Office of the Historian

500.A15A4 General Committee/693: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Germany (Dodd)51

Washington, December 11, 1933—1 p.m.

147. Your 198 December 9, 1 p.m. and 201 December 10, 4 p.m.

1.
I have talked over your two messages with the President. Although we know the general tenor of the suggestions put forward [Page 331] by Hitler and of the French reply, we do not have the exact details. Even the British position, as explained to you by Phipps and still more as interpreted to us by Lindsay is far from definite, and would not warrant a final expression of this Government’s views. While awaiting further developments from London, I submit for your guidance the following general considerations of our policy.
2.
We have told the French that we would not put pressure on them to make a decision on armaments against their better judgment especially those affecting Europe primarily as we were unwilling to assume responsibility in a risk which we would not share.
3.
Not only during the President’s talks with MacDonald,52 Herriot,53 and Schacht54 last spring, but subsequently at Geneva, we have taken a strong position against immediate rearmament by Germany.
4.
The present proposals resolve themselves into an attempt to adjust European armaments on an upward basis, contrary to the object for which we have participated in the Disarmament Conference.
5.
The problem under discussion is in its final essence a Franco-German one, with England playing both ends against the middle. We cannot offer to participate or play the role of honest broker between them outside the Disarmament Conference, as this would inevitably draw us into the general European political picture, (see the Davis statement of October 1655).
6.
The President and I are somewhat concerned over your references to the Far East. We assume, of course, that you did not convey the impression that our disarmament policy was dependent on the development of British policy in the Orient. In our view the two problems should be as far as possible disassociated.
7.
More specifically, we are particularly anxious to avoid any step which might give the appearance of endeavoring to isolate Japan. During the recent visit of Litvinoff and the discussions surrounding the recognition of the Soviet Government great care was exercised not to give the impression that recognition carried with it any thought of cooperation with Russia against Japan. We spoke only in general terms of mutual effort to maintain peace throughout the world.
8.
With respect to the still delicate Manchurian problem, please keep in mind two facts: (1) that we consider that treaties have been deliberately broken and (2) that there exists in Manchuria a de facto governmental organization. We do not feel that any move should be made by us toward either (1) condoning breaking of treaties or [Page 332] (2) bringing to bear upon Japan pressure suggestive of coercion in regard to the Manchurian situation.
9.
Please repeat your two telegrams and this reply to Amdelgat Geneva.
Phillips
  1. This telegram bears the following notation: “Approved by the President.”↩
  2. See memorandum of a conversation between President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister, p. 102.↩
  3. See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, April 26, p. 109.↩
  4. See telegram No. 98, May 8, 7 p.m., to the Ambassador in Great Britain, p. 130.↩
  5. See telegram No. 377, October 16, to the Chairman of the American delegation, p. 277.↩