Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/307

Memorandum of Conversation in the Prime Minister’s Office at the House of Commons on November 23, 1934¹⁶

November 23, 1934

Present:

For the United States:	For Great Britain:
Mr. Davis	The Prime Minister
Mr. Atherton	Sir John Simon
Mr. Field	Mr. Craigie

At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Davis showed Sir John a copy of Secretary Hull’s telegram¹⁷ relating to the Krock incident and Sir John expressed his appreciation of the action taken.

Sir John thereupon gave a resume of the recent conversations with the Japanese. He assured Mr. Davis that the British had made no concession beyond the point indicated at the previous meeting¹⁸ between the American and British Delegations. Matsudaira had expressed himself as appreciative of American and British efforts to find a way of accommodation. He had repeated, however, that Japan would have to denounce the Treaty at the end of the year but that she was still anxious to find a way of agreeing with the United States and Great Britain. Japan would not be satisfied with shadow without substance and still desired a common upper limit, although Matsudaira was satisfied that if some arrangement on that basis could be made, Japan would never build up to that limit. It would make a tremendous difference in Japan if the principle of parity had been once agreed to. Matsudaira had gone on to say that his government understood that the British envisaged the fixation of building programs on a contractual basis and he did not think his government could accept that. He had not made any statement as to whether Japan might agree to a declaration of programs without a contractual promise.

Sir John said he had asked Matsudaira about certain wider matters he had discussed in the last Anglo-American conversations. He had pointed out that what Japan was proposing was much broader than a mere change in the naval treaty; it was a question of putting an end to the whole system on which Pacific peace had been built up. For instance, there was the non-fortification provision. Matsudaira replied that he thought Japan would favor a continuance of that sort of clause, whereupon Simon had asked whether that was an official statement of the Japanese Government. Matsudaira had replied that it was not official but that he was quite certain this would be the Japanese position. Simon requested him to confirm this, which he agreed to do.

Simon then had asked Matsudaira about the clause relating to notification of construction. Matsudaira had stated that he had no knowledge of this technical point and that the matter should be discussed with Yamamoto.¹⁹

With respect to the Four Power Treaty, Matsudaira had said that Japan would be prepared to “continue” this treaty. He had intimated that he was giving this as a direct message from Hirota.²⁰ Simon had pointed out that this was not a full answer to his inquiry since what he was driving at was not merely a continuance of the Four Power Treaty but a definite agreement not to denounce it during the duration of a new naval treaty. Matsudaira had answered that he interpreted the message as covering that. Simon had referred to the Netherlands and Matsudaira had said he thought this would include the Netherlands. (Simon here explained to Mr. Davis that he had in mind the Dutch East Indies although he had not specifically mentioned them to Matsudaira).

Simon said that Matsudaira had expressed himself as unfavorable to qualitative limitation alone and had declared that it would be very difficult for Japan to agree to qualitative without quantitative limitation as Japan might have to keep her liberty with respect to types of ships.

Simon stated that in a very personal and confidential talk with Matsudaira, the latter had inquired in effect whether, since it was now quite apparent that the Washington Treaty would be denounced before the end of the year, it was really necessary that Japan should denounce it single-handed. Simon had taken that to mean that the Japanese Government, realizing that its announced action was incurring hostile comment outside of Japan, had instructed Matsudaira to find out whether the British would join in denunciation. In reply Simon had pointed out that there was nothing in the treaty which required a notice of termination before the end of the year; the treaty merely provided that that was the earliest date. If an agreement were reached among all of us as to a new treaty, then we would of course put this new agreement in the place of the old treaty. Japan had voluntarily and arbitrarily announced its decision to end the treaty and the British Government could not join in any such action which it felt was premature.

At the conclusion of Simon’s exposition, Mr. Davis stated that he had desired this meeting with the British with a view to setting forth frankly what he had cabled Washington as to the British position and what Washington’s reaction was. He wanted to do this in order that there should be complete certainty on both sides of the table that he had correctly interpreted to Washington what the British position was in order that there might be no misunderstanding. Mr. Davis said that after having cabled a summary of what had transpired during the meeting on November 14, he had received certain comments from Washington indicating that it would be inadvisable to negotiate a substitute treaty while the hammer of denunciation was hanging over the heads of the British and American Governments. Washington felt that if we were ready quietly to continue negotiations as though nothing had happened, it would be interpreted in Japan as a tacit acquiescence on our part to Japan’s upsetting the whole basis of naval limitation. The treaty would not expire until two years after denunciation. If the Japanese were permitted to go home with anything at all in their hands, no matter how insignificant, the militarists would consider that they had rid themselves of something they did not like and had won a diplomatic victory at the same time. On the other hand, if we should let the Japanese denounce and then let them go home empty-handed, we might meet later on a different basis. Washington felt strongly that it was more important to preserve Anglo-American cooperation than to try to find a formula to satisfy Japan. It would have a very good effect if both countries were to show Japan how seriously they considered her determination to denounce the Treaty and to make it plain that neither of us could negotiate with them on that basis. While Washington’s reaction to the idea of a qualitative limitation alone was that it would be a negation of the whole principle of naval limitation, that was not the main point. The essential thing was to let the Japanese go home with nothing in their pockets. Mr. Davis remarked that, even if the United States were willing to consider qualitative limitation, they did not think this was the time to do so.

Mr. Davis then summarized his telegram No. 44 of November 21, setting forth the British position in greater detail, and concluded by outlining the pertinent portions of the reply he had received that night (No. 34 of Nov. 22).

Sir John thanked Mr. Davis for having put the British position to Washington with such complete fairness and MacDonald and Craigie indicated that they considered that the British case had been presented with complete accuracy.

Mr. Davis said that Washington was bothered by the reaction in certain American newspapers, which were implying that the Delegation was staying around in London making concessions to the Japanese and that Great Britain was trying to act as mediator. The British problem, Mr. Davis continued, was the opposite: The British Government had to convince its people that it was giving Japan every reasonable chance to come to an understanding. MacDonald indicated assent. He took occasion at this point to inform the American Delegation that his morning mail had included the largest correspondence he had ever had from the United States, based on his speech at the Lord Mayor’s banquet, which apparently had made a very favorable impression in America.

MacDonald and Simon here had to go to the floor of the House for a brief period. During this interruption Craigie expounded the following views: He thought we should place ourselves in the position of the moderate man in Japan who was anxious to have an agreement. His argument with his opponents would probably be that if Japan went to the absolute extreme of cutting herself completely adrift, it would inevitably drive the United States and Great Britain together and Japan would derive no good from this in the long run. It would greatly assist this moderate element, Craigie felt, if that element could point out that at present there was no evidence of a common front against Japan. We could thus strengthen the hand of the moderates in Japan by avoiding all appearance of a common front. The same argument, Craigie continued, was valid in the case of British opinion. There was a strong element in England which feared trouble with Japan and it was most important not to give them the chance to claim that a break had been brought about not through Japanese but through British and American intransigence. Craigie felt that the wisest policy for the United States and Great Britain at the moment would be to give Japan enough rope.

Craigie informed Mr. Davis that he had learned from the French naval Attaché that the French Government would be favorable to a continuance of qualitative limitation.

Mr. Davis said that he felt that it would have a very good effect in Japan if our two countries could just get one idea across, namely, that the United States and England felt the issue to be much greater than a mere technical question and that they were most eager not to destroy any part of the world’s peace machinery and to avoid any action that would have a disturbing influence in an already disturbed world; that on the contrary they were engaged in a concerted effort to preserve peace rather than any common front and that they wanted all the other powers to join with them in this effort. If we could get rid of the constant suspicions of supposed differences between us, Mr. Davis thought the whole problem would clarify itself.

After MacDonald’s and Simon’s return to the meeting, Mr. Davis stated that it was now apparent that our two governments were substantially in agreement as to principle and objective; the only real difference was as to methods, namely, as to whether it would be better to go on now or to close the conversations. He wondered whether it would not be the perfectly logical thing for both of us to say to the Japanese that their apparently irrevocable decision to denounce was a very serious thing, since it amounted to destroying the collective system we had set up for promoting peace and cooperation in the Far East in accordance with certain definite principles and policies; that such a grave step required careful thought on the part of the United States and Great Britain, since they were anxious not to lose the ground which had been gained; that it would therefore be wisest to end the conversations for the time being and to resume them some time in the future, when we have all had an opportunity to consider the situation. Mr. Davis suggested that we might even consider issuing a statement which would appeal to the moral sense of the world, and could not possibly be taken amiss by the military party in Japan while aiding the moderate element. He pointed out that the Washington Treaty system was a collective peace system for the Far East as was the League for Europe and the world and that Japan’s action was analogous to an attempt to scrap the League covenant. Mr. Davis jokingly added that Japan had already plucked several feathers from the Washington bird, to which MacDonald replied that in fact the fowl was already in the pot.

MacDonald also said that had Japan announced that she could not renew the London Treaty, it would not have been anything like so serious as her decision to abrogate the Washington Treaty.

Simon agreed that the difference between us was purely a question of method. He said Mr. Davis had very justly appreciated the difficulty with public opinion in England. The British Government wanted to be quite sure that when all was said and done it would not be told that it was responsible for bringing the house down on top of it.

Mr. Davis said that he was profoundly convinced that the only hope of avoiding ultimate grief in the Far East was for the United States and England to go step in step. He was informed that the Japanese were increasingly disturbed. He had learned confidentially that Matsudaira had been to see the French to find out about the chance of France and Italy joining in denunciation, and that the French reaction had been unfavorable. Simon apparently had not heard about this.

MacDonald stated he did not agree with the American view as to the effect of termination on the military mind in Japan. The Japanese, he thought, did not require concessions; they merely wanted a demonstration that Yamamoto had stood his ground against the other powers up to the very end. MacDonald agreed that if Japan refused to budge at all, it was naturally better to end the conversations, after making it perfectly clear that it was Japan’s determination to denounce which made it impossible to continue the naval conversations now. MacDonald felt, however, that matters had not yet reached that point, and that the British had not yet finished their case. He wanted to get a straight answer from Japan as to what they meant by denouncing the Washington Treaty, and how they envisaged future relations in the Pacific. Indeed, they ought to get a definite written statement from Japan as to her intentions. If the deadlock with Japan remained, we would still have to consider what to do about next year’s conference. Even if Japan were out of action, there would still be much to consider between the British and the American delegations. He sincerely hoped that we would not leave before the work was finished.

Mr. Davis assured him that he had no intention of abruptly walking out of the conversations. He fully appreciated the difficulty of the situation. There was still a strong pro-Japanese sentiment in Great Britain which felt that without a definite guarantee from the United States, which was unobtainable, Great Britain had better avoid a break with Japan at all costs and seek some sort of agreement with Japan. Mr. Davis thought that was shortsighted and if put into practice would inevitably lead to trouble in the future. Then there was the Australian problem. Her trade with Japan was better than ever before, and Australia naturally did not want to do anything to jeopardize it. Mr. Davis frankly thought, however, that Great Britain needed American cooperation more than the United States needed that of Great Britain, but the United States could not afford to have anything happen to Great Britain any more than Great Britain could afford to have anything happen to the United States. MacDonald agreed, adding that Great Britain was in the front firing line, and would have to bear the brunt of the first attack, not only in the Pacific, but in European waters. They could not give up anything that would prevent their getting through the first barrier. He hoped that if the Washington Treaty system were scrapped and the two nations were faced with a dangerous situation in the Far East, we would be more generous to England in the matter of tonnage. Mr. Davis replied that the United States was in a very reasonable frame of mind.

Simon said that neither the Prime Minister nor he would ever do anything to harm Anglo-American cooperation, and MacDonald added, “I don’t believe that any of you who have had contact with us through the years have any shadow of a doubt about our desire to keep Anglo-American relations of the most cordial and affectionate character”.

Mr. Davis said he would stake his whole reputation and future on the definite assumption that neither MacDonald, Baldwin nor Simon would want, or be unwise enough, to do anything that would alienate the United States. But it was essential that there should be no mental reservations about Anglo-American cooperation. They replied that Mr. Davis was safe in such an assumption and agreed with him.

Simon said their position at the moment was that Matsudaira was waiting for a reply from his Government as to three or four points about which the British had inquired. It was not practicable to end the talks now. Some time must be given to think things over. Mr. Davis said he believed Yamamoto had come with very definite and limited instructions and could make no real concessions now. Matsudaira had intimated definitely that this was the case and that after denunciation we could meet under better auspices. Mr. Davis suggested the desirability of our following this up a little more with Matsudaira; it would have to be done very delicately, since Matsudaira was in a difficult position. Mr. Davis did not think the Japanese would accept qualitative limitation alone. He again emphasized that we did not wish to terminate the conversations abruptly. It was necessary to find out definitely what Japan had in mind and what they proposed to do after denunciation. He thought we should impress upon the Japanese the seriousness of the situation they were creating. Mr. MacDonald declared that the British Government had already begun to emphasize the seriousness of the situation in talking with the Japanese and Simon said that that was the object of his statement in the House on the preceding day. Mr. Davis said he thought that statement was excellent.

Mr. Davis then pointed out that the Christmas holidays were not very far off. Simon said the British would be very preoccupied by the India debate, which would become critical the following Wednesday. Then there was the Royal Wedding,²² which also took much time. Simon therefore hoped that Mr. Davis would hold his hand a little. He also wondered whether Mr. Davis might not make a short statement to the press, approving what he had said in the House of Commons, and, after some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Davis would mention the matter in his press conference in the afternoon.

16. Transmitted to the Department by Mr. Field, secretary of the American delegation, in his despatch of November 27; received December 5. Apparently these are minutes written by Mr. Field, not agreed minutes with the British.
17. No. 33, November 22, 6 p.m., p. 363.
18. November 14, 1934; for minutes of meeting, see p. 334.
19. Member of the Japanese delegation.
20. Japanese Prime Minister.
22. The Duke of Kent married Princess Marina of Greece, November 29, 1934.