500.A15A3/1833a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)33
Washington, October
28, 1936—7 p.m.
385. Your 445, September 25, 5 p.m., and 485, October 21, 11 a.m.34 The suggestion of the British that they might now wish to retain five cruisers of “C” class in addition to the four cruisers of the Hawkins class already under discussion has been accorded very careful consideration and the following is a statement of our informal and strictly confidential conclusions:
- 1.
- We do not question the viewpoint of the British Government that the political situation has deteriorated to a point which was not envisaged at the time of the negotiation of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, and we must reluctantly admit that there is at present throughout the world a general trend towards rearmament where the scrapping of serviceable ships becomes a matter of serious concern for any country. Indeed we are able to appreciate that the marked change in the international situation might cause the British now to wish to retain the five cruisers of “C” class as well as the four cruisers of the Hawkins class, although this would, as far as the five “C” class cruisers are concerned, constitute a reversal of the position taken in the British Memorandum, dated May 2, 1936.35 It was stated in that Memorandum that it was the intention of the British Government, after converting four cruisers of the Hawkins class, three to subcategory (b) and one to a training ship, to scrap five subcategory (b) cruisers of the “C” class, thereby making the total cruiser tonnage of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations remaining on December 31, 1936, less than the sum of 146,800 tons of cruisers of subcategory (a) plus the 192,200 tons of cruisers of subcategory (b) which may be retained under Article 16 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930.
- 2.
- We note that the British cite a new factor in the situation, namely, the fact that between the month of May and the present they have ascertained that Japan will be obliged to dispose of only three old ships, the Tsushima, the Hirado, and the Yahagi instead of seven ships, including some of more recent date, as the British had previously believed. Aside from the fact that this Government always believed that the Japanese would dispose only of the three old ships, it must be clear that this argument can have no very great appeal to us for the reason that any increase in cruiser tonnage by the British through the retention of the five “C” class cruisers will merely furnish a pretext to the Japanese to retain overage tonnage in the cruiser [Page 150] class. In view of the fact that this country has no overage tonnage in the cruiser, or in any other category which it may retain, the position of the United States relative to Japan and Great Britain will be adversely affected.
- 3.
- We note the British statement to the effect that the 1930 Naval Treaty was drafted on the assumption that it would be succeeded in 1936 by another naval treaty continuing quantitative features, which has not proved to be the case, and that therefore the London Naval Treaty, 1930, should be accorded as wide an interpretation as possible. With reference to this aspect of the situation we must point out that prior to our acceptance of the cruiser holiday which was incorporated in the London Naval Treaty, 1936, we received assurances from the British Delegation that it was the intention of the British Government to scrap down in the cruiser category to a total of 339,000 tons. These assurances facilitated to a great extent the acceptance by us of the principle of the cruiser holiday.
- 4.
- Considering the problem as a whole, then, from the political as well as the technical standpoint, we can see no issue to the situation which has been brought about by the request of the British Government to retain the five “C” cruisers (which in May it announced its intention of scrapping), except through recourse to Article 21, the Escalator Clause, of the London Naval Treaty, 1930. This Government does not question the right of the British Government to make the proposed increase in the cruiser category in excess of the tonnage specified in the London Naval Treaty, 1930, as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936, nor the right of the British Government to be the sole judge in determining whether its security has been affected to such an extent that the retention of this excess tonnage in the cruiser category becomes a necessity. It does contend, however, that recourse to Article 21 is the only method provided by the Treaty for raising the tonnage limits of the Treaty and that were action to be taken under this Article no question would arise as far as this Government is concerned as to the legality and propriety of the increase in tonnage and the legal position of all Powers Parties to Part III of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, would in consequence be clear.
- 5.
- Most attentive consideration is being given by us to the various problems which have arisen from the fact that the London Naval Treaty, 1930, which expires with the close of this year, is not to be renewed. We hope that by continued exchanges of views between the American, Japanese and British Governments these problems may be resolved without departure from the terms of that Treaty to the satisfaction of each and of all the Powers concerned.
- 6.
- You are requested to communicate the substance of the above confidentially and informally to Craigie in reply to his oral communication of September 25.
- 7.
- In communicating this information to Craigie you are requested to recall that in our reply, dated September 5, 1936, to the Memorandum communicated to us by the Japanese Ambassador on September 3,36 relating to the intentions of the Japanese Government to retain overage tonnage in the destroyer and submarine categories in view of the action of the British Government in invoking Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, to retain excess destroyers, we felt obliged to insist on a strict application of Article 21. We could not very properly therefore agree to a loose interpretation of the 1930 Naval Treaty in considering with the British the matter of the cruisers.
Hull