500.A15A4/2291: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 28—3 p.m.]
768. For the President and the Secretary. While there has been an overwhelming opinion that the Conference should continue, there is not yet a unity of opinion as to what the Conference should attempt to do. Some, including France, would like to write a convention modifying the British draft to conform to the French thesis of two periods of 4 years each and agree to accept this conditional upon Germany’s adherence. Others, including Italy and now perhaps the British Government, are opposed to committing themselves definitely to something which they know Germany will not accept without modification. There is apparently a growing feeling, particularly on the part of the British, that an agreement is possible in spite of the difficulties that have arisen but that it would be a mistake to push too fast or to adopt a dried and cut program until they can see their way more clearly.
I invite attention to the fact that Henderson has repeatedly emphasized that the work must follow the lines of the British draft. He has adopted this course because the British draft has been accepted as the basis of the convention by all parties including Germany. Therefore, there should be nothing provocative to Germany in following this path. Furthermore, if something is eventually worked out and we start again negotiating with Germany, a certain limit of sacrifices to be demanded of the armed powers has already been established by the fact that Germany could again accept the British draft as the basis for a treaty. Henderson, furthermore, thinks it would be a mistake [Page 301] now to attempt to prepare a compromise plan with a view of meeting Germany’s wishes because this would be construed by Germany as weakness and cause her to increase her demands. This, of course, does not exclude the necessity for keeping the German position in mind in all the moves made to advance the work. It is felt that as long as the Conference is at work seeking a solution in a way that is not provocative to Germany it will lessen the risk of Germany repudiating the Treaty of Versailles with its attendant consequences.
While certain elements in France and in the French Government may still harbor the hope of preparing with the approval of the British, Italians and also the United States, in spite of our clearly expressed attitude, something to present to Germany as a take it or leave it proposition which would involve the probability of coercive measures in case of Germany’s rejection, I am told that French public opinion is apparently turning more against any military adventure. Time alone can determine which of the two conflicting trends will prevail.
While we can probably tell better after the next meeting of the Bureau the probabilities are that for several weeks to come such work as the Bureau will do will be similar to that done by the Bureau last autumn in which case my own presence would be unnecessary and perhaps from a strategic point of view inadvisable. Thus, if the major decisions have been taken, and I should reach the conclusion that this type of work will continue for some time, I shall consult you as to the advisability of returning home for consultation.