762.63/102
The Ambassador in Italy ( Long ) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 6.]
Sir: Referring to my despatch No. 136 of August 10, 1933, concerning Austria’s request for increase in military strength, and to my subsequent telegrams numbered 92, August 21, 7 p.m.11a and 93, August 23, 10 a.m., concerning the Austrian situation, I have the honor to submit a résumé of events, as follows:
On August 7th I learned from an American newspaper correspondent in Rome that Austria had formally requested the consent of England, France and Italy to an enlargement of her military establishment in order better to cope with the Nazi threats against the peace and independence of the Republic. Later, the same day, I had an informal conversation with Mr. Suvich, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whom I met by chance. During the course of this conversation Mr. Suvich admitted the Austrian request had been made and also confirmed the rumor that Italy had talked directly to Hitler and had obtained his promise to prevent further airplane flights over Austria from Germany for the purpose of dropping Nazi propaganda leaflets, to prevent radio broadcasting in Germany aimed against the Dollfuss government, and, generally, to try to subdue the violent expressions [Page 437] and manifestations of Nazi sentiment in Austria. Mr. Suvich seemed to think these assurances would be effective and that they would make unnecessary any further discussion of an increase in Austrian arms.
Later events have proven Mr. Suvich over optimistic, however, as Hitler is either unable or unwilling to control Nazi activities against Austria and Austria has consequently increased her standing army already by eight thousand men.
The increasing gravity of the situation between Austria and Germany caused Mussolini and several important officials from the Italian Foreign Office to go to Riccione near Rimini to confer with Dollfuss. Great secrecy has surrounded these conversations, the press carrying no information about them and, due to the simultaneous absence of all the chiefs of the political divisions of the Foreign Office in Rome—which looks almost deliberate—no enlightenment is forthcoming from that source.
A member of the staff of this Embassy sought an interview with a colleague of the Austrian Legation day before yesterday and was told that the conversations between Mussolini and Dollfuss at Riccione had resulted in the clarification of three points on which both countries were in perfect accord. He insisted that these conversations did not deal with any emergency questions and that he felt positive that with Austria’s increased military strength backed by the firm stand of the British, French and Italian Governments there was no cause to fear a resort to force by the Nazis. According to this informant the Riccione conversations have covered the following three points;
- 1.
- A renunciation of any intention, if any existed, of the formation of a political union or block by Austria, Hungary and Italy, or the conclusion of any political understanding which might lead to the formation of a block in opposition to the Little Entente. Italy acknowledged the necessity that Austria remain a free and independent country.
- 2.
- The development of greater commercial interchanges between the three countries by means of commercial accords rather than by the formation of an economic union.
- 3.
- The return as soon as possible to normal relations in all respects between Austria and Germany.
Mr. Quaroni, of the Italian Foreign Office, said unequivocally in a conversation with the First Secretary of this Embassy that Italy would consider a Nazi government in Austria as tantamount to Anschluss and that Italian public opinion as well as government policy was solidly against it.
On August 23rd I had a talk with the new French Ambassador, M. de Chambrun, which lasted nearly an hour and was devoted [Page 438] largely to the Austro-German situation. M. de Chambrun quoted Mussolini as saying most emphatically that Italy would not permit an Anschluss and that he desired Italy to treat with Germany separately and tactfully rather than to allow Germany to be made a defendant before the world at Geneva. I personally doubt, however, if such an eventuality can be avoided for Germany as Nazi activities are going through too violent and determined a phase to be successfully controlled at the present time even by Hitler.
M. de Chambrun said that Mussolini told him that Hitler was a disciple of Fascism who did not play the game according to the rules, meaning that Mussolini disapproves of persecutions of Jews and other features of the Nazi program. The French Ambassador also quoted Mussolini as saying that Hitler has less real power than is generally supposed and that there are some movements in Germany which he cannot control. The Austrian diplomatic secretary to whose conversation I have already referred, is also of this opinion and thinks that Hitler is unable to curb the Nazi propaganda against Austria even though he may wish to do so.
M. de Chambrun attributed to a British political observer at Vienna, in whose views he had confidence, the opinion that the Dollfuss government was not believed in Vienna to be as strong and as sure of remaining in power as was believed abroad.
M. de Chambrun told me that he intends to propose, if his Government approves, a number of bilateral commercial treaties between Italy, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and if necessary even with Bulgaria, each country arranging individually with each of the others some commercial agreements. The purpose of this would be to try to ease the economic distress of the various countries and to relieve the depression which exists over the whole area excepting Italy, with the result, it is hoped, of distracting their minds temporarily from the question of boundary readjustments and territorial claims. I suggested that it might not be easy to distract the minds of some of these countries and especially Germany’s from territorial questions. He said in reply that he thought it was immaterial whether Germany liked the plan or not and that Germany would not necessarily be a party to any of the treaties as her cooperation was not vital in order for such a movement to be successful.
To sum up, the French Ambassador believes that France probably will be ready to cooperate with Italy even to the extent of using force if necessary to save Austria and he thinks that Italy would not shrink from forceful measures as a last resort.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩