500.C001/872
The Consul General at Berlin (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 20.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit the following comment on the action of the German Government in withdrawing from the League of Nations and from the Disarmament Conference, and on the elections to be held on November 12, 1933, in consequence of this action.
While the action of the German Government came as a surprise to the League and to the Disarmament Conference, it is I believe interesting and significant to note that it came as a surprise as well to the German people and even to most of those in the immediate entourage [Page 302] of the Chancellor, Mr. Hitler. The proceedings at the Disarmament Conference were watched with the greatest interest by a considerable part of the thinking people in Germany, as the recognition of so-called equality is undoubtedly something in which all thinking Germans are interested. This issue has been pushed into the foreground by the present Government as it knew that it would find a responsive echo in practically every German. The agitation which has been continuously carried on for months to stimulate interest in so-called air protection in Germany, and the very general feeling which has been aroused even among intelligent people that the country is being threatened by air attacks from every side and is defenseless against it, and the emphasis by the Government on the fact that France and certain other countries have not only increased their armaments but are planning to further increase them, have aroused a feeling of resentment and injustice, and one may say I believe with correctness that in this one question the German people are a unit, irrespective of what their attitude towards the present Government and the National-Socialist party may be. From my conversations I am of the opinion that the German people as a whole do not desire war and that, if the activities of the present Government have for their basis the desire to stimulate an offensive, warlike attitude of the German people, they have so far failed. On the other hand, if the Government has been deliberately planning its propaganda within the country in order to prepare the people for such action as the withdrawal from the League and the Disarmament Conference, it has been eminently successful. It was obvious, however, from the conversations which I have had during the past few months that the thinking people had great hopes that some form of recognition of equality would be arrived at with authorization to make some slight increases in the military equipment of the country.
What the leaders of the National-Socialist party and of the Government have actually had in mind, I am not in a position to say, but there is much reason to believe that among the inner groups of the party the question of withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference has been a live issue and in their minds as the most effective means of either forcing action in their favor by other countries, or of relieving Germany of any obligation which they may have, so as to enable the party and the Government to go ahead with the rearmanent of Germany. That there has been such pressure towards rearmament cannot be doubted, but it has come from a very small group within the party and there is much reason to believe that certain of the industrialists of the country have been urging such action in order to stimulate the groups of industry which they control.
From the information which is available, however, to me I do not believe it is likely that the German delegation went to Geneva [Page 303] with the object of withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference and the League. When the final impasse was reached at Geneva and the German delegation realized that it could not carry away from Geneva the satisfactory results which they hoped to get, the situation was still perhaps not entirely lost, but I am informed that it was the conversation which Sir John Simon had with Dr. Goebbels the afternoon of the departure of the latter, which really precipitated the crisis. In this conversation Sir John Simon is said to have informed Dr. Goebbels that under no circumstances could the British Government support any increase in armaments of Germany until it could feel satisfied that it could place greater confidence in the promises of the present German Government. It is said that Sir John made it clear to Dr. Goebbels that up to now the British Government could not approve of the acts of the Hitler regime and could not depend upon its assurances with respect to its will for peace, but that the British Government would have to await more favorable developments in the German situation. It seems that the conversation was very frank and direct and unequivocal on the part of Sir John, and that Dr. Goebbels himself said very little, but that he left the conversation furious with anger and resentment. He immediately determined to go to Berlin by plane although he distrusts air travel and avoids it whenever possible. I happened to have been on the Tempelhof field in Berlin awaiting the arrival of Senator McAdoo in the plane from Russia, and a few minutes before the arrival of his plane that of Dr. Goebbels arrived from Geneva. The usual crowd was gathered to meet him, but I was informed the next day by one of my National-Socialist friends who was there to meet him, that Dr. Goebbels was evidently in a very bad frame of mind and hardly paid any attention to his friends who were there to meet him, but immediately hurried to a conference with the Chancellor. I am informed by responsible persons that the decision to leave the League and the Disarmament Conference was arrived at already that evening in the conference between the Chancellor and Dr. Goebbels.
I believe that in order to appreciate the rapidity with which this decision was reached, one must not fail to consider the extraordinary mentality, fanaticism and precipitateness of both the Chancellor and Dr. Goebbels. Dr. Goebbels is more in accord with the Chancellor on the Jewish and certain other primary questions of the National-Socialist movement than any other of the primary leaders of the party. They are both exceedingly prejudiced and are capable of deep-seated animosities. Both of them are exceedingly narrow-minded and ignorant of real conditions in the rest of the world and of the mentalities of other peoples than the German. They are both inclined to be passionate and fanatic. It is unquestionable that Dr. Goebbels suffered keenly as a result of the conversation with Sir John [Page 304] Simon. Anyone who knows him realizes that it would be intolerable to him that a Jew should speak to him as Sir John is said to have done and should transmit to him the attitude of Great Britain. He would feel that the attitude on German equality was being determined by a Jew supported by what he chooses to call a world-wide movement of the Jews against Germany. As this question is also one on which the Chancellor feels exactly the same and has the same fundamental resentments and prejudices, it is understandable that Dr. Goebbels would find a willing ear. (While I am not personally aware whether Sir John is a Jew or not, he has been constantly referred to as such by the controlled press in Germany, and on the basis of conversations which I have had with people in the Government and in the party, I take it that he is obviously considered by them as such.) I am not able to vouch for the entire correctness of the statement, but as I have already said I am reliably informed that the decision to leave the League was formed the same evening of the arrival of Dr. Goebbels from Geneva. The actual conversations with Mr. von Neurath, the Foreign Minister, did not take place until the following day.
As an interesting sidelight on this decision I may mention that I have been informed by a most reliable source that when the Italian Ambassador here called on the Chancellor to convey a message on behalf of Mussolini, the interview was on the part of the Chancellor a stormy and extraordinary one. It seems that the precipitate departure of Dr. Goebbels from Geneva disturbed the Italian delegation which knew what advice Dr. Goebbels was going to give to the Chancellor. Immediately, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin was instructed by Mussolini to call on Hitler and to state that the German action in leaving the League and the Disarmament Conference would be looked upon with the greatest regret and concern by the Italian Government. It seems that Hitler immediately became furious and reproached the Italian Ambassador that Mussolini was deserting him, that he was jealous because fascism had never had world influence and that National-Socialism was the real fascism which was having an influence throughout the world. He is said to have alternately wept and shouted during the interview, and the Italian Ambassador when he left the room is said to have declared to the people in the anteroom: “Children, I don’t know whether you know it, but your chief is unbalanced.” I do not have this story directly from the Italian Ambassador, but I have it from a practically first hand and unimpeachable source. I have only recited it to indicate that there is much reason to believe that the decision to leave the League and the Disarmament Conference was made on the basis of prejudices and in the heat of anger and resentment.
[Page 305]In this connection it is further interesting to note that several days after the decision had been announced, one of my friends who is important in the party councils asked me what my reaction was over Germany’s action. I told him that an official reaction I could not give him because I did not know the attitude of my Government and had no authority to speak for it and that my personal reaction was not worth anything. He insisted on having my personal reaction; so I told him that in my opinion it was very unwise for them to leave the League and that the action in leaving the Disarmament Conference was taken much too hurriedly and precipitately, and apparently at a time when those who made it were not in a position to reflect. To this my friend replied: “But the Chancellor had every reason to be angry and upset.” To this I replied that it was all none of my concern, but that I would view it a grave danger to my own country if decisions of such great moment were made by our chief of state in the heat of passion, and that it did not seem desirable that decisions affecting so seriously the future of sixty-five millions of people should be made so quickly. To this my friend could reply in no other way than by saying that Hitler had had a right to be angry. To those in the entourage of the Chancellor anything which he does is right.
The declaration of the withdrawal, however it may have been arrived at, was met with popular approval. If Dr. Goebbels persuaded the Chancellor to take this action without due consideration, he has certainly also assisted him in putting the action before the German people in a way so as to arouse practically unanimous approval. I have not heard a single German, even among those who are directly opposed to the National-Socialist party, who does not approve of the action of the Government. The way had already been carefully prepared for such action, and the proclamation of the Government and the first appeal of the Chancellor which appeared in the papers of October 14, showed the clever head of Dr. Goebbels and assured from the outset popular approval. Simultaneously with the publication of the German action appeared articles derogatory of Sir John Simon and attacking him in various ways. It is understood that Dr. Goebbels had issued instructions that Simon was to be attacked, but that England was to be treated gently. The instructions to attack Simon were very quickly recalled by the Propaganda Ministry. I mention this as it has an interesting bearing on the assumed fact, and apparently tends to substantiate that Goebbels was largely influenced in his action by personal resentment against Sir John. Dr. Goebbels is a great exponent of “the truth” and speaks always loudly and long about it, but it is the one thing which he cannot bear to have told to him.
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[Page 306]The question as to the action which Germany will take in actually increasing its armaments as a result of the November 12 elections, is one which I hope to be able to cover in another despatch in the near future.
Respectfully yours,
- The omitted portion of the despatch referred to the forthcoming elections of November 12.↩