500.A15A4/2165
The American Delegate ( Wilson ) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received July 11.]
Sir: Referring to previous correspondence on the subject of the attitude of the Japanese Government respecting disarmament, I have the honor to report the following conversation which I had this morning with Mr. Naotake Sato, chief of the Japanese Delegation to the Disarmament Conference.
Mr. Sato asked to see me this morning and after discussing matters of procedure which the Bureau was shortly to take up, informed me that he had recently been in London to consider matters with Viscount Ishii90 and Ambassador Matsudaira. He had taken the occasion to explain to Mr. Aghnides, Chief of the Disarmament Section of the League of Nations, and to Captain Anthony Eden, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and acting head of the British Delegation here, certain difficulties which the Japanese Delegation are experiencing.
The Japanese feel that the problem of disarmament ought to be treated regionally; that it is impossible to harmonize their needs, which arise from their conditions, to the needs of Continental Europe, which seems to be the sole basis for the consideration of every problem. For instance, the Japanese could not accept any limit below 155 mm. for guns, since, if they took the British Plan, the Russians, who already have an enormous quantity of 155s would have equipment of much heavier metal. Further, they would have to insist on twenty tons for tanks.
Concerning their point of view on the Navy, Sato did not enter into details, as he assumed that I was already familiar with it.
The new and important point that he brought up was, in my opinion, that Japan could not have anything to do with Part I, Security, as it now stands. Sato explained that they had just gone through a very unfortunate experience because of their obligation to consult and that colloquially speaking they were having no more. Japan would not accept an obligation which would bring about the risk of a repetition of its experience in leaving the League of Nations. In the happy event that they could iron out their difficulties in the Far East91 in the near future (incidentally, they hope to do so with Russia through the sale of the Chinese-Eastern) they might be able to take such an obligation. But at present they would certainly have to refuse to sign such a convention.
[Page 201]I told him that it was a heavy responsibility for them to undertake. That however desirable a regional treatment was, and in many respects I had great sympathy for the regional idea, nevertheless, on the matter of artillery calibers, for instance, Russia faced on both fronts and it would seem as if a universal standard was essential. Otherwise, I saw no way of solving the problem of the relations between Russia and the States of eastern Europe. As far as the Security part went, I did not think for a minute that the French would accept a treaty where the security was in a separate instrument which Japan would not sign. Perhaps the only thing to consider, therefore, was whether, if the Continental difficulties could be ironed out, we should not go ahead and write a treaty, leaving it open for signature by Japan, in the hopes that the passage of the next few months would alter their point of view.
I asked him whether he did not think it advisable to inform Henderson of his views, since the President had been charged with the task of trying to harmonize the various points of view and certainly should know of any position as important as the one which Sato had just outlined.
Respectfully yours,
- Japanese Privy Councilor, delegate to the London Economic Conference.↩
- For correspondence relating to the Far Eastern question, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.↩