740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/559
The Minister in the Netherlands (Emmet) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 2.]
Sir: With reference to my telegram No. 13, of March 19, 11 a.m., 1936,15 I have the honor to inform the Department that on March 18th I had a talk with Prime Minister Colijn, whom I met at the annual Royal Netherlands Industries Fair held at Utrecht.
We talked for some time about the European situation, which was rapidly coming to a head with the meeting of the four Locarno powers, in conjunction with the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, also being held in London on that day. Dr. Colijn, a [Page 261] realist in public affairs as in other relations of life, took a rather serious view of the European political situation looked at from long range, although he thought there was no immediate danger of war. He thought affairs were in the hands of men who could and would control them sufficiently to avert present war but not sufficiently to secure a lasting peace through a new pact. He was of the opinion that the present international crisis would be patched up but not healed.
He thought that the two recent unilateral denunciations of treaty obligations by Germany (the denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles about a year ago, when Hitler announced that Germany intended to increase her armed forces to full strength in contravention to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and now the denunciation of the Pact of Locarno, whereby Hitler announces that Germany will occupy the demilitarized zone) were explained, though not justified, by the inequality complex that now obsesses Germany, who is constantly smarting under what she feels is the injustice and inequality imposed on her by the Treaty of Versailles. The average German man-in-the-street today feels that the Treaty of Versailles was the work of the devil and was designed to subjugate and humiliate Germany. Any new agreement, pact or treaty (as was the case to a certain extent with Locarno) that perpetuates and continues any inequality that was imposed on Germany or the Germans by the Versailles Treaty is an anathema and has a right to be denounced, because the poison of Versailles is in it; it makes no difference whether Germany signed it voluntarily,—if it perpetuates any inequality of the Versailles Treaty, which Germany did not sign voluntarily, it must be eradicated before Germany is precluded from denouncing it. It is this demand for equality on the part of the Germans, involving a feeling which in intensity far transcends any scruples they otherwise might have against violating a treaty obligation, that explains their willingness to approve the unilateral denunciation on their part of a new pact or treaty which perpetuates any inequality contained in the Versailles Treaty without consulting the other signatories to it.
Dr. Colijn, as well as other prominent Netherland statesmen—men like Jonkheer van Karnebeek and Jonkheer Beelaerts van Blokland (with both of whom I have spoken within the last six or seven days) felt that some such psychology as I have just outlined explained Germany’s approval of its unilateral denunciation of Locarno. Dr. Colijn did not attempt to justify that frame of mind, but accepted it as a fact and faced the reality that a solution must be found which acknowledged its existence if the wounds under which the European political situation suffers are to be healed and the surface of the European political situation is to be calmed down. But he did not think the French would heal the wounds,—on the contrary, he thought they [Page 262] might favor prolonging the agony and making Germany smart further under the accusation of being a treaty breaker without justification or excuse; in other words, continuing the inequality instead of killing it. He thought Belgium would probably be motivated the same way. He regretted the divergences, and thought it a pity that all hands were not able to get together and agree on a realistic, practical basis, although he did not have entire faith in Germany’s ability to stay put. He was under no illusions about that side of their character.
He said that he thought the new peace plan offered by Hitler in the shape of a non-aggression pact might have good results if entered into whole-heartedly by everyone, and tend to maintain peace in Europe for a considerable time but, as stated above, he feared the present situation would only be patched up and not healed and that it would break out again by some positive action on the part of Germany within a few years, perhaps from some other quarter, such as Austria, Hungary or a Balkan State, where the statesmen in control of the situation would not be or could not be so willing or anxious to avert war as they are today.
On the whole Dr. Colijn was not optimistic for the future peace of Europe. He thought the proposed Franco-Soviet treaty was unnecessary and impractical and in the long run was bound to produce harm. He pointed to the map of Europe and showed that Russia could only give military assistance to France by the passage of troops through the Carpathian Mountains, where the pass is so narrow and the way so hard that at best she could never give France anything but the most meagre and small military assistance. Of what practical use was such a pact even if it did not violate Locarno.
So far as Hitler’s present offer invited Holland to join a general European non-aggression pact, he said that while conditions remained as they are “they will receive a polite but firm no in reply.” He believed in Holland retaining its political and national independence and refraining from joining entangling alliances.
Respectfully yours,
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