500.A15A5/698: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 29—8 a.m.]
114. For the President and the Secretary. Supplementing our 113, February 28, 10 p.m., it is of course unlikely that all of the principal naval powers will decline to come into a treaty.
[Page 82]If, however, in such an unlikely event you should deem it inadvisable to sign alone with Great Britain or to commit yourself in advance to do so I suggest that we do not go on record specifically to that effect at the present but that we stipulate in a memorandum that in case none of the other Washington Treaty powers or any other principal naval power as the case may be except the United States and Great Britain are prepared to sign the proposed treaty the United States and Great Britain will then exchange views and determine what action they shall take under the circumstances with a view of at least preventing a naval race as between themselves and of promoting an ultimate general limitation and reduction in naval armaments. My reason for this suggestion is that other naval powers will be more likely to sign if they are kept guessing as to what the United States and Great Britain will do in the event that all or some of them do not adhere and they will have less incentive to try to bargain or dictate conditions upon which this [they?] will come along.