500.A15A3/1824: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
London, September
25, 1936—5 p.m.
[Received September 25—2:45 p.m.]
445. From Atherton.16 By his request I called on Craigie this morning.
He opened a somewhat lengthy discussion by informing me:
- 1.
- Embassy’s 421, September 7, 7 p.m., Foreign Office has
discussed with appropriate Japanese authorities here destroyer
tonnage figures and ascertains that 11,099 is the maximum
overage destroyer tonnage (over and above their treaty
figure).
- 2.
- Foreign Office doubts whether it would be equitable to attempt
to solve this question on too legalistic a basis, particularly
as article 21 of the London Naval Treaty was drafted with a view
to construction of new tonnage by escalator power rather than
retention of overage tonnage.
- 3.
- As far as the Foreign Office is concerned, it would not see
any objection, from naval or political viewpoint, to retention
of 15,500 tons of old submarine tonnage by Japan, particularly
as both United States and this country are retaining additional
destroyer tonnage.
- 4.
- There may be political objections to invoking escalator clause
by Japan in the present circumstances (in particular invoking it
against Soviet) but this is a matter primarily for Japan, and as
a first step Foreign Office proposes to ask Japanese Government
whether they are prepared to adopt United States suggestion.
Should Japanese Government give negative reply, Foreign Office
hopes it may be possible for the United States to agree to a
settlement on the lines proposed by Japan; the United States
retaining additional overage destroyers and submarine tonnage
should the United States see fit.
- 5.
- In reply to a query regarding the Hawkins class cruisers, I outlined my personal
impressions after my talk in Washington17
(Department’s 317, August 25, 6 p.m.18) and Craigie expressed
his appreciation of the explanation of my understanding of the
American attitude.
Craigie then said that he was speaking to me in the strictest confidence,
and then discussed the case for the detention of five “C” class
cruisers, stressing that he hoped we would consider his remarks from the
point of view of general policy and naval equity rather than from a
legalistic point of view, and we agreed upon the following text as
outlining his remarks, made to me in an attempt privately and
unofficially to consult the United States Government:
[Page 139]
- “1. The general political situation has deteriorated in
recent years more seriously than it was possible to predict
in 1930 and the process has been further expedited since the
question whether the escalator clause could be used to
retain these cruisers was considered by His Majesty’s
Government in the spring of the year. There has, in fact,
been a complete change in the whole aspect of international
affairs and a considerable general move throughout the world
towards rearmament. It must be obvious to any thinking
person, not only here but in the United States, that a
situation is fast arising in which the scrapping of any
serviceable ship becomes a serious matter for this
country.
- 2. Since the matter was considered last spring, it has
been ascertained that Japan will only be obliged to dispose
of three very old ships, the Tsushima, the Hirado and the
Yahagi, instead of seven ships
(including some of much more recent date) as had previously
been believed. This has upset the argument which was used in
Parliament, that we should lose more than we should gain by
retaining our overage cruisers on the basis of Japan being
allowed to do the same. (This situation has arisen because
the Japanese will not have completed two new vessels—the Suzuya and the Kumano—which they had been expected to complete
before the end of 1936.) Thus the mutual scrapping of
overage cruisers with a view to reaching treaty limits can,
as things stand, only react to Japan’s advantage.
- 3. The 1930 Naval Treaty was drafted on the assumption,
which at that time seemed reasonable, that it would be
succeeded by another quantitative naval treaty in 1936; that
there is now no hope of continuing the quantitative
limitation of naval armament after December 31st next, is a
fact which seems to justify as wide an interpretation as
possible of article 22 [21] of the
1930 Treaty.
- 4. It is becoming increasingly difficult to explain to
public opinion in this country why, in view particularly of
the United States of Europe,18a it should be necessary to scrap
five reasonably serviceable cruisers at a time when it is
the avowed policy of His Majesty’s Government to increase
their cruiser strength up to 70 cruisers—a figure which has
long since been notified to the United States Government. If
we have to scrap the five “C” class cruisers, the number of
our completed cruisers will by December 31st next, have
dropped to 48 (including 13 overage), and this at a time of
increasing tension.
- 5. It is, therefore, desired to consult the United States
Government privately and unofficially as to whether some way
round this difficulty cannot be found without detriment to
the interests of other countries. We are reluctant to
attempt to invoke the escalator clause in this matter
because, on a narrow interpretation of article 21, we must
first be able to affirm that the ‘new construction’ by other
powers is of a character materially to affect our national
security. Whether our security has been so affected is a
point on which there might, for certain technical reasons,
be a divergence of view, and, pending any understanding on
this matter with their cosignatories, His Majesty’s
Government consider it of great importance to take no action
which might conceivably be held to strain the obligations
assumed by this country under the treaty.
- 6. Looking at the matter from the political and naval
rather than from the legal standpoint, it is suggested that
the United States would suffer no disadvantage if these five
old cruisers were to be retained by His Majesty’s Government
on the following understanding:
- (a)
- Vessels would be retained for a maximum of 5
years.
- (b)
- They would be used not as cruisers but as
antiaircraft ships, which would involve the
substitution of a lighter armament.
- (c)
- If the Japanese Government were to ask for a quid pro quo, it is suggested
that this should be limited to the retention of the
three old vessels mentioned in paragraph 2
above.
- (d)
- It would, of course, be open to the United States
Government to retain additional overage destroyer or
submarine tonnage should they think fit, seeing that
the United States has no overage cruisers due to be
scrapped under the London Naval Treaty.
- 7. Should the United States Government see no obection in
principle to an arrangement of this kind, it would remain to
decide what would be the best method of carrying it into
effect. We should prefer a friendly agreement, reached quite
independently of the escalator clause. Should this method
prove unacceptable to the United States Government, the
matter might perhaps be settled by adopting, after
consultation with the United States and Japanese
Governments, an interpretation of the escalator clause which
would take into consideration the factors mentioned in
paragraph 1, 3 and 4 above. In pursuance of this
interpretation His Majesty’s Government would then formally
notify the Governments of the United States and Japan that
they consider themselves justified in retaining the five old
cruisers.”
In agreeing to transmit the above I took great pains to point out to
Craigie that we lacked power to modify any agreement which had been
ratified by the Senate, which he said he realized, but that his
Government hoped we should consider all the suggestions outlined herein,
with, in view of my interpolation, particular reference to paragraph
7.
Under paragraph 4 Craigie stated for my confidential information that,
because of recent experiences, by the end of this year certain existing
cruisers would be in process of rearmament against airplane attack and
the number of available cruisers would drop to something around 40.
[Atherton.]
