500.A15A4/2253: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 19—7:47 p.m.]
758. 1. The impression seems to be solidifying that it is essential to keep the Conference going in some form or other. A continuance of the Conference and the solidarity of effort to find a solution of the disarmament question will act as a deterrent to more drastic action and will give time for realization of the grave consequences of failure to get an agreement. While it is agreed, as you indicated, that an attempt to reopen negotiations with Germany before the elections8 would be premature, it is felt that a structure should exist into which Germany may return if she should desire to resume her participation in the disarmament work. Furthermore, even though Germany has gone out of the Conference Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria remain and deserve consideration. While Germany’s action has made the task more difficult it brings the situation more to a head and will force those powers which had never been completely converted to the wisdom of a genuine program for disarmament to decide upon such a program or face the alternative.
2. A number of people still feel that the Conference should carry on as before and elaborate a detailed convention. Another course has been suggested to the effect that at its next meeting on October 26 the General Commission should set up a committee or instruct the Bureau to bring British draft up to date in the light of the negotiations which [Page 290] have been carried on and of the report to the Bureau; that the Bureau itself should be called together at some date in the latter part of November to receive a report from this committee and then decide when to fix a date for the next meeting of the General Commission. This plan would have the advantage of avoiding public sessions in which declarations would probably be made which would still further embitter the situation and at the same time offers a basis which is more adaptable perhaps for negotiations than would be the adoption of the Simon report9 as a basis. Such a committee would be acting strictly within the Disarmament Conference. It is not anticipated that the work of such a committee could in itself bring Germany back but perhaps it might work out something which would be more palatable to Germany than Germany now believes would be offered her in the present state of mind of France and England. It also carries on the continuity of the Conference.
3. In thinking back over the past few weeks we are convinced that there was more promise of agreement than there had ever been in any stage of the Conference before and that this promise was not fulfilled because public opinion was so fixed that it was extremely difficult really to negotiate. The passage of time and the growing realization of the gravity of the situation may enable us to approach this matter from a more technical side and perhaps to frame a document which, while it does not surrender in essentials, would place the things which are distasteful for Germany on a basis of technical practicalities. We might thus make a by-pass around the difficulties of principles while realizing the principles through the technical application of disarmament.
4. The key of the position would seem to lie in Great Britain because France will be conciliatory or firm depending on the policy of England. As you know, there is in the British Cabinet a decided difference of opinion. A group led by Baldwin is convinced that with the present German Government it is unwise to make concessions and that Great Britain must stand shoulder to shoulder with France and if necessary see to the rigid application of the Treaty of Versailles. They feel that in 1914 they did not act fast enough and that the mistake must not be repeated. MacDonald, on the other hand, is more inclined to negotiate with Germany and believes that the working out of an agreement with Germany would in itself diminish the strained relations between that country and France and England. Simon, who arrived in Geneva a firm believer in Baldwin’s policies, seemed to me to change his ideas quite radically during his stay here, and now approaches MacDonald’s ideas. The British Cabinet must naturally [Page 291] decide what course they are to follow but, in the event that increasing uneasiness of the present situation causes MacDonald’s views to prevail, it is possible that they may shortly be ready to take positive steps to bring about a resumption of the work.
5. I have been considering whether, if this evolution takes place in British public opinion and Cabinet, it might not be possible for the British and ourselves to work out alterations of the draft project in such a way that we could lay it before both France and Germany. Simon suggested we might consider that eventuality. I realize it could not, of course, be done in the form of a general agreement submitted to Germany but might be done as a sort of mediation between the two. I realize clearly the difficulty of urging France to change its attitude in the obscurity of the present European situation, but the situation might arise in which the French Government would turn with relief to a document which left their overwhelming military superiority intact and yet at the same time surrendered those points which Germany has considered humiliating to it.
6. Effort toward realization of such a project is premature since there must be a considerable change in public opinion in both England and France before the effort could be fruitful. But the apprehensive and sober state of mind of their representatives here is an indication that they may eventually feel constrained to make a further effort to negotiate an agreement with Germany.