500.A15A3/1832a
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)
Sir: From time to time in recent months questions have arisen relating to the London Naval Treaty, 1930, as well as other aspects of the general Naval problem, and these have been reported and discussed in various telegrams and despatches to and from the Embassy [Page 141] and the Department. In order to consider this problem as a whole officers of the State and Navy Departments, also Mr. Ray Atherton, met informally on August 25, 1936, in the Office of the Acting Secretary of the Navy and reached certain tentative decisions with regard to the attitude of this Government toward the problems relating to the various categories of naval vessels and the Anglo-Soviet Bilateral Naval Agreement,19 as follows:
1. Submarines.
It is the view of this Government that it would be desirable that no tonnage be retained by any Power signatory of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, in the submarine category over and above that specified in the Treaty as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936.
It is the further view of this Government that should a Power signatory of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, wish to retain tonnage in the submarine category over and above that specified in the Treaty as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936, it must, as the only legal means available, have recourse to Article 21 of that Treaty.
In the event that a Power signatory of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, should have recourse to Article 21 in order to retain tonnage in the submarine category over and above that specified in the Treaty as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936, the United States would be reluctantly obliged to exercise the right under Article 21 to retain a proportionate amount of tonnage in the submarine category.
This was the position taken by this Government in the Memorandum, dated September 5, 1936, in reply to the Japanese Memorandum of September 3, 1936,20 in which the Japanese Government announced its intention of retaining 15,598 tons of excess submarines in order to compensate for Japan’s lack of over-age destroyers. This remains the position of this Government in respect of submarines.
2. Destroyers.
Article 17 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, states:
“A transfer not exceeding 10% of the allowed total tonnage of the category or sub-category into which the transfer is to be made shall be permitted between cruisers of sub-category (b) and destroyers”.
On December 31, 1936, the United States will have only 75,900 tons of completed cruisers of sub-category (b), that is to say, 67,600 tons less than the tonnage which is permitted under the terms of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, in this sub-category.
[Page 142]As a consequence, this Government will exercise its right under Article 17 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, and retain an additional 19,000 tons in the destroyer category.
A Memorandum to this effect should be handed to the appropriate British authorities.
3. Cruisers of Sub-category (b).
In a confidential Aide-Mémoire, dated July 18, 1936,21 Sir Robert Craigie stated that the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference, 1935, had agreed to the British proposals in connection with the disposal of four Hawkins Class cruisers and that this agreement had been notified to the British Delegation by Captain Ingersoll of the American Delegation.
This Government cannot accept the view that agreement to the conversion of four Hawkins Class cruisers was expressed by the American Delegation during the period of the London Naval Conference, 1935, and it wishes to place on the record a categorical denial that any meeting took place at the Admiralty in which Captain Ingersoll discussed with anyone the disposal of the Hawkins Class cruisers, or that Captain Ingersoll, or that any other member of the American Delegation, ever agreed on behalf of the Delegation as to the method by which the retention of the Hawkins Class was to be legalized.
The American Delegation to the London Naval Conference, 1935, could not commit the United States Government to an amendment of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, unless the amendment were included in the new London Naval Treaty of 1936, for ratification by the United States Senate. Moreover, no commitment to an amendment of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, could be given in the absence of one of the signatories, namely, Japan. Evidently then, no definitive agreement as to the method of disposal of the four Hawkins cruisers could have been given by the American Delegation, and none was given.
At the same time this Government has no objection to the proposed demilitarization of a Hawkins Class cruiser for use as a training ship and the conversion of three cruisers of sub-category (a) to cruisers of sub-category (b) in so far as it affects the American naval position in respect of the British Commonwealth of Nations. This Government deems it highly important, however, that such conversion, if made, should be effected in strict accordance with the terms of the Treaty.
While this Government does not wish to suggest to the British Government what course it should adopt in order to effect legally [Page 143] the conversion of the four Hawkins cruisers, it expresses the hope that the conversion shall be effected in such a manner that this Government will not feel called upon to make formal objection in accordance with the informal statement of position which you gave to Sir Robert Craigie in the course of an interview on July 15.
4. Capital Ships.
In the matter of the Japanese attitude toward the stipulation of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, which would limit the caliber of guns on capital ships to 14 inches, it is thought wiser to do nothing at present or at least until after Ambassador Grew has had an opportunity to confer in Washington during his period of leave. Then it may become necessary to make formal inquiry of the Japanese Government, but before taking action, this Government will exchange views with the British Government.
5. Anglo-Soviet Bilateral Naval Agreement.
Careful consideration has been accorded the Anglo-Soviet Bilateral Naval Agreement (reference Embassy’s 382, July 30, 8 p.m.22), and this Government has no direct comment to make. It is our understanding, however, that this Bilateral Naval Agreement with the Soviet Government is of a tentative nature pending the adherence of the principal Naval Powers to the London Naval Treaty, 1936.
With regard to the three reservations and two amendments to the Anglo-Soviet Naval Agreement, the following are our confidential views:
(a) The first reservation deals with the situation in Far Eastern waters. The Soviet Government “reserves the right not to consider itself bound by the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, regarding qualitative limitation and the exchange of information as far as all its Far Eastern Naval forces are concerned, so long as there shall not be concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan a special agreement on this subject”.
It is noted that the British Government is prepared to accept this reservation on the understanding that the Soviet Government will not take the initiative in constructing any ships outside the limits of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, unless there is construction by any Power or Powers outside Treaty limits. In that event, the Soviet Government will resume liberty of action and will notify the British Government of such intentions without, however, giving any particulars in regard to the contemplated construction and without recourse to the procedure of consultation and three months advance notification as set out in Article 25 of the London Naval Treaty, 1936. A simple notification to the British Government will free the hands of the Soviet Government to build in the European part of the Soviet Union or the Soviet Far East any type of ship which it may require for [Page 144] employment in the Far East, although the qualitative limits as regards ships to be used in European waters will not be modified.
It is noted, moreover, that the British Government is in agreement with regard to the provisions relating to exchange of information that, subject to the provision that full particulars shall be furnished at all times in respect of all vessels built in the European part of the Soviet Union and also in respect of any vessels transferred from the Far Eastern to the European fleet, no information should be given by the Soviet Government of their Naval forces in the Far East, while the British Government for its part, should undertake to furnish the Soviet Government with complete information regarding its naval construction.
It is assumed that this reservation, which is made contingent upon a Soviet-Japan naval agreement, is based on the assumption that Japan will not become a party to the London Naval Treaty, 1936. If this is so, we assume that the Soviet Government would have no objection to making a categorical statement to this effect.
It is our understanding, moreover, that the stipulation for the exchange of information will apply only as between the British and Soviet Governments and that the British Government will not transmit to the Soviet Government confidential information regarding American naval construction which it will receive from this Government in accordance with the terms of the London Naval Treaty, 1936. An expression of the views with regard to this point of the British Government should be requested.
(b) The Soviet Government makes a specific reservation with regard to Germany, to the effect that it “shall consider itself bound by the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, only to the extent to which Germany will take upon itself similar obligations.”
Regarding this reservation we have no comment to make.
(c) The Soviet Government makes a specific reservation in regard to the provision of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, for notification of minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, for the reason that all Soviet ships are State owned.
This Government notes, and agrees with, the British position that in the event of a general international naval treaty the Soviet Government would be obliged to enter into an undertaking to furnish the required particulars.
(d) The Soviet Government proposes an amendment by the terms of which it would reserve for itself the right to construct, prior to January 1, 1943, “such a number of capital ships”—in actual fact, two—with guns not exceeding 16 inches.
It is noted that the British Government is prepared to accept this amendment, conditional upon its acceptance by the other Governments signatories of the London Naval Treaty, 1936.
This Government does not desire to assume the onus of opposing this amendment. It is clearly the responsibility of the British Government as negotiator of the Bilateral Agreement with the Soviet Government to accept or reject the amendment in respect of capital ships. This Government has no direct interest in the type of construction which might be undertaken by Soviet Russia. Indirectly, however, it has the interest that the construction by the Soviet Government of certain types of ships may affect the amount and kind of construction of capital ships by other Powers.
[Page 145](e) A second amendment proposed by the Soviet Government relates to A Class cruisers, specifically that the Soviet Government shall not construct light surface vessels with guns of a caliber exceeding 7.1 inches prior to January 1, 1943, in excess of the number of light surface vessels carrying 8-inch guns of the Power a party to the London Naval Treaty, 1936, possessing the smallest number of vessels.
It is noted that the British have concurred in the construction by the Soviet Government of seven 8,000 ton cruisers carrying a gun of 7.1 inches.
In the view of this Government the British, in agreeing to this amendment, have countenanced naval construction which is not in conformity with the cruiser holiday restriction of the London Naval Treaty, 1936. It is not our intention, however, to register any formal objection or to comment on this or other specific angles of the Anglo-Soviet Bilateral Naval Agreement, or either formally or informally to acquiesce in or reject its terms.
It was our understanding that the British Government would proceed to negotiate bilateral naval agreements with Germany, with the Soviet Union and with other naval Powers, in conformity with the principles and provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, with a view of bringing these Powers into the framework of that Treaty pending their adherence to it. Insofar as any such bilateral agreement departs from the principles and provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, it would seem to complicate rather than facilitate a general solution of the naval problem.
In any event, the receipt should be acknowledged of the “Unsigned summary of the results of the conversations”, dated July 30, 1936, with the Soviet Government, communicated to us by the British Government. No comment, however, should be made.
Except as otherwise stated, the conclusions enumerated above are communicated to you for your guidance. In view of the fact that Mr. Atherton was a member of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference, 1935, and the further fact that he was present at the informal meeting in which these matters were considered, it is suggested that you instruct him to proceed as indicated above in informal discussion with the appropriate officials of the British Government.
Very truly yours,
- Naval discussions between representatives of the British and Soviet Governments had taken place in London, May 14–July 29, 1936. The Anglo-Soviet naval agreement was signed on July 17, 1937; British Cmd. 5518.↩
- Neither printed; see telegram No. 114, September 10, 1 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 137.↩
- Transmitted to the Department in telegram No. 358, July 20, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom; not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩