500.A15A5/313
The Chargé in the Netherlands (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 5.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that great interest continues to be shown, as reflected by the press and by the comments of Government officials, in the naval conversations at London. Next to the three Powers taking part in the conversations, Holland is perhaps the most closely concerned. The Minister for Foreign Affairs,13 in the [Page 366] speech he made recently during the budget debate (see despatch No. 102, of November 15, 193414), denied that there were conversations taking place between Netherlands and British naval authorities at the moment. He did not deny that conversations on naval questions have taken place in the past and are taking place at present between British and Netherlands authorities in the Far East.
In several recent despatches mention has been made of opinions expressed by various Government officials, including Premier Colijn, concerning the Japanese question. Their extraordinary frankness in denouncing Japan reflects the feeling of the country and its fears for the safety of its colonial possessions. The commercial tactics of the Japanese, followed by their high-handed methods in the Commercial Conference now being held at Batavia, have not lessened these fears. Briefly analyzed, prevailing Dutch opinion is that only through a combination of circumstances can the Japanese be kept from eventually taking full possession of their vast colonial empire. They are well aware of the strategical importance of the East Indies Islands, lying as they do between Singapore and Australia at the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian Ocean. They sense that the present commercial invasion of Java and Sumatra by the Japanese is only a preliminary movement, to be followed later by racial subversive activities and eventual annexation. This does not mean that they consider their island as immediate objectives, for, as Premier Colijn pointed out to Mr. Emmet,15 Japanese policy is at present directed northward.
Holland, however, places its hopes for the future in the maintenance of British and American prestige in the Far East. This is not openly admitted. On the contrary, a very self-reliant, even combative, attitude is noticeable. As soon as the Japanese commercial delegates, who are by no means anxious to leave, can be gotten away from Batavia, some fifty quota restrictions will be put into effect against Japanese goods entering the East Indies. The Government’s determination to put a curb on the economic penetration of Japanese cheap goods has not been in any way modified. Fear of military aggression does not perhaps exist for the moment and naval authorities have recently expressed the opinion that if Great Britain and America maintain themselves in their present position, Japan would not dare to send against the Netherlands East Indies more than a small part of her fleet, with which detached unit they might themselves succeed in coping.
However, keen interest in the London conversations is due to the apparently recognized fact that Holland’s future in the Far East [Page 367] depends in the last analysis on Great Britain and in a somewhat lesser degree on ourselves, and it need hardly be added that no sympathy for the Japanese contentions can be detected.
The confidential statements of Premier Colijn and Jonkheer Beelaerts, Vice President of the Council of State, to the effect that they consider Japan a menace, to be dealt with as such, are reflected in the press, where the question has been discussed with somewhat less restraint than usual. I quote herewith in part from a recent editorial appearing in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (Liberal), of Rotterdam, which advocates an Anglo-American understanding and emphasizes the American angle:
“The Americans are absolutely right in their attitude of having nothing to do with Japanese parity proposals, however unreasonable their own claim to parity with England. The rationing in the Washington Treaty was based not only on the actual size of the then existing ships of the line but also very definitely on the ability of the nations involved to exceed each other in shipbuilding. America did not threaten at that time, if the 5:5:3 ratio were rejected, to make use of its great fleet in destroying smaller navies but it did threaten to build and further to augment the existing great difference.
“That form of being right is perhaps not sympathetic. But the attitude of the Americans as regards the Japanese is morally much stronger when it is considered that for Japan’s smaller ratio America paid well. It said to Japan: ‘We shall give you greater security for your weaker navy’. That is why it renounced, almost irrevocably, the construction of its naval bases in the Far East. Japan profited immediately from this offer and wishes again to profit today, but to withdraw payment for the original concession.
“The Japanese wish to effect a non-aggression treaty with America bears a curious political character. Such treaties differ considerably, all depending on the nations which conclude them. In case Japan should attack Russia and destroy it as a possible ally of America, the Americans would, if they signed a non-aggression treaty, be unable to intervene. A treaty of non-aggression would in no way weaken Japan’s position but would materially weaken America’s, the latter having nothing up its sleeve either in the form of alliances or as a member of the League of Nations. Japan’s calculations are clever, but much too transparent.
“In reality negotiations have so far accomplished one thing, namely, to make Washington more distrustful of Japan. Lord Lothian, the prudent and wise English Liberal, has called attention to the hopelessness of the negotiations. He says he knows of but one means to checkmate the military party in Japan and compel a change of tactics, namely, cooperation between America and England. He is right, for the Japanese are fond of making endless efforts as long as the others show patience.”
Respectfully yours,