500.A15A5/695: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
113. For the President and the Secretary. Your 48, Feb. 27, 6 p.m. As I interpret your 46, Feb. 25, 8 p.m., the only substantial difference in the procedure suggested by you and the second alternative outlined in my 110, Feb. 27, noon, is with regard to inviting other powers to adhere to the draft treaty. I concur entirely in your view that the British, who have taken the initiative, should keep it and do the inviting.
Eden told me today that since our last talk he had had two long conversations with the German Ambassador and that he was still encountering some difficulties with Germany due to the unfortunate publicity with regard to the questions raised by the French as to the method of Germany’s being brought into the naval treaty. The Germans apparently have no objection to the technical provisions of the proposed treaty but object to run[ning] the risk of being put into a position of committing themselves to sign a treaty if and when the French navy permit. Eden thinks he may be able to obviate this difficulty through a supplementary bilateral treaty with Germany but, as he has explained to the Germans, he will do this only in case of necessity and as a preliminary step towards bringing Germany ultimately into a multilateral treaty.
Eden says that the French are becoming more nearly disposed to reach agreement but have not yet given definite assurances to that effect. If this is not done before Monday, he will take the matter up direct with Flandin in Geneva. He is very hopeful that the French will come alone [along] on a three-power agreement although they claim that Italy, in refusing to join in an agreement partly on technical grounds, makes it more difficult for France to make the necessary concessions to meet the British and ourselves. He thinks that if the Italians will give the same assurance to the French that they gave to us today it would be most helpful (see my 112 Feb. 28, 2 p.m.). Eden [Page 80] expressed the opinion that while we should not let up in our efforts to get France to agree to a draft treaty which the three of us may at least initial, it would be a tragic thing in the situation that exists in the world today if we should terminate our efforts here without any concrete accomplishments and that the United States and Great Britain should consider what agreement or measure of accord they can reach and what steps they may best take to bring about an ultimate general agreement. In case it is not possible to get France to come along, the British think this may be the only way to break the political deadlock which has been injected into the Conference and which now prevents a four-power naval agreement and may prevent France from reaching a three-power agreement despite the fact that there are no insuperable technical difficulties. Eden stated in effect that the United States and Great Britain should make every possible effort to prevent other naval powers from injecting extraneous questions and thereby to stymie both of us completely in an effort to work out a solution of the naval problem. Furthermore, that Great Britain was prepared to cooperate with the United States to the fullest extent compatible with the limitation of our policy.
In view of the extremely critical situation now existing and particularly the recent developments in Japan,66 we share Eden’s opinion that it is highly important that at least Great Britain and the United States as the two principal naval powers should show that they are in some measure of agreement and that it would be most unfortunate for the Conference to terminate without putting on record any definite accomplishment. We recognize, of course, the objections to signing a bilateral naval treaty. We, nevertheless, think that something could be worked out in accord with the suggestions in your 46 and which would be acceptable to the British.
In order to be sure that our views are in complete harmony with yours, I may say that what we have in mind is to complete a draft treaty, incorporating into it the technical agreements already reached and the remaining one as to battleships, doing so in collaboration with the British and such of the other delegations as are willing to cooperate. This draft would be left open by a recorded decision of the Conference or by a memorandum of such delegations as may agree for subsequent signature on a date prior to December 31, 1936, to be determined. The British Government, as the inviting power, would submit the draft to the other powers and, on the basis of the replies received, determine the time and method of signature.
We have thought of two lines of procedure. One would be for such powers as are in agreement to initial the draft treaty or, two, signify [Page 81] through a memorandum their willingness to sign the treaty at the time fixed, provided in the meantime the other principal naval powers agree to sign or to do so with the appropriate escape clauses if any of the other naval powers refuse. In case Great Britain and the United States should be the only ones now prepared to initial the draft or to signify their willingness to sign such a treaty, we must determine whether or not subsequent signature of the treaty shall be conditional upon it being signed by one or more of the naval powers.
If at least three of the Washington Treaty powers sign the proposed treaty no difficulty will arise for us provided adequate escape clauses are included. On the other hand, there are two other contingencies which may possibly arise and which we feel should be considered. One is that only Great Britain and ourselves may be ready to sign upon any fixed date. While the President expressed himself as willing to reach an understanding with the British as to naval policy, he was opposed to negotiating solely an Anglo-American naval treaty. He may feel, however, that the objection he had in mind would not hold if the two of us are the only ones to enter a treaty to which all of the naval powers had been previously invited to adhere and which continues to remain open to them. If, notwithstanding this, the President’s objection still holds, we could agree with the British that in case no other principal power agrees to sign the proposed treaty, we may then determine through an exchange of views whether the draft may serve as a basis for a naval understanding between our two Governments either through simultaneous declaration on an exchange of notes or just what action we shall take.
The other contingency is that Germany might not care to be the only other power besides Great Britain and ourselves to agree in the end to sign the proposed treaty. If you think this possibility might raise political difficulties for us it could be obviated by a provision to the effect that in order that such a treaty be effective it must be signed and ratified by say at least three of the Washington Treaty powers.
- Telegram in two sections.↩
- For correspondence concerning political developments in Japan, see vol. iv, pp. 706 ff.↩