500.A15A4 General Committee/690: Telegram
The American Delegate to the Bureau of the Conference ( Wilson ) to the Acting Secretary of State
Geneva
, December
11, 1933—6 p.m.
[Received December 11—3:25 p.m.]
[Received December 11—3:25 p.m.]
804. For the Under Secretary.
- 1.
- We now know the general lines at least of the conceptions of disarmament being discussed among the great powers of Europe. The information contained in 144, December 3, 10 a.m. from Rome and 537, December 8, 11 a.m. from Paris as to the German attitude is confirmed in its essentials by a talk which I have just had with the German Minister to Bern. Furthermore, some idea of British tendencies is apparent from the recent speeches in the House of Commons of Simon and Baldwin.
- 2.
- Briefly the major question at issue is whether a measure of increase in armament for Germany is to be an immediate result of any convention that may be signed.
- 3.
- The British plan56 itself contemplates an increase, for example, effectives doubled, unlimited number of 115’s instead of limited number of 105’s, tanks, antiaircraft guns, coast defense guns. The conception which Simon expressed on October 14th provided for an increase in German armament to take place during the second half of the suggested 8-year treaty period. The point on which opinion is now focusing is whether an increase in armament comparable to that which Simon envisaged for the latter half of the treaty shall take place in the early stages of the treaty.
- 4.
- From my talk with Von Weizsäcker57 it appears that for the present at least the German Government is convinced that substantial disarmament of the armed powers is illusory. In the circumstances Germany is willing to [accept?] the retention without further increase or replacement by the armed powers of what is roughly termed “offensive weapons” (in other words retention of all their present material with the exception of bombing planes) provided Germany receives [Page 333] the right at once to modernize the equipment of her armed forces with the so-called “defensive weapons.”
- 5.
- Since no power seems willing to force the maintenance of the Versailles Treaty provisions on Germany and since Germany has definitely taken the position that she will no longer remain in her present position of inferiority—that is if there is to be regulation of armament and not irresponsible competition in armament the treaty must be along lines which Germany will accept willingly. According to our present knowledge such a treaty must either be one of radical reduction by the armed powers reaching the Versailles Treaty level or an agreement permitting Germany to adjust her military situation in conformity with the types which all shall decide are included in the “defensive” category. Therefore the choice seems to lie between no treaty with the practical certainty that Germany will then rearm and all that this means or a treaty which while initiating limitation and providing for progressive disarmament accords at once a certain increase in armament to Germany.
- 6.
- I hope to be in a position to give you more concrete information on this subject on my arrival in Washington.
Text mailed Rome and Paris.
Wilson