500.A15A5/632: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
64. The French Ambassador came to see me last night to discuss the future procedure of the Conference, particularly with regard to inviting Germany and Russia in at an early date as the British wished to do. He said that while France, until the Anglo-German naval accord,31 favored bringing Germany into the naval negotiations, conditions had now changed radically. In the first place the political situation in France is now very precarious, and in the second place the British naval agreement with Germany raises serious questions for France. He said that they were now doubtful of the wisdom of making a naval agreement with Germany unless they could get a secondary agreement as to land and air armaments which he admitted was now impossible. Furthermore, he said that sitting in conference with Germany to negotiate a new naval agreement would be construed as a condonement of Germany’s violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
The French consider it desirable to try to reach some agreement temporarily to which we should endeavor to get Japan, Germany and Russia to adhere at a later date, but that unless Japan, at least, were to become a party to the agreement they could not see that it would be of much value.
I told him that if such an agreement were only to be made effective on condition that Japan adhere he could be sure that Japan would refuse, but that if provision were made in such treaty for freedom of action on the part of the contracting powers in case of departure from its limits by a noncontracting power the latter would have more incentive to abide by the limits fixed.
I added that the question of German participation was primarily one for France and England to determine since we are not a party to the Treaty of Versailles and since we do not wish to mix in European political problems.
Monsieur Corbin then asked if there was a possibility of substantial reductions in types which would justify us in going ahead. I told him we could at least agree not to increase any of the types provided for under existing treaties, either as to tonnage or calibre of guns and that I thought we might perhaps agree upon certain reductions which I proceeded to outline.
[Page 41]He said that if that was all the reduction we could get it would be a very great disappointment to the French.
I replied that although the minor reductions that could now be agreed upon might be disappointing to certain powers it would be infinitely better to agree not to increase existing types than to have no qualitative agreement and an ensuing naval race which in the course of years would make the present types seem small indeed. He remarked that this was an important aspect to consider.
In conclusion Monsieur Corbin said that he was waiting for a further reply from his Government in answer to his report of the talks he had had with the British regarding Germany and that as soon as he received a reply be would like to have another talk with me as they were anxious to work out something if now possible.
In a conversation with Reber32 tonight Boncour and Deleuze33 reiterated what Corbin had said about the impossibility from the political angle for France to agree at this time to include Germany in the conference. No government in France could survive if it agreed to making such advance to Germany. They said that the British who had told them last summer that Germany would agree to whatever qualitative limits were accepted by the five naval powers were now insisting that she must be given an opportunity to express her own views and must therefore be brought into the conference at some future date. The French are convinced that the Anglo-German naval accord is only valid pending the conclusion of a more comprehensive naval agreement and that the British fear that if the wider agreement were to prove unacceptable to Germany the bilateral accord would fall and Germany regain her complete freedom of action.
The only solution which Boncour considers might be acceptable to his Government is to have the four powers prepare the best qualitative agreement possible and leave it open until the end of this year for the adherence of Germany and of Japan. If these two powers have not accepted by that time the others are going to again reconvene to discuss the situation. The French add that even in this case England must accept the responsibility of presenting this agreement to Germany.
The political situation in France is such, Boncour explained, that if some such solution cannot be found the French feel that it might be better to end the conference now and wait at least until after the elections have taken place in France before resuming negotiations. They add that this delay may also make Japan’s return easier. In order, however, to avoid making the German issue the cause for [Page 42] adjournment they may insist upon lower qualitative limits—which they in any case would prefer—than are acceptable either to England or to ourselves thus precluding any further progress at this time.
Boncour leaves for Paris tomorrow to seek final instructions as to the position France will adopt at the next meeting of the First Committee now scheduled for January 29.
In a talk with Lord Monsell this evening he told me that while the French were taking a very irreconcilable position just now he was convinced that they would ultimately recede from it and accept a qualitative agreement such as contemplated because it is of vital importance to France that the Anglo-German naval agreement which is a protection to France as well as to England should continue. Moreover, it is most important for the French to have an agreement limiting the number of 8–inch gun cruisers which Germany can build and providing for exchange of information.
The British have intimated to us that it is essential that any qualitative agreement shall include Germany.
- Telegram in two sections.↩
- For correspondence concerning accord, see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, pp. 162 ff.↩
- Samuel Reber, technical assistant for the Department of State.↩
- Jean Paul-Boncour and Capt. E. E. Deleuze, technical advisers to the French delegation.↩