500.A15A4/2258: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 20—3:20 p.m.]
175. Department’s 131, October 17, 7 p.m. For at least the last month there have been cumulative signs of increasing dissension in the upper strata of the Nazi Party over and above the ever present problem of keeping the turbulent rank and file in order. While I do not suggest that this was the primary cause of Germany leaving Geneva, I think that it may well have been a strong contributory cause to the decision of last Friday which, however, long beforehand the German leaders may have been preparing. This step seems finally to have been reached in a distinctly impetuous frame of mind. There are now signs that the Germans appear almost disappointed that their abrupt and challenging action has not aroused more direct repercussion abroad.
This is perhaps especially evident in the case of France: Daladier’s cautious speech during the budget debate in the Chamber has left [Page 292] the Germans somewhat discomfited and they are, I believe, hoping that he may dignify Hitler’s advances by a more extended discussion of them in the forthcoming Chamber debate on foreign affairs.
Altogether then I think that Germany realizes that that part of her maneuver which she hoped would operate to create discussion among the other principal powers engaged in the Geneva negotiations has fallen rather flat.
Incidentally the role of Italy is somewhat obscure to me from here though I should report that the Italian Ambassador professes to have been entirely surprised by the German action.
Altogether, if I diagnose correctly the German psychology, this step was largely motivated by a subconscious desire on the part of the Germans to assert themselves in the sense of drawing more attention upon themselves nationally speaking; and as I indicated above there would appear to be some realization now that this has not worked out just as desired. I should be inclined to conclude further that as a result there will be a disposition to go slowly in the immediate future in spite of the flood of oratory for internal consumption and exploitation of the situation which will inevitably be loosed between now and the intrinsically artificial election and referendum of November 12th. This does not mean, however, that the German leaders are more ready than heretofore to admit the incompatibility between their speeches for foreign consumption and the definitely militaristic spirit sedulously inculcated within Germany by the present regime.
Finally I should record my belief that the mass of German opinion is with the Government.
Please see despatches 21111 and 215 of October 17 and 218 of October 18 going forward in pouch by S. S. Bremen.
Code text mailed to London, Paris, Rome, Geneva.
- Not printed.↩