740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/654
Report by the Military Attaché in Germany (Smith)13
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To anyone who has studied the German political literature of recent years, there is little mystery connected with Germany’s present move. No nation has ever studied with greater thoroughness the effects of military force on world politics as Germany has done in her last eighteen years of military impotence. She has seen all her own political and diplomatic maneuvers come to naught, for lack of a military basis. Efforts to obtain friends and allies failed repeatedly because Germany could only receive favors and never give them. Rightly or wrongly therefore she has come to the belief that a strong military position is a prerequisite to a successful diplomacy and to an improvement of her position in the world.
The rearmament of Germany which began in 1933 and which was announced openly on March 16th, 1935, was a first step towards a strengthening of her international position. The non-attack treaty with Poland14 was a second step, the importance of which for Germany is now abundantly clear. Together these measures improved her position somewhat, but they still failed to close the weak links of her armor, the open and defenseless western frontier. Just across this wide open gap stood France, the strongest military power of Europe, walled in by impregnable fortifications, but still constantly endeavoring by more and more intricate defensive alliances in Eastern Europe to encircle Germany and nullify her efforts for expansion.
This combination of French military alliances, anchored fast to the League of Nations covenant has given France a predominating position on the European continent, not possessed at any time since the early years of Louis XIV’s reign, for Napoleon even in his most victorious years was always challenged by both Russia and England. From 1919 to 1933 there was no challenge to France.
It is against this dominating position of France in Europe that Hitler’s Rhine action strikes home.
The German General Staff no more thinks of attacking, let alone breaking the wall of France’s fortifications in Alsace and Lorraine, than it dreams of attacking Peoria Illinois. The German soldier knows it would be suicide, both now and as long as France remains even a moderate military power. The German General Staff, however, knows equally well, that its action on the Rhine is a definite challenge to France: not to its security but to its political domination of Europe.
[Page 259]The prelude to any German foreign policy whether it be actually military or purely diplomatic must be the erection of a defensive front against France. As long as the danger exists for Germany, that any step by Germany in Eastern Europe can be brought to naught by a mere French threat to occupy the Ruhr and Rhineland, such a step has to be left unmade. A German-Austrian policy or a German-Czechoslovakian policy is unthinkable so long as the open gap of the Rhine remains and France can offer strong and effective military assistance to her Central European allies.
Viewed as a politico-military question, Germany’s action becomes clearly understandable and we can see the immense importance of her move for the future history of Europe. The “symbolic” Rhine occupation is the first step towards the erection of a solid defensive front in the west. Whatever course the present negotiations will take, Hitler and Germany will scarcely yield an inch on two essential points:
- 1)
- The creation of a one-sided neutral zone in favor of France;
- 2)
- Any infringement of Germany’s sovereignty which makes it impossible for her to create a solid defensive front with respect to France.
There appear to be four possible outcomes of the present crisis.
- 1)
- The crisis may end in a general European pacification.
- 2)
- The crisis may peter out with a moral condemnation of Germany’s act but with no actual punitory measures.
- 3)
- Punitory measures of a financial and economic nature may be applied by a large group of nations.
- 4)
- An aggressive war may be launched by France and her allies upon Germany.
In case course 2 (moral condemnation) develops, we may look to see Germany commence immediately the fortification of her western frontier while continuing to strengthen the army.
In case course 3 (Punitory Financial Measures) is taken, the same German reaction will occur. The Rhineland will be fortified intensively, economic autarchy pushed and the army continue its expansion. This course is quite likely to result, ultimating in military aggression by Germany in Central Europe perhaps in 1937, perhaps at some later time more suitable to the German General Staff. The danger of a German “explosion” must be faced as an imminent possibility, provided the financial and economic pressure on Germany is severe enough to threaten seriously her position.
The outcome of the present crisis if either course 1 or 4 (General pacification or war) is adopted by France and her Allies, is more problematical. A French invasion will be met by a German people fully united behind Hitler, and with a formidable army, which will not easily be overrun and which if France’s allies are not too numerous, might well check the French attack. The effect of course 1 (General [Page 260] Pacification) upon Germany’s position, on the lines proposed by Hitler is even less easy to prognosticate.
If either course 2 or 3 (moral condemnation, financial punitory measures) are adopted, Germany’s military position will slowly improve as the army expansion continues and the fortifications of the Rhineland become an actuality. Autarchy is already too advanced in Germany, to permit effective economic or financial sanctions being applied. Suffering and privation there might be and probably would be, but so far as one dares prophesy, these would not be sufficiently serious to warrant the belief that Hitler would fall or Germany change its present course.
It seems probable that no other course in the present crisis than war will prevent a marked improvement in Germany’s world position. Let there be any other solution, and we will shortly hear the rattle of the footsteps of the Little Entente climbing off the French and onto the German band wagon. For in one year Germany will be as impregnable to France on the Rhine as France now is to Germany.
The Rhine move is far more than a peaceful reentry of garrisons into a few German cities. By a single daring move on the diplomatic chess board, he has cut the military basis from under the whole series of French post war alliances.
Come what may, the present crisis represents the end of an historic era. The “World War” is coming to its closing chapters. Versailles is dead. There may possibly be a German catastrophe and a new Versailles, but it will not be the Versailles which has hung like a dark cloud over Europe since 1920. March 7th 1936 is already a historic date in the history of the world.