500.A15A5/634: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 23—7:24 p.m.]
66. My 62, January 21, 2 a.m., last paragraph. A difference of opinion between the British and ourselves has developed as to the meaning of the informal understanding arrived at in the bilateral conversations last September and October with regard to qualitative restriction for capital ships and cruisers and a limitation upon the number of 10,000-ton cruisers of both subcategories.
Our contention is that the tentative agreement as to gun caliber and tonnage of capital ships was conditional on a qualitative agreement to which Japan was a party and that the tentative agreement to build no more category (a) cruisers except as replacements and to limit the number of 10,000-ton category (b) cruisers was conditional on a quantitative agreement. The British contend that as we have both for some time envisaged the possibility that Japan would pull out and that no quantitative agreement was possible among the remaining powers that we should proceed with qualitative limitation with the understanding that the caliber of capital ships guns be reduced to 14 inches, that no further 8-inch gun cruisers be built except as replacements, and that no further 10,000-ton 6-inch gun cruisers be laid down after January 1, 1937. The British, of course, [Page 43] envisage adequate provision for freedom of action in case Japan fails to abide by the limits imposed. The British point out that as early as last September they recognized the virtual impossibility of getting Japan to agree to the continuance of quantitative limitation or perhaps to enter into any treaty at all. They consequently asked us at that time “whether, if Japan would not join in any agreement, the United States would be willing to consider a pact (to include France and Italy) with a let out clause” (see Embassy’s telegram No. 439 Sept. 12, 8 p.m. 193534). We informed them that we would be willing to do so and that “it would be advisable under these circumstances that such an agreement be in effect a continuation of existing naval treaties with such modifications as the circumstances may require and that it should be left open for Japanese adherence at any time” (Department’s 261 September 19, 6 p.m. 193535).
In the discussions in London which followed, the American representatives were authorized to state that we concurred in the British suggestions as to the reduction of gun caliber of capital ships to 14 inches, subject to British and Japanese concurrence and that “as part of a comprehensive accord on cruisers” we could agree to the nonconstruction of category (a) cruisers other than as replacements (Department’s 300 October 14, 1935, 6 p.m.36) In a conversation on December 8, which Mr. Phillips, Admiral Standley and I had with the First Lord, the First Sea Lord, and Craigie (see memorandum enclosure to despatch of Dec. 2337) we informed them after ascertaining, as we then understood, that what they desired was to increase the numbers of their cruisers 60 including 10 overage, that within the limits of this proposition we could agree not to insist upon building any further 10,000-ton ships either in the 8-inch or 6-inch gun class except as replacements, although we would not scrap any of the 10,000-ton ships already laid down. This, of course, was still upon the assumption of a comprehensive agreement.
While the American acceptance of these qualitative reductions was made conditional upon a comprehensive agreement, the British contend that throughout the discussions that have taken place since the arrival of the American delegation it has been evident that Japan would not adhere to such an agreement and that quantitative limitation had become impossible. They claim that they were therefore under the impression that we would not make the nonparticipation of Japan an obstacle to continued negotiations along the lines agreed upon last year.
[Page 44]The British argue that while it is politically difficult for Japan to make a reasonable naval agreement now, Japan realizes the futility of starting a naval race and a qualitative agreement between us with adequate escape provisions would serve as a powerful deterrent to hold Japan in line.
The view which we have repeatedly set forth to the British is that the concessions we were willing to make in the qualitative field were the price we were willing to pay for a comprehensive quantitative agreement.
The British are very much disturbed by the possibility of an Anglo-American disagreement now that the subject of qualitative limitation is before the Conference, especially since the other powers, although preferring greater reductions, appear to be willing to accept the limitation reduction involved in restricting future capital ship gun gradations to 14 inches and in the nonconstruction for at least some years of additional 10,000-ton cruisers in both subcategories. Moreover, there is the danger that this difference will become public and be played up as evidence of American unwillingness to participate in any important qualitative reductions in the absence of Japan. There seems to be no difficulty with respect to agreements reached on aircraft carriers, submarines and the nonconstruction zone.
I naturally want to avoid, if possible, any evidence of a difference of opinion or to be the one that is blocking a qualitative agreement. The adjournment during these few days has given us time for further conversations with the British in the hope of working out a compromise. I am sending another telegram giving the results to date of these conversations.