762.63/95: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 25—6:35 p.m.]
94. My 93, August 23, 10 a.m. Mr. Suvich returned today from the Mussolini-Dollfuss conversations and I had a 40-minute talk with him this afternoon devoted practically entirely to those conversations and to the Austrian situation. He denied the emergency character of Dollfuss’ visit and said his sudden decision to visit Mussolini was simply expediting a plan to pay him a courtesy visit which had been fixed for September or October. The diplomatic character of Suvich’s declarations and the equanimity of Italy’s viewpoint, however, is somewhat contradicted by his subsequent remarks.
The Austrian situation he considers not dangerous, but serious, and that Italy is the only government to handle it because Dollfuss cannot talk to Germany and is prevented from talking to France because he would immediately lose prestige at home and be criticised as being anti-German. Mussolini has a policy which comprises two points:
- 1,
- an economic and political alliance between Austria and Hungary, each maintaining its complete independence and having its own autonomous agencies but collaborating and cooperating for their mutual economic good and for their political protection;
- 2,
- to create a situation of friendly feeling for, and friendly economic cooperation with, their respective neighbors.
As to point 1, Italy is not now considering a political alliance with them but has not discarded the possibility for future use. He called attention to the fact that two small countries would be swallowed up by the Little Entente under the Tardieu plan.12 Italy is committed to Austrian independence and to help maintain it but thinks it will not be necessary to use force to maintain it because a Nazi putsch in Austria would immediately bring international armed cooperation on Austrian soil in order to maintain Austrian independence and they are certain Hitler would exert all his authority to prevent what he knows would be the result of a putsch. He thinks there is still remote danger of a putsch but he is disinclined to believe it will occur early in September, though he knows of that possibility, and he doubts it will occur the end of September or October though the possibility is still present.
As to point 2, Italy counts on trade agreements with Austria and Hungary to help them individually and collectively. He stated he [Page 440] believed Hitler would gradually increase his hold and he thought that although revolutionary troops frequently got out of hand and by their actions gave indication of waning authority of the head of the Government, these were just temporary manifestations which were usually brought under control. He thought Hitler would improve his position but that he would not act in opposition to the trend of Nazi psychology unless confronted with serious consequences of an international character. He denied Hitler had promised to stop radio broadcasts directed at Austria but had promised to tone them down and to cease efforts to stir up forcible opposition to Dollfuss.
- For correspondence relating to the plan for a Danubian Federation, see Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. i, pp. 846 ff.↩