500.A15A4 General Committee/228: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Marriner) to the Secretary of State
101. My 98, March 18th.95 When Daladier received me this afternoon he said that he wanted to talk over a little the situation in Geneva since the presentation of the MacDonald plan and the efforts of Mussolini as indicated in the project presented by the British Prime Minister at Rome.
He said that affairs in Geneva had reached an impasse in which Italy and Germany were together opposing all progress and that the MacDonald plan was an effort to save the situation; that it was based on elements from all the plans hitherto presented and thus contained certain ideas acceptable to each nation but that as it was presented without any previous consultation there was no possibility for France or any other nation to say without profound study exactly what it would mean in detail in the working out. He did not think even that the 3 days debate, schedule on the plan beginning Thursday at Geneva, would suffice for a proper appreciation of it but he felt definitely that it could not be accepted in any way it was.
I gathered that on the side of security he felt that progress at Geneva might have permitted a broader treatment on the subject. With respect to the disarmament provisions themselves it seemed to be his opinion that the rearmament of Germany thus permitted was not compensated for by sufficient guarantees or assurances to France. He likewise pointed out that in allowing Russia 500,000 men and Rumania and Poland respectively 150,000 and 200,000, acceptance by the two latter powers was made impossible.
[Page 65]He said that frankly he had preferred the method of reduction suggested in the American plan presented last year, namely, percentage reductions on present bases.
He then turned to the conversations in Rome, and said that the proposal of Mussolini for a kind of pact of the four principal European powers96 while it negatived the principles at the base of the League of Nations, namely, equality of nations and contained nothing new, nevertheless, at the present moment had a valuable psychological effect since it indicated clearly that Mussolini had no intention of tying himself up too closely with Germany alone and he added that he felt that the fear of any possible Anschluss with Austria played a considerable part in this attitude. He felt that the four great powers, however, would have to reckon with a new element in Europe, namely, the association of groups of small powers such for example as the recent agreement among the Little Entente97 which seemed to be working very well at Geneva where their solidarity had been remarked at the recent meetings and such groups as the Scandinavian powers.
Although he did not tell me himself I learned from an intimate friend of his that it was possible that France might make the suggestion that instead of a four power agreement along the lines Mussolini suggested the agreement should provide for the four powers plus a representative of each of the associated groups and powers such as Scandinavia and the Little Entente and possibly two other powers to be chosen along the basis of the non-permanent seats of the League of Nations. This idea has as yet not been clarified or put into any definite form.
The Prime Minister realizes that France at the present moment is in a difficult situation with the evident hostility in Germany, an unfriendly attitude in Italy, no strong backing in England and the difficulties with American public opinion engendered by the debt question. He felt that this last question could be regulated and that some progress had been made recently toward changing the opinions of the Chamber but it was his opinion that France could not possibly risk another failure on this subject and it was necessary at present to persuade the Socialists to change their votes in order to make possible a success. He said that the question had unfortunately become a political issue and that the Right parties which would certainly, if in power, vote immediately for payment were opposed to it when a Left Government was in power. He said that he had welcomed very much the kind initiative of President Roosevelt in talking with the [Page 66] French Ambassador98 and felt that patience was the only means to bring about the change which he most ardently desired.
He inquired when Norman Davis would reach Paris and I told him probably in the early days of April.
- Telegram in rive sections.↩
- Not printed.↩
- For correspondence relating to the Four Power Pact, see pp. 396 ff.↩
- A Pact of Organization providing for a standing council, permanent secretariat, coordination of policies, economic collaboration; concluded at Geneva, February 16, 1933; for French text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxxxvi, p. 630.↩
- Paul Claudel.↩