Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1936, General, British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/635: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State

London, January 24, 1936—8 p.m.
[Received January 24—8 p.m.³⁸]

67. My 66, January 23, 10 p.m. In a recent conversation Monsell and I had agreed that representatives of our navies should meet to discuss a possible compromise between our differences—such compromise to be considered by us and if it gives promise of acceptance to be referred by me to you for approval.

Following this understanding Schuirman³⁹ and Danckwerts⁴⁰ met on Wednesday to discuss on purely personal and unofficial basis any possible methods to reconcile American and British views on size of guns of capital ships and on qualitative limits of cruisers and numbers of 10,000-ton cruisers in both subcategories. Schuirman and Danckwerts exchanged suggestions and with these suggestions in mind Admiral Chatfield called on Admiral Standley⁴¹ Thursday for further discussion on these points.

Part I. Cruisers.

In opening the cruiser discussion Chatfield said they will build 25 or more of smaller type in the next 5 or 6 years. It is of great importance to them that their cruisers should not be individually outmatched by larger vessels. He hoped Japan will not build more 8-inch gun cruisers or more large 6-inch gun cruisers. He said the United States might not want as many small cruisers as Britain but pointed out that there is nothing to prevent the United States from matching the increase in British cruiser tonnage by building other types such as aircraft carriers. Quantitative limitation is gone forever he said. In regard to qualitative limits for cruisers Standley said that it was essential that the new treaty provide for both category A cruisers and 10,000-ton category B cruisers. Also that we could not agree never to build any more 10,000-ton cruisers as these categories are necessary when replacements become due and to enable us if necessary to reply to Japanese building in those types (we also had in mind excessive cruiser building by Great Britain). The British are apparently ready to [agree to?] retention of these types provided that a 5-or 6-year building holiday commencing January 1, 1937, is agreed to. It should be noted that our agreement to this holiday means consenting to a quantitative limitation on these two types in a treaty which is otherwise purely qualitative.

The reason for fixing the length of the building holiday at 6 years instead of a shorter period, say 3 years, was because a nation might delay all cruiser construction for a short period in order subsequently to build the larger types, whereas if it were for 6 years every nation would have to undertake some cruiser construction and would therefore become committed to the smaller type. Also unless this were done nations might start replacements of 8-inch gun cruisers ahead of the time when they were normally due and before the British had completed their program of smaller cruisers.

The first category A replacement cruiser in any navy is due to be laid down by Japan in 1943. The British suggest that the termination of the 10,000-ton cruiser building holiday in both subcategories might therefore logically be fixed as January 1, 1943. Admiral Standley suggested that we must consider a building holiday in big cruisers as provided in the British plan until January 1, 1942.

Chatfield also stated that the British intend to lay down two 9,000-ton 6-inch cruisers this year which the London Treaty permits; that would give them [fifteen] category A and ten category B cruisers over 8,000 tons against our eighteen category A and nine 10,000-ton category B cruisers. Chatfield made the point that their ten 9,000-ton cruisers would be a tonnage balance against our nine 10,000-ton cruisers. (We do not know whether or not Great Britain intend to invoke the escalator clause to retain any or all of the Hawkins class but we will endeavor to ascertain their intentions.)

Admiral Standley stated that we had indicated our willingness to refrain from building large cruisers over a certain period of time. We could not agree to no more big cruisers for all time. If the British cruiser fleet became no larger than 60 we might match in cruiser tonnage their increase but with their program unlimited we could not agree to such an undertaking. If the British have 70 cruisers we would not want to match them all in cruiser tonnage.

From what Chatfield said the conclusion is inescapable that the British position on qualitative limits is inextricably bound up with the details of the European situation generally and their naval agreement with Germany particularly. We agreed that their problem was much more complicated than ours and pointed out that that fact made it more difficult for us to deal with them, as any compromise on our part had to be such as would enable the British to fit it into their agreement with Germany and the consequent effects of this agreement on France and Italy and still satisfy the British position vis-à-vis Japan. We pointed out that the proposed compromise between the United States and Great Britain to limit category A cruisers and 10,000-ton category B cruisers for a period of years was a delicately balanced one to meet a particular situation between those two nations and that when it emerged from the First Committee after discussion by France and Italy it might bear but slight resemblance to the original.

It should be noted that the expressed British intention to build 25 or more cruisers in the next 6 years will result in a large increase over the present allowed cruiser tonnage and, if overage cruisers are retained, will result in at least 70 cruisers and not 60 as we understood on December 8 (see memorandum, enclosure despatch of Dec. 23⁴²).

Summarizing as to cruisers, the British proposal is an agreement for all powers after January 1, 1937, not to build for a period of 6 years any more 8-inch gun cruisers nor any more 6-inch gun cruisers over 8,000 tons. They propose to group all combatant ships under 8,000 and over 100 tons with a gun not larger than a 6.1 in a category to be known as “light service [surface] vessels”.

Having in mind that the British proposal, although apparently only qualitative, involves limitation on the number of cruisers of categories A and B for a period of years and that it provides no other limit of total tonnage in other categories, an expression of the Department’s views as to the acceptability of the British proposal is desired.

Part II—Capital Ships.

In presenting our views as to the capital ships, Standley emphasized the fact that in this as in other matters we had done everything we could to foster and support a closer Anglo-American accord. He also pointed out that the 16-inch gun was a superior weapon for our needs and that with Japan free, American public opinion would not understand and would not support an agreement which in effect weakened our relative strength as compared with Japan. He stated that in his opinion our position would be best sustained by accepting the existing limits of the Washington Treaty, i. e. 35,000 tons with 16-inch guns with a proviso that if all signatories to the Washington Treaty would prior to January 1, 1937, so agree to the size of the guns would be limited to 14 inches for the life of the treaty or for a definite period.

The British counterproposal was to rephrase our proposal to read that the limit would be 35,000 tons with 14-inch guns and if Japan or any other principal naval power refrained from coming into this agreement by January 1, 1937, the permitted gun calibre would revert to the Washington Treaty limits.

Chatfield in presenting their view said in substance that all Europe wants smaller ships but the British do not feel as strongly about that as they did. They have no intention of pressing their limits but for public consumption they may lead off in the Conference by repeating their desire for smaller ships. There would be considerable moral advantage from a disarmament point of view if we could agree on 14-inch guns. The British will lay down two ships next year. Whatever happens they state these ships will have to be 14-inch gun ships and will have to be fast ships to meet the building of fast ships in Europe. They believe a 14-inch, 35,000-ton ship is better balanced than one with 15-inch or 16-inch guns. Chatfield stated that phrasing the treaty their way is more likely to appeal to the world and would be more likely to exert moral pressure on Japanese authorities. He said the result is the same but it is a matter of tactics.

Chatfield told us that the British want the 14-inch gun because they cannot build both a [fast?] ship and a 16-inch gun ship on 35,000 tons. In addition, their design has proceeded to the point where a change to a 16-inch gun, if made, would involve a delay in laying down their first two battle cruisers which they intend to do early in 1937.

Obviously, the difference as regards capital ships is one of approach. As Chatfield stated the results will be the same in either case. The Department’s views on the proposed conditional reduction to the 14-inch gun are requested.

Davis

38. Telegram in four sections.
39. Commander R. E. Schuirman, U. S. N., technical adviser for the Navy Department.
40. Capt. V. H. Danckwerts, R. N., Admiralty adviser to the British delegation.
41. Admiral William H. Standley, Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. N., and American delegate.
42. Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, p. 156.