of reference were conveyed without delay to General Somervell, U. S. Army, and to Brigadier Napier, British Army, for immediate action.

General Gerow left the Conference in order to be present at the discussion.

3. Establishment of United States Forces in Northern Ireland

The Conference had before them a report by the Joint Planning Committee on the establishment of United States Forces in Northern Ireland. (U. S. ABC–4/7, British WW (J.P.C.)7)²

Air Chief Marshal Portal referred to Paragraph 5 (c) 3 in which it was stated that it would be the responsibility of the British to provide adequate air protection and support for the United States field forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland. He explained that the British forces in Northern Ireland were generally protected by our own system of fighter defense, the local air forces in Northern Ireland for protection and support being one night fighter squadron, two day fighter squadrons, and one Army cooperation squadron. It was proposed to make no change in these forces so long as the United States forces were not engaged in active operations, except that in some emergency it might be necessary to make a temporary reduction in the British air forces in Northern Ireland, for example, if concentrated attacks were made on convoys on the Eastern coast of England. If active operations developed in Ireland, the present British plan was to send three bomber and two fighter squadrons in addition to the air forces already there. These additions were, of course, dependent on the general situation at the time. If the main attack on the United Kingdom was being put in at some other point and an attack on Ireland were only a feint, it might not be possible to send all these additional forces. On the other hand, if the main point of danger seemed to be in Ireland, they might well be increased. He inquired whether these arrangements would be satisfactory to the American Chiefs of Staff. He did not wish them to expect a higher scale of air support than the British would be able to provide.

General Arnold said that the scale proposed would be acceptable to him in the circumstances.

Admiral King pointed out that since it was a matter of judgment whether the air protection and support would be “adequate”, it would be more correct to change the word “adequate” to “appropriate.”

The Conference approved the report by the Joint Planning Committee (U.S. Serial ABC–4/7, British Serial WW (J.P.C.)7), subject to the substitution of the word “appropriate” for “adequate” in line 2 of paragraph 5 (c) (3). (See Annex l.)²

General Marshall left the Conference at this point.³

4. Defense of Island Bases Between Hawaii and Australia

The Conference had before them a report by the Joint Planning Committee on the defense of island bases between Hawaii and Australia. (U. S. ABC–4/8, British WW (J.P.C.)8).⁴

General Arnold, referring to Paragraph 9 (d), questioned the advisability of sending air forces to New Caledonia “even if this has to be at the expense, initially, of the ABDA Area.” Even if shipping were available there were not available a pursuit squadron and a medium bomber squadron to be sent immediately except at the expense of the ABDA Area. He did not think that New Caledonia should have priority over Fiji or Samoa. Samoa was of particular importance, since if it were lost the air route for the heavy bombers from America to the ABDA Area would be cut.

Admiral King pointed out that New Caledonia was of great importance to the ABDA Area. Not only were the nickel mines a tempting bait for the Japanese, but also if the Island was in Japanese possession, all reinforcements to the ABDA Area would have to take the long route south of New Zealand.

General Holcomb said that the garrison proposed for Samoa (in the Annex to the paper)⁵ was already en route. There was no question of diverting any part of it.

Admiral Pound suggested that the shipping experts who were examining the possibility of providing additional shipping for reinforcing the ABDA Area should be instructed to take into account the needs of New Caledonia and see if it were not possible to send in the necessary reinforcements without taking anything away from what was proposed for the ABDA Area itself. General Gerow was notified of this.

General Arnold pointed out that shipping was the limiting factor only for the land forces; in the case of air forces, it was availability.

After some discussion it was agreed that the first sentence of Paragraph 9(d) should be amended to read as follows:—

“That the defense of New Caledonia should, in principle, be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should, as a temporary measure, furnish forces for the defense of the Island immediately after meeting the emergency in the ABDA Area.”

Admiral King said that the following addition should be made to Column (c) of the Annex under Item 3, Samoa:—

• 1 Fighter Squadron
• 1 Dive Bomber Squadron

Admiral Turner explained that reference had been made to the need for obtaining from Australia an opinion as to the priority for arming the Free French on the Island because there was some doubt whether, in view of the shortage of equipment and shipping, these troops were worth arming at the expense of other requirements in, say, Australia. It had not been intended by the Joint Planning Committee that these forces should never be armed at all.

The Conference:—

a. Accepted, in principle, the report of the Joint Planning Committee (U.S. ABC–4/8, British WW (J.P.C.)8), subject to confirmation by General Marshall, and to the amendments agreed in the discussion.

b. Invited the British Chiefs of Staff:—

(1) To obtain without delay from Australia an opinion as to the priority for arming the 3,700 Free French in New Caledonia;

(2) To take up immediately with the Free French the question of the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant of the nickel mines, and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in New Caledonia.

c. Agreed that the American and British shipping experts should be instructed to include in the examination which they had been ordered to carry out (vide Minute 2)⁶ the possibility of sending urgent reinforcements from America to New Caledonia, without retarding the rate of reinforcing the ABDA Area itself.

5. Inclusion of Port Darwin in the ABDA Area

Admiral Pound said that a telegram had been received from General Wavell pointing out that it was not clear whether Port Darwin was included in the ABDA Area as defined in his directive or not. He felt that it should be, since it was linked up with the control of the Timor Sea, which was his responsibility. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed that there was more to be considered than the mere local defense of the port, but Australia would, of course, have to be consulted. It appeared that since Port Darwin was an essential base of the ABDA Area, the case might be covered by Paragraph 2 of the directive, which placed General Wavell in command of forces “located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective Governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.”

Admiral Stark expressed, on behalf of the American Chiefs of Staff, the opinion that the defense of Port Darwin should be made the responsibility of General Wavell, in view of the fact that it was a necessary base for the ABDA Area.

The Conference adjourned at 6:00 P.M., to meet at 2:00 P.M.,⁷ January 12, 1942.

1. Not printed.
2. As amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, the report was serialized as ABC–4/7 (Approved), WW–12, post, p. 256.
2. As amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, the report was serialized as ABC–4/7 (Approved), WW–12, post, p. 256.
3. Marshall had an appointment with Roosevelt at 5:30 p.m.
4. As amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, this report was serialized as ABC–4/8 (Approved), WW–13, January 13, 1942, post, p. 325.
5. The annex to ABC–4/8 (Approved), WW–13 is not printed. It consists of a four-page list of the military forces and equipment on, and en route to, New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa, Canton, Christmas, Palmyra, and Borabora.
6. i.e., section 2 of the minutes, ante, p. 177.
7. The Chiefs of Staff did not meet until 4 p.m. on January 12; see post, p. 182.