500.A15A5/638: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 26—6:35 p.m.]
72. Further study of my 67, January 24, 8 p.m. leads me to fear it may be confusing. The facts are that the proposed cruiser compromise was offered by the British and was discussed by our naval advisers on the understanding that it was purely tentative and subject to approval by Washington. Standley believes it acceptable in view of our present status in 10,000-ton cruisers but desired the views of Washington before definitely committing us. I fully concur in Standby’s views as to the acceptability of the cruiser compromise.
In substance this proposal provides within the framework of a qualitative treaty what is in effect a quantitative restriction on 10,000-ton cruisers until 1942 but without quantitative restrictions on smaller cruisers or any other types. This would be subject, however, to two escape clauses.
- 1.
- To provide that in case any high contracting power felt itself menaced by excessive building in any category by any power, it would be free of the restriction on numbers of 10,000-ton cruisers. This clause would be invoked by us in case Japan should exceed her present ratios in 10,000-ton cruisers or in case of excessive cruiser building by Great Britain—say beyond 70.
- 2.
- A general escape clause in case any power did not abide by the qualitative limits to be fixed in the new treaty.