500.A15A5/280a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)
34. With reference to our teletype conversation today. We remain of the opinion that the most potentially advantageous course would be that the Japanese, it being their intention to denounce the treaty, be given no encouragement to expect any concessions or the conclusion of any new treaty in substitution therefor and, through abstention on the part of the British and ourselves from further appearance of solicitude in that connection, be compelled to make the denunciation on their own sole responsibility and at a moment of their choosing between now and the end of December.
We believe that, insofar as the situation in Japan and in the Far East in general are concerned, as distinguished from considerations of British internal politics, the tactics of exploring possibilities with regard to substitutes, etc., has been and would be, if continued, of more disadvantage than advantage. This is true also of the situation in this country.
A clean break, brought about by denunciation by Japan, would properly and should in fact bring about the end of the first phase. The idea of proceeding immediately with what would in fact be new conversations toward a new objective would signify that the fundamental demand of the Japanese in the present conversations, namely, that the existing ratios be given up, has been conceded. Immediate entrance upon new conversations or negotiations would have a very bad psychological effect and establish a bad precedent. The Japanese would have been accorded a substantial gain and there would be given no chance for the development which we envisage as likely within a reasonably short time, namely, an approach by the Japanese on their own initiative asking for further discussion of naval limitations, whereby there would be created a setting for such discussions favorable to the viewpoint that naval limitation is desirable. If our expectation of such a development should, as time goes on, be disappointed, there nevertheless is a period of two years during which it will be possible to make revision of estimates and plans, before the present obligations of the parties to the treaties terminate.
We therefore do not believe that further exploration of the “middle course” by the British would be of any practical value unless it is envisaged and be carried out by them solely for purposes of filling in time until the Japanese assume the responsibility of breaking off the [Page 365] first phase by denouncing the Washington Treaty; and even in that connection we conceive it to be hazardous, because it encourages the Japanese to believe that the British and perhaps the American Governments are unduly perturbed in the presence of Japan’s strength and apparent determination; also, it would continue to provide opportunity and possible material for propaganda and suspicion.
I feel that you therefore should try to talk the British out of their idea of further exploring a middle course, avoiding, of course, trying to exercise on our behalf any veto power, but refraining from giving assent; drawing the British out by compelling them to repeat and to extend the scope of their arguments in support of such procedure; asking them to specify as far as possible what useful purpose they expect that procedure to serve and to what ends they expect it to lead; seeking repetition of their affirmations that they will make no agreements to which we are not party or do not assent. You could, if necessary, prolong a discussion of that type over several days, thereby delaying procedure by them in that direction and adding to the uneasiness and embarrassment in which the Japanese find themselves.
We do not see how the present conversations could be turned into or be immediately followed by negotiations without its becoming thereby a fact that the British and the American Governments had ipso facto made concessions both in principle and in fact while the Japanese not only had made no concessions but had made definite gains both in appearance and in fact.
Personal for Davis. Some of the tone of the foregoing may seem to you somewhat blunt because of its hurried preparation. You are doing splendidly.