Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, General, British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A3/1836

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Ambassador (Bingham)²⁴

I called on Sir Robert Craigie this morning in accordance with your instructions. We first discussed certain questions arising out of Mr. Dunn’s²⁵ confidential letter to me of October 6, 1936.²⁶ Sir Robert Craigie informed me that about a week ago he had asked the Japanese Ambassador in London what he considered the position of his Government in regard to 16-inch guns. Mr. Yoshida replied that he felt certain that Japan wanted a 14-inch gun but could not bind herself to this in view of public opinion at home and the fact that Japan had in the current year withdrawn from the recent naval treaty negotiations. Sir Robert Craigie, however, felt that from what Mr. Yoshida said his Government might be prepared to give an official assurance in writing that Japan would limit herself to 14-inch gun construction, with a face saving device, technically permitting Japan to notify interested Governments to the contrary. Sir Robert Craigie said that one reason the British contemplate the Japanese might favor a 16-inch gun was that, due to restricted quarters in which it was possible to house Japanese crews as compared with those demanded in British and American navies, the Japanese might fit their ships for 16-inch guns to better advantage than the British and American navies. Sir Robert Craigie hoped that in all naval dealings with the Japanese both the British and American Governments would not be too legalistic and bear in mind the possibility that Japan might still be prepared to conform to the terms of the treaty. And indeed he said he had had intimations that the Japanese might want to undertake fresh conversations with the British and Americans some time after January 1, 1937. In reply to this intimation Sir Robert Craigie had stressed the fact that no discussions were possible on a quantitative basis. Craigie gave as his personal opinion that naval architects would find it extremely difficult to construct 35,000-ton capital ships with 16-inch guns and that shortly the experts would be seeking a 40,000-ton ship. I was then informed in strict confidence that the British had decided to put 14-inch guns on their first two capital ships which were to be laid down early in the coming year. The Japanese Government, however, had not been informed of this and I was asked to keep it strictly confidential. Sir Robert Craigie admitted their decision was influenced by European conversations, especially since the Russians and Germans were already showing a tendency to seek increasing sizes.

With the arrival of Ambassador Ribbentrop²⁷ here this week, Sir Robert Craigie expected an early resumption of Anglo-German naval negotiations and stated that about a fortnight ago the Germans had informed the British of modifications they had in mind which were practically identical with the Soviet reservations (forwarded by this Embassy to the Department of State in a confidential aide-mémoire dated July 18, 1936²⁸). Also specifically Germany objected to Russia having its first ship under construction carry 15-inch guns. Sir Robert Craigie hoped the Russian and German negotiations might be completed this year, and added that when the final texts were concluded with Germany²⁹ and Russia, the British Government would want a statement from the United States (and France as well) indicating at least that the United States was not raising objections, for otherwise England would be unable to sign. Craigie hoped that the final agreements might be submitted to Parliament and be ratified before the end of the year.

Sir Robert Craigie then went on to stress the importance of the retention of the “C” cruisers (see my No. 445, September 25, 5 p.m.). Craigie pointed out that the treaty had been a success for six years but the serious political situation which had recently developed had caused enormous political importance to be attached here to the retention of these cruisers. He personally foresaw that Japan might be in opposition but he hoped the United States Government would not. Craigie stated that he realized the United States could not make a special agreement in this connection but he hoped the United States might intimate privately that they would not protest against a wide interpretation of Article 21 as regards these cruisers. Craigie said the Admiralty were pressing for an answer; that it was important that before the question arose in Parliament, which was probable in the near future, some idea as to the attitude of the American Government should be obtained. Craigie then went on to point out that the fact that quantitative limitation is now about to disappear removes, in his view, the main purpose for the scrapping of over-age tonnage originally inserted in 1930.

Craigie went on to add that there was nothing new as regards the Scandinavian negotiations:³⁰ the real difficulty concerned coast defence vessels (sub-category B capital ships).

As regards Italy, Sir Robert Craigie said that Ciano³¹ had informed the British in September that once Italy’s attitude vis-à-vis the League³² was settled Italy would come into the Naval Treaty. In view, however, of the decision in September that the Abyssinian Delegation should remain in Geneva the Italians said subsequently they were not able to act as they had hoped. Craigie added, for my confidential information, that at one time recently Italy had tentatively sought light as to whether England would be prepared to consider in any way limiting its forces in the Mediterranean, the impossibility of which was immediately explained to them.

It appears that Turkey has been pressing for the opening of negotiations on naval matters and Craigie contemplates that these may take place in December or January (1937) after completion of the German and Russian negotiations.

Craigie informed me that the French had advised him only this morning that France has no present intention of building more 8-inch gun cruisers, dependent on Germany not endeavoring to seek increases. The French further stated that they intend to submit the Naval Treaty for ratification to the French Parliament on November 15.

In the course of the conversation certain points taken up in the Department’s confidential instruction No. 1442, September 29, were touched upon. In this connection I may say I reminded Sir Robert of the contents of point (2) and the memorandum furnished thereon. Under point (4) I reminded him that should the American Government make formal inquiry of the Japanese Government it will exchange views with the British Government. In general discussion of point (5), more especially the last paragraph under sub-heading (a), Craigie agreed with the understanding therein expressed that the contemplated exchange of information was only between the British and Soviet Governments. Sir Robert, however, went on to say, quite on his own, that if agreements were reached with Germany and Russia he wanted to know whether the United States Government would be disposed to conclude agreements with those two countries for exchange of information pending the conclusion of a general treaty. Sir Robert Craigie had previously asked me a question arising out of point (5) paragraph (d), and when I told him my understanding was that my Government did not desire to assume an attitude of opposition to this amendment, Craigie expressed great disappointment since he said the British had been very firm against it and hoped the United States and France would likewise support their opposition point of view.

In conclusion, Craigie again stressed the importance to the British Government of the retention of “C” cruisers, partly because of world political deterioration, partly because of home politics considerations, and lastly (as transmitted in the Embassy’s telegram No. 445, September 25, 5 p.m.), the vessels would be retained for a maximum of five years and would not be used as cruisers but as antiaircraft ships which would involve the substitution of a lighter armament for the existing 6-inch gun armament.

London , October 27, 1936.

24. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 2613, October 27; received November 3.
25. James Clement Dunn, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.
26. Not found in Department files.
27. Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
28. Apparently an error for “July 29, 1936,” the date of the statement of Soviet reservations transmitted to the Department in the Ambassador’s telegram No. 382, July 30, 8 p.m., and in his despatch No. 2398, July 31; neither printed. For the substance of the Soviet statement, see passage numbered 5 of the Department’s instruction No. 1442, September 29, supra.
29. The Anglo-German agreement was signed at London, July 17, 1937; British Cmd. 5519.
30. See enclosure to despatch No. 128, October 2, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 108.
31. Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
32. In connection with the Italo-Ethiopian conflict; see vol. iii, pp. 34 ff.