500.A15A4 General Committee/233: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson)99
308. Your 569, March 17 and subsequent telegrams including 580, March 18, 9 p.m. As we see the problem here, our strategy should be to avoid insofar as possible any definite expression of views on the British plan as a whole during the general discussion. It is already clear from your talk with Massigli that the French will not accept the plan in its present form, and no affirmative position on our part would alter their attitude for the moment. A deadlock between the French and British will almost inevitably develop which would offer us our best chance to exercise a mediatory influence, and this influence in turn will be effective in direct proportion to our having previously maintained a neutral position on the side-lines.
For these reasons I hope that if it becomes necessary for you to take part in the general discussion, you will confine yourself to friendly but very general terms, paying tribute to MacDonald’s purpose in offering this proposal, stressing the primarily European character of many of its essential features, and expressing an intent on our part to continue studying the plan as a whole in the light of the debate as it develops.
In particular I am anxious for you to avoid any expression of our attitude toward the security clauses of the plan until the arrival of Norman Davis. A preliminary analysis of the British draft leads us to believe that Part I, despite its apparent purpose, goes further than mere consultation. After providing for a machinery of consultation, the draft goes on to lay down what shall be the object and duties of the conferees. For us to agree in advance that we should, even under specified circumstances, determine which party or parties to a dispute should be held responsible, would tend to tie us up not as an associate but as an actual member of a peace-enforcing machinery. Before committing ourselves one way or the other we wish to await the recommendations of Norman Davis after he has had an opportunity to talk [Page 67] matters over with you and to make a further diagnosis of the international situation in Europe.
I want to make certain, however, that the British do not feel that we are unsympathetic or working against them. We realize that no effective disarmament can be brought about unless the two countries are in close accord. You may therefore tell them in the strictest confidence of the reasons governing our tactics as set forth in this telegram and explain that an endorsement at this stage might not only commit us as to certain of the technical features of the plan, notably that on aviation, but also as to the security section, certain implications of which are far reaching and require further study.
The War and Navy Departments are examining the technical features of the plan and I hope to send you a telegram embodying their views tomorrow or Wednesday.
- This telegram bears the notation: “Approved by Mr. Norman Davis with the addition of the insert [paragraph 5].”↩