500.A15A4 General Ccmmittee/306½
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips)
The President held a conference with M. Herriot this afternoon at 2:30 in the executive offices of the White House. M. de Laboulaye, the French Ambassador, and I were the only others present. The conversation was a rambling one touching on the political aspects of Europe and disarmament. The conversation was opened by the President, who showed M. Herriot the instructions which had been sent to Mr. Norman Davis on the 25th which contained the contribution which we were willing to make to the cause of security, in the event of a real disarmament treaty being concluded. M. Herriot read the two telegrams very carefully and expressed his pleasure at their clearness and was undoubtedly pleased at the step which the President had agreed to take. The President reread the last paragraph of the instructions to Davis emphasizing that our agreement to abandon our rights of neutrality, etc., etc., would only be given in the event of a substantial agreement on disarmament having been [Page 110] reached by the principal military and naval powers. M. Herriot criticized Part I of the MacDonald Plan on Disarmament and then touched upon certain features of Part II with which he was not in sympathy, but in particular he referred to the fact that, under the MacDonald Plan, Germany could build samples of large guns, samples of large tanks, samples of all sorts of weapons which were prohibited, and samples once having been constructed could be the means of manufacturing large numbers of these forbidden instruments of war in a very short period of time. The President pointed out that the British had expressed the viewpoint that the MacDonald Plan had given no authority to the Germans to construct such samples. M. Herriot replied that that was precisely the point which he had in mind and that it was necessary to deny Germany categorically the right to construct samples; otherwise she would most certainly do so. The President agreed at once that the French viewpoint was sound in this respect and said that he would support it in Geneva. M. Herriot talked at some length about the necessity of maintaining a large French army. In his opinion the French army was essential to support the British navy since the British had no large army of their own. The President was amused at this remark and said that it was a new conception to him of the need for a large French army.
M. Herriot then brought up the question of reduction of armament by the budgetary system and expressed the view that, while this was not by any means a satisfactory method of control, it did in fact give a degree of control. He admitted that the United States, owing to the difference in costs, could not conform to budgetary agreements of other powers, but nevertheless he felt that, with the special position of the United States thoroughly recognized, we might be able to approve of some such system. The President did not express any views in respect of this point.
The President said that he regarded autonomous and continuous inspection as of the essence of the whole problem of keeping down armament. M. Herriot agreed thoroughly and seemed very much pleased at the attitude which the President had taken in our instructions to Geneva.
There followed a brief discussion between the President and M. Herriot on the subject of French-Italian naval parity.55 The President said that he hoped very much that some arrangement could be arrived at between the French and Italians in regard to their respective navies. M. Herriot talked at considerable length about the responsibilities of France not only towards her African colonies but in [Page 111] Indo-China, and gave the impression that, on account of these responsibilities, the French navy must be retained superior to that of the Italian. M. Herriot was not definite, however, in this matter and merely pointed out the French difficulties.
He then moved into the political situation in Europe. He discussed in general terms the dangers between Italy and Yugoslavia, the ambitions of Italy in this respect, which he said France would never consent to. He thought that this was a really dangerous spot in Europe but that the Polish Corridor56 was an even more dangerous one. The President said that he could not understand why some mechanical arrangement could not be made by which Germany and East Prussia could not be more closely united either by air communication, by elevated train service or, if necessary, by underground tunnels. Both M. Herriot and the Ambassador responded to this suggestion by a description of the excellent train service and motor roads between the two frontiers. M. de Laboulaye said that there were five daily trains crossing the Corridor each way and that there were no difficulties at the frontiers beyond the requirement of a certificate of identification. M. Herriot described the artistic qualities of the Poles, how difficult they were to negotiate with and how even the French, who were perhaps closest to them, found them exceedingly difficult to restrain and to quiet whenever they became excited. M. Herriot did not offer any suggestion for overcoming the Polish Corridor danger spot nor did he seem to feel that there was any solution to the problem. He pointed out that the Corridor was inhabited by Poles and agreed with the President that Danzig and its adjoining port were the only Germanized centers in the Corridor.
After the conference the President asked me to draw up a telegram57 to Norman Davis at Geneva indicating that he agreed with the French in their feeling that Germany should not be allowed to construct sample types of weapons which were already prohibited under the present treaties.
- For correspondence relating to negotiations looking toward a solution of the problem of French and Italian naval construction, see Foreign Relations, 1931, vol. i, pp. 358 ff.↩
- For correspondence concerning the Polish Corridor, see pp. 448 ff.↩
- Infra.↩