500.A15A4/2289
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat)
The German Ambassador came to see me this morning after leaving the Secretary’s office. He said that he wished to recount his conversation with the Secretary, partly because he knew my interest in disarmament, and partly because of the dinner I had arranged for him to meet Norman Davis when the latter was here a month ago.
He said that he was completely unable to comprehend the reaction of the world to the latest German disarmament proposals. That they should be badly received in France and certain other countries which were only doing lip service to disarmament, he could readily understand, but that they should receive a bad press in other countries which genuinely desired success in disarmament, notably the United States, was to him a matter surpassing understanding.
He wished to say to begin with that if the Disarmament Conference failed, its repercussions on the Continent of Europe would be so staggering that their effects would be felt in this country where they would seriously cripple our recovery program.
He had no need to go into the details of the German position; the Secretary and myself were both familiar with these details not only from Mr. Davis’ telegram but also from the talk which Mr. Meyer had had with me Saturday morning. What he wanted to say was that they represented nothing new: they were a re-statement of the position which the Germans had been maintaining for years and that they were designed to force the Allies in to some definite gesture of disarmament. The French plan for disarmament was a thinly veiled [Page 244] disguise. It endeavored to set up for Germany a “trial period” at the end of which France might consent to disarm. What did this mean when analyzed? It meant that France would succeed in reestablishing the control over Germany which had been abolished and it did not commit France to do any further disarming than she has agreed to do by the Treaty of Versailles.
Germany could never consent to sign a treaty which did not produce actual disarmament. I suggested that the French had gone further and made more definite commitments than ever before, but he brushed these aside as mere words.
I then said that frankly we were unable to accept the German thesis of rearmament, in no matter how modified a form. He said he was aware of this philosophic conception and that in theory it would be better to have only disarmament downward on the part of heavily armed Powers. But in practice the others were not coming down and Germany must go up to meet them in order to be able to satisfy its own public opinion. I suggested that it would be extremely difficult for Germany to explain this while the other Powers were actually making a greater effort to go down than ever before. The Ambassador then told me that the Secretary had asked whether the Germans were still guided by the declaration of December 11. At first he was unable to understand the import of the Secretary’s question, the answer seemed so clear. Finally it dawned on him that the Secretary felt that the Germans were not paying enough attention to the demand of the other Powers for “security”. This to him was as incomprehensible as American reaction as exemplified by the press. He asked how Germany disarmed and living in the midst of heavily armed nations could possibly be a menace to their security. He said that the Secretary had shown him a number of newspaper clippings of alleged provocative German activities. This did no# seem fair, he said, as when Polish chauvinists indulged in the same type of activities, it received no adverse comment abroad. The whole history of the past 14 years was one succession of episodes showing that Germany was not a threat to her neighbors. He himself had for years believed in the possibility of a Franco-German rapprochement. He had signed the Locarno Pact, but that Pact had brought with it no results. He believed that Briand was sincere but that his efforts were always checkmated by the French General Staff.
I did not feel it my place to argue the Ambassador’s points. I merely said that I agreed with him as to the extremely critical phase of the negotiations mentioned; that our information from Mr. Davis was now some 48 hours overdue and that the situation was so fluid that it was difficult to know where it was at the moment. It seemed [Page 245] that the critical week had at last arrived and I could only hope with him that an agreement embodying “real disarmament” would ensue.