817.1051/459
The President of Nicaragua ( Moncada ) to the Secretary of State 31
[Received November 13.]
My Dear G[ene]ral Stimson: Your message relating to the reduction of the Guardia was delivered to me on November 6, 1930.32 A very careful study of your message leads me to believe that at the time you sent this communication you had not received all the pertinent information relating to the subject under discussion.
In order to clarify this matter I desire to make a résumé of my actions and ideas regarding the Guardia and the existing conditions and facts on which my actions and ideas are based.
The agreement for the establishment and the organization of the Guardia provided for a total appropriation of $68,932.00. In April 1929 the Congress allotted $720,000.00 for the maintenance of the Guardia and made an additional appropriation of $40,000 to cover the expenses of the prisons and penitentiaries. Shortly thereafter the country being in a prosperous condition, I, in my desire to exterminate organized banditry in Nicaragua, informed the Jefe Director that I would allow him an additional $340,000.00 for the maintenance of the Guardia. And some six months ago the Jefe Director advised me that with a temporary increase of two hundred Guardia he believed that within six months organized banditry would be exterminated. I authorized this increase and furnished the necessary funds but at that time I informed the Jefe Director that the economic outlook was bad, that Nicaragua could not continue to support a million dollars Guardia and that the size and cost of the Guardia must be reduced. Since that time I have on several occasions told the Jefe Director and your Minister that the growing economic depression had so seriously affected the finances of my country that plans must be made to manage the Guardia on an annual allotment of $800,000.00.
And recently I have advised your Minister that the maintenance of the Guardia must not exceed that figure, that furthermore, I believed that such an appropriation would under most careful administration permit a Guardia of at least 1,700 men with a corresponding number of officers, and, that with a Guardia of that size peace and order could be secured in those parts of the country most vital to its welfare.
In my letter to your Minister I suggested that a reduction of three hundred men in the Guardia could be effected by abandoning some 60 [Page 680] posts garrisoned by from one to five men and some 12 posts garrisoned by from 6 to 9 men. This would release approximately 300 men. As a military man it has been and it still is my belief that posts of such small size are of no real military value and that the cost of maintaining small outposts is exceedingly expensive. Furthermore, I suggested that the pay of officers in the Guardia could be temporarily reduced twenty per cent, which would I believe effect a saving of about $42,000.00 on a basis of 1,700 men. Incidentally, for the past few months the pay of all employees of my government has been reduced twenty per cent because of the shrinkage in our national income. In fact the officers of the Guardia constitute the only group of government employees whose salaries have not been reduced as I have indicated. To me and my people this last suggestion of reducing the expenses of the Guardia is a just one. Undoubtedly, other saving can be effected by revising and carefully supervising the expenses of the Guardia.
Referring to your message, I understand very well that “the primary duty of any Government is to maintain law and order. Unless this is done no Government can stand. The situation in Nueva Segovia, Jinotega and Estelí is the big problem now facing the Nicaraguan Government. This situation must be met by the Nicaraguan Government and all possible resources of the Government devoted to its solution. This is the first and paramount duty and obligation of the Government.”
My dear Mr. Secretary, my Government has met this grave problem with the greater part of the resources of the Republic and has given all the authority in the Republic to the commanding officers of the Marines and of the Guardia Nacional and yet banditry has not been exterminated during the two years of my administration. Which is to say, that the problem is still acute despite the efforts of 2,200 Guardias aided first in 1929 by no less than three thousand Marines, and afterwards, in this year of 1930 by approximately 1,500 Marines in the first six months and by about 750 during the last few months.
All of this leads me to believe that the problem of banditry in Nicaragua cannot be solved by following the methods of what might be termed scientific warfare but that bandolerism[o] must be met by the use of patrols in the field that can operate as freely and actively as those of the bandits.
And in consequence I am of the firm opinion that banditry cannot be stamped out of Nicaragua with a Guardia of less than five thousand men. To support a Guardia of that size is of course out of the question and the only alternative is to maintain a Guardia of sufficient size to protect all vital points and to then use all available funds to educate my people, thru schools and by building roads, to desire and to follow the pursuits of peace. The latter I have been and am [Page 681] doing and the results of the recent elections are tangible evidence of the success I have met in that direction.
And at this time I desire to observe that the efficiency of an army depends not only upon the number of men composing it but also upon the qualities of the chiefs of the army and their activity and desire to accept and assume responsibility.
I am able to prove and I have demonstrated many times to the Jefe Director of the Guardia, General McDougal, the error he has committed in stationing in exposed places small groups of Guardia of ten men. Such detachments are inevitably the victims of the bandits. Even as I write this message, word has been received that a garrison cuartel has been burned and that probably five Guardia have been killed by the bandits. I have repeatedly told General McDougal that he should locate his principal detachments at strategic points and use them as a base from which active patrolling could be done.
Even though the Guardia has cost two million of dollars during the last two years, my Government would gladly continue to give one million of dollars for the coming year if the national income permitted it, but my Government has not the necessary funds. And now, at every moment I fear that my government will be obliged to say to the Guardia that there is no money, and in that moment the disaster will be greater than that feared by you in reducing the Guardia some three hundred men.
You have suggested to me some means by which money may be obtained for the Guardia. One of them I consider practical, that regarding the formation of local police supported by the municipalities.
This scheme was proposed by me more than a year ago but the idea was not accepted by the Department of State, by Señor Minister Hanna or by General McDougal. Finally after much persuasion, the Jefe Director a few months ago agreed to the formation of municipal police in Managua and to test its possibilities. Because of this opposition and because in the last Congress my Government did not have the requisite majority, no law pertaining to this matter was presented. However, at the opening of the coming Congress on the first of December such a law will be presented. But it will probably take six months to pass this law, to reproportion the municipal budgets and to provide for an efficient collection of taxes within the municipalities. But during these months the resources of my country will not warrant the maintenance of a million dollar Guardia.
Along this same line of thought, I would invite your attention to the fact that during the recent electoral period33 at the request of the President of the Electoral Mission, the Jueces de Mestas and Jefes de Cantones, who constitute a group of about five thousand men have [Page 682] worked under the orders and supervision of the Guardia and I am of the opinion that these officials can be so organized that they will be of valuable assistance to the Guardia in maintaining peace and order.
As you doubtless know the Jueces de Mestas and Jefes de Cantones perform work similar to that of deputy sheriffs in your country and for almost a year I have urged the Jefe Director to permit this group to operate under the control of the Guardia. These men are scattered thruout the country and can and will prove of great assistance to Guardia in securing information and in making arrests in sections of the country where there are no Guardia and where such arrests would otherwise only be made by sending out a Guardia patrol to effect the capture, which procedure is unnecessarily expensive.
Furthermore, if an emergency should arise requiring the repression of any undue disorder by the use of force I can place under the direction of the Guardia one or more groups of volunteers whose employment will cost the government much less than a corresponding number of Guardia.
Also you have suggested to me that I “give explicit and irrevocable instructions to the Collector General of Customs to segregate during each month as a first charge on the customs revenues after paying the expenses of the collectorship and service of debt sufficient funds so that he can pay directly to the Chief of the Guardia on the first of each month the full amount necessary for the expenses during the ensuing month of the Guardia at a strength of 2,000 men.”
I have already requested the Department of State to authorize the Collector General of Customs to retain in this country for use by this Government all funds collected in excess of the required annual payment of $400,000.00 to the bond holders. In the past all monies collected from certain specified sources in excess of the $300,000.00 has been distributed among the bond holders. The Department of State has as yet not acceded to this just request.
At the present time the Customs are collecting approximately one hundred thousand dollars monthly which is more or less seventy thousand dollars less than was collected in the corresponding months of the preceding year: which is to say that the customs collections barely provide for the pay of government employees, public schools, maintenance of roads, etc.
If we do not pay these employees, bandolerism[o] will enter the very heart of the Republic and will not be confined solely to Jinotega, Estelí and Nueva Segovia.
If we suspend the small public works that are now being undertaken, those without work will precipitate the Republic into a grave disaster.
If Nicaragua is forced to continue at this time to support a million dollar Guardia it would mean the temporary suspension of public [Page 683] instruction and the temporary conclusion of all road building which would create a most aggravated unemployment problem and would cause untold discontent and unrest among my people. I do not feel that I could accept the responsibility for the creation of such a situation when I am firmly convinced that a Guardia composed of seventeen hundred men could thru this period of financial depression protect the vital interests of my country and that a Guardia of such a strength can be maintained on an annual appropriation of $800,000.00.
The problem is indeed grave and should be solved by viewing it from all sides and with a complete and full spirit of cooperation and friendship on the part of the American Government, the Honorable Señor Stimson and the Nicaraguan Government.
I earnestly urge and beseech that the fullest thought be given this serious question in order that it may be solved to the present and future satisfaction of all concerned.
I am [etc.]
- In his telegram No. 149, November 8, 11 a.m. (not printed), the American Minister in Nicaragua reported: “I delivered your message concerning reduction of the Guardia on November 6 and at President Moncada’s request I am forwarding his reply by air mail tonight” (817.51/2196.)↩
- Supra. ↩
- See pp. 636 ff.↩