500.A15A5/702: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)
54. Your 113, February 28, 10 p.m., and 114, February 29, noon. We agree with your view that it would be appropriate to complete a draft treaty to be left open either by a recorded decision of the Conference or by a memorandum given by each delegation to agree to sign the treaty later. The time for signing might be postponed to a date which would give the British Government, as the inviting power, time to submit the draft to the other powers and to determine the method of signature and the limit of time for signing or adhering.
Whether we initial the draft, or signify by a memorandum our willingness to sign later, seems to us immaterial provided our agreement to enter into the treaty is subject to the final adherence of the other principal naval powers, and provided the treaty has appropriate escape clauses in case all the principal naval powers do not come in.
I do not see any difficulty in our signifying our willingness now to enter into the treaty at a later time even if Great Britain and ourselves are the only ones who might be prepared at this time to signify such acceptance. In this case, I think it would be preferable for us not to initial the treaty with Great Britain, but to signify our willingness by depositing a memorandum to that effect with the British Government.
[Page 83]I consider it advisable to defer at this time any decision as to the action we might take in the event the British and ourselves are the only ones who are ready to sign the treaty at the end of the limit of time for which it would be left open for signature. We could, it seems to me, assure the British, but not formally, that we would be glad to confer at the end of the time limit as to the procedure to be adopted in the event that our two countries are the only ones ready to enter into a treaty.
As far as Germany is concerned, an American-Anglo-German Treaty seems inadvisable. I suggest the British be informed that in view of the essentially European aspects of the German Navy and the fact that the German Navy even under the proposed Treaty would not exceed more than approximately a third of the total British naval force, the United States would greatly prefer a bilateral British-German arrangement if based essentially on their ratios as at present agreed on. A way of avoiding a three-power treaty including only ourselves, Great Britain and Germany, would be to adopt the provision you suggest to the effect that in order that the new treaty be effective it must be signed and ratified by at least three of the Washington treaty powers.