740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/590
Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson)11
As to what is taking place in London, Mr. Motta12 is not better informed than the daily press. He says that events seem to be happening [Page 256] with such rapidity and the scene shifting with such complexity that the Swiss Legation finds it difficult to do more than keep abreast of the general currents as reported in the press.
In respect to the general question, Mr. Motta says that whereas, as I knew, he had been inclined to side with the French in the discussions with Great Britain in respect to the Ethiopian question, now he was, on the contrary, inclined to side with the British point of view in respect to the Rhineland invasion. The further he understands the British point of view in respect to this matter, the more clearly he sees that it matches his own. He thinks the French have gone far too far in their legal conceptions. He points out that international affairs cannot be construed on a purely legalistic basis. The matter of Germany’s occupation of the Rhineland, for example, would not be settled by a court decision, unless that court were so constituted that it could pass on equity as well as law. The Latins, Mr. Motta says, go to palpable absurdity in their legalistic conception, witness the conception “the father is he whom the marriage indicates.” This is true in the majority of cases, happily, but there are exceptions, and the law takes no cognizance of such exceptions in the Latin mind. In this present situation in the Rhineland, there is no shadow of a legal doubt in the question, but there is plenty of equity or extenuating circumstances or whatever you like to call it, and these should not be lost sight of, even through Hitler’s brutality.
I told him confidentially of a message I had had from Berlin, to the effect that our people believed that the offer was really constructive in the opinion of responsible Germans, and that it was a final offer. Mr. Motta said this checked absolutely with his own impression and that which he had given to the Federal Council yesterday.
He then discussed Switzerland’s situation in respect to this matter. There is not a shadow of an obligation, according to him, either legal or moral, resting on those States which signed neither the Treaty of Versailles nor the Locarno Pact, and which are nevertheless members of the League of Nations, to carry out punitive measures in respect to a violation either of the Treaty of Versailles or of the Locarno Pact. He has had a careful study made of this question and this is his definite conclusion and he has so reported to the Federal Council. He has said nothing openly about it as yet, as he sees no reason to take an attitude publicly unless necessity arises.
He had a conversation with Mr. Westman (Swedish Minister to Bern) yesterday and found that the Scandinavian states are adopting in this question what Mr. Motta calls a negative attitude. They do not feel, in any case, that they can apply sanctions against Germany. I asked him whether they had reached the same legal conception of [Page 257] their responsibility as Switzerland. He said that Mr. Westman had not so stated to him—that that phase of the matter had not been touched on.
This led Mr. Motta into an analysis of what the League of Nations now stood for. He said that if this crisis had happened in exactly the same way before the existence of the League, two or three weeks would have necessarily elapsed before the parties even got together. Those weeks would have been spent discussing whether, where and how they would get together. The strength of the League lies in the automatic obligation to consult, and, added Mr. Motta, there is no other strength in the League, that he could see. He has come to the belief, after the endeavor to apply sanctions to Italy, that little or no distinction can be drawn between economic and military sanctions. Military sanctions mean war, and nobody wants to apply them. Economic sanctions, to be effective, must develop into military sanctions. If they are applied and are not effective, they merely exasperate the situation. Now one comes to a palpable absurdity. A second nation has violated a treaty, and a first violator is called into council not only to condemn the second, but still greater absurdity, it has been suggested that it apply sanctions against the second. Therefore, the use of coercion in the machinery of the League of Nations has, Motta thinks, been ruled out on a sort of reductio ad absurdum. Furthermore, should the League be changed or rather curtailed of its functions to be merely a body for automatic and prompt discussion of danger, it would doubtless attract the entrance of other States, even, perhaps, of the United States. He said that Mr. Westman had said to him, spontaneously, yesterday, that he, personally, had come to the conclusion that one of the inescapable results of the whole story of the past eight months must be the stripping of the League of Nations down to its essentials and the establishment thereby of a League compatible with actualities. Doubtless, Mr. Motta thinks, such an endeavor would be bitterly contested by Russia and perhaps by other states. These states might gain in popular opinion as being the friends of peace through insisting on “collective action.” Nevertheless, men of common sense must learn by experience and it is difficult to see what other lesson we can draw from what has transpired since the League undertook the Ethiopian question.
The foregoing should not give the impression that Motta is any the less a League enthusiast than he has been in the past. This would be contrary to the facts. He believes in the League sincerely, but as a clearing house for the ventilation of dangerous situations and not as a means of coercion, either for prevention or for punishment.